On Petition for Rehearing
Achor, J.Appellant, in support of his petition for rehearing, asserts that the opinion and decision of this court in the above entitled cause is in error in the following respects [See: Spires v. State (1962), 244 *85Ind. 82, 189 N. E. 2d 413]: That the statute upon which the court based its decision is unconstitutional. The statute involved reads as follows:
“No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding for writ of error coram nobis in which the defendant alleges matters or issues which have been or might have been adjudicated in a prior proceeding for writ of error coram nobis brought by the defendant, and a writ of prohibition shall issue to prevent any such court from so assuming jurisdiction.” Acts 1947, ch. 189, §2, p. 625, being §9-3302, Burns’ 1956 Repl.
Appellant alleges that the above statute is in violation of Art. 1, §12 of the Constitution of Indiana, and in violation of §1 of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, being the due process clauses thereof. In support of this contention, appellant cites the fact that this court has already declared §1 of ch. 189, Acts 1947 unconstitutional in State ex rel. McManamon v. Blackford Circuit Court (1950), 229 Ind. 3, 95 N. E. 2d 556, wherein this court held that the time limit in which to bring such an action was an improper limitation, the limit being five years after judgment was entered. Appellant asserts that, for the same reason, the limitation on the number of actions which a defendant might bring, as provided in §2 of ch. 189, supra, is unconstitutional, being in violation of the due process clauses, supra.
It is tó be noted that the opinion of State ex rel. McManamon, supra, relied upon by appellant, overruled two previous decisions written by the same judge, in the cases of Pembleton v. McManaman (1949), 227 Ind. 194, 84 N. E. 2d 889, and State ex rel. Hunter v. Murray (1950), 228 Ind. 93, 89 N. E. 2d 539.
*86Without approving the reasoning employed in the McManamon case, supra, it must be observed that the circumstances involved in that case and in the case at bar are clearly distinguishable. In effect, the Mc-Manamon case merely held that appellant was entitled to his day in court, under conditions guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions and that, in the absence of such a day in court, he could, at any time thereafter, upon being appraised of his denial of a constitutional right, challenge the validity of the judgment rendered against him by a proceeding in error coram nobis, which subsequent action might be characterized as his second day in court. However, with respect to issues which he might previously have asserted, the opinion does not purport to thereafter grant a defendant yet a third and subsequent days in court in ad infinitum.
Except and unless the courts reaffirm and adhere to the doctrine of res judicata, there is no finality and, therefore, no stability in our judicial system to litigation, which is necessary to the rule of law. as established over many centuries.
Under the doctrine of res judicata all issues, which were or might have been presented in the prior proceedings, are considered to have been adjudicated.
Petition for rehearing is denied.
Myers, C. J., not participating; Jackson, J., votes to grant rehearing.
Note. — Reported in 189 N. E. 2d 413. Rehearing denied 190 N. E. 2d 653.