On Rehearing
Plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing is largely a reargument of the points in their original brief. They again assert that although the accident occurred in Wisconsin, defendant’s claim for contribution under Wisconsin law should be dismissed as opposed to our public policy because Illinois follows the common law rule denying contribution to joint tort-feasors. Nevertheless they urge that we should apply the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act (Wis Stats 331.045), although Illinois follows the common law rule in denying recovery to plaintiffs who are in any degree contributorily negligent; and they argue that the application of the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence law is discharged by reading the text of the Wisconsin statute to the jury, unaccompanied by the special interrogatories made mandatory in Wisconsin.
It is true that in Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 25 Ill App2d 429, 166 NE2d 316 (1960), we said that the Wisconsin statute relating to joint tort-feasors is opposed to our public policy. We also held that the action was properly dismissed under the provision of our Practice Act which prevents direct actions against liability insurers. On reconsideration of that case, and in the light of authorities not heretofore cited in this proceeding or in the Mutual Service case, it seems clear that to create a public policy barrier to the enforcement of a foreign law, more is required than a mere difference between the law of the forum and that of the sister state. Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal2d 108, 109 P2d 701 (1941). Nor does dissimilarity of legislation prove that the public policy of the forum is offended by the foreign law. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 NY 99, 120 NE 198 (1918). As there stated by Judge Cardozo (p 202): “The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit the individual notion of expediency or fairness. They do not close their doors, unless help would violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.” Thus, a gambling obligation which arose in one state has been denied enforcement in another state when the law of the forum showed a deep repugnance to gambling. Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn 51, 54 A2d 669 (1947). Simply because a right of action created by a foreign statute does not exist here will not necessarily render enforcement of that right repugnant to good morals or natural justice or prejudicial to the best interest of our people. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Rouse, 178 Ill 132, 52 NE 951 (1899). In the case before us, no deep repugnance between the law of Illinois and that of Wisconsin has been shown. Public policy is no barrier to the action here.
The anomalous position taken by plaintiffs illustrates the difficulties inherent in a broad application of the public policy concept in conflict of laws cases. Plaintiffs ask us to declare unenforceable as against our public policy the Wisconsin statute which permits contribution among tort-feasors; at the time they seek enforcement of another Wisconsin statute which is no less contrary to our law than is the law of contribution. • Clearly we could not sustain plaintiffs’ position with respect to contribution without also holding that the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence law is opposed to our public policy, because our law denies recovery to the eontributorily negligent plaintiff. We are in effect asked to hold that any foreign substantive law which differs from our own is unenforceable here for reasons of public policy.
It has frequently been held that contribution between joint tort-feasors is a right arising under the substantive law of the states. Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F2d 967 (3d Cir 1950), affd United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 71 Sup Ct 399 (1951); Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 174 F2d 788 (5th Cir 1949). Therefore “if there is a right of contribution, it must stem from the law of the state where the tort was committed.” North Dakota v. Przybylski, 98 F Supp 21, 22 (DC Minn 1951). Thus, in Charnock v. Taylor, 223 NC 360, 26 SE2d 911 (1943), contribution was refused because no such right existed in Tennessee where the accident occurred, even though the forum, North Carolina, recognized the right. Consistent with the above authorities, the Maryland court in Steger v. Ekyud, 219 Md 331, 149 A2d 762 (1959), permitted contribution between joint tort-feasors, since this right was recognized by New Jersey, the place of the injury. Accordingly we conclude that the right of contribution as existing in Wisconsin is the law of this case.
As to other matters urged in the petition for rehearing, we reaffirm our former opinion. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.