(dissenting) — Serving warrants is an official police duty. CrR 2.2(c), (d). If a warrant is reasonably believed to be outstanding, it is reasonable to investigate. Here, the officer stated he had knowledge of a recently issued arrest warrant for Mr. Barnes, but did not know if the warrant had been cleared. No dispute exists that a warrant had been issued within the previous two weeks or that after arrest it checked clear. However, Mr. Barnes was not seized to investigate for a suspected warrant.
The trial court found on disputed facts that the initial encounter was voluntary; thus it was not a seizure. This is a trial court function. The record contains facts supporting the trial court’s decision. The officer asked Mr. Barnes if he “would be willing to stick around while I check on it” or “would you mind.” Thus, our review is limited to deciding whether the law has been correctly applied to the facts as found by the trial court. See State v. Thorn, 129 Wn.2d 347, 350-51, 917 P.2d 108 (1996) (question of seizure is mixed question of law and fact).
*226The officer stated he became concerned for his safety during this voluntary encounter when Mr. Barnes refused to remove his hands from his pockets while fidgeting. These are specific and articulable facts similar to the situations found in City of Seattle v. Hall, 60 Wn. App. 645, 806 F.2d 1246 (1991); State v. Nettles, 70 Wn. App. 706, 708, 855 F.2d 699 (1993) (cited with approval in Thorn, 129 Wn.2d at 352), review denied, 123 Wn.2d 1010 (1994).
A protective search or frisk is a police function allowed under these circumstances if the initial encounter is (1) legitimate, (2) the officer has a legitimate safety concern based on specific and articulable facts that a weapon may be present, and (3) the frisk is limited to the protective purpose. State v. Collins, 121 Wn.2d 168, 173, 847 F.2d 919 (1993). First, the trial court determined the encounter was legitimate because it was voluntary. Second, Mr. Barnes admits he refused to take his hands out of his pockets, thus supporting the officer’s stated specific and articulable facts. Third, the purpose of the limited protective search was to learn whether the pockets contained weapons.
Mr. Barnes was arrested based on probable cause that he obstructed an official police function. That the initial charge underlying the arrest was obstructing, assault or any other possible connected offense is not important. Neither is the failure to prosecute the arresting charge important. It matters not that the warrant was stale or current. These considerations are irrelevant under these facts so long as probable cause existed to arrest.
Mr. Barnes has not shown his consent to the initial voluntary encounter was revoked or vitiated by any prior illegality on the part of the police. To decide otherwise is to re-decide the facts and intrude into trial court functions that we may not do. Because a protective search is a recognized police function that protects police and others, I would hold the contraband was seized incident to a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable cause.
*227Accordingly, I would affirm. Necessarily, I respectfully dissent.