dissenting:
The majority’s decision that the Secretary of State (Secretary) has standing to appeal a trial court’s granting of a judicial driving permit (JDP) is based upon the majority’s conclusion that under section 6 — 206.1(B) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 206.1(B)), the Secretary plays a substantial part in JDP proceedings. (129 Ill. 2d at 99-100.) Because I believe that the majority’s reading of the statute assigns a far greater role to the Secretary in JDP proceedings than the General Assembly intended, I must respectfully dissent.
Section 6 — 206.1(B) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides:
“(a) *** The [circuit] court may issue a court order, pursuant to the criteria contained in this Section, directing the Secretary of State to issue *** a JDP to the petitioner. ***
* * *
(d) The Secretary of State shall, upon receiving a court order from the court of venue, issue a JDP to a successful Petitioner under this Section. Such court order form shall also contain a notification, which shall be sent to the Secretary of State, providing the name, driver’s license number and legal address of the successful petitioner, and the full and detailed description of the limitations of the JDP. ***
Any submitted court order that contains insufficient data or fails to comply with this Code shall not be utilized for JDP issuance or entered to the driver record but shall be returned [by the Secretary] to the issuing court indicating why the JDP cannot be so entered.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6-206.1(B).
The majority reads this language as giving the Secretary broad powers and a significant role in JDP proceedings. According to the majority, the statute creates a two-step JDP proceeding:
“In the first phase of the hardship proceeding, the driver petitions the circuit court for a JDP. During this stage, the State’s Attorney, if he chooses, may participate. If the court grants the petition, an order is entered for the JDP. After the order is entered, the litigation in court is terminated between the petitioner and the State’s Attorney. In the second phase, the matter proceeds to the Secretary, who reviews the court order and returns it to the court if it is found improper. The court may accede to the Secretary’s position or resubmit the order. If it is resubmitted, the Secretary may ignore the order and risk being held in contempt, or an appeal may be taken. Thus, the statute contemplates a separate proceeding in which the Secretary is intricately involved, not unlike that present in the cases just discussed.” 129 Ill. 2d at 102-03.
There are two problems -with the majority’s reading of the statute. The first is that it violates the “elementary principle of statutory interpretation that no statute should be construed in a manner which will lead to consequences which are absurd, inconvenient, or unjust.” (People v. Partee (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 24, 30-31.) Under the majority’s reading of the statute, the State’s Attorney, as a representative for the people of the State of Illinois, can present evidence and argument against the driver’s petition for a JDP. The trial court, based upon the evidence and argument presented at the proceeding, then makes a ruling as to whether a JDP should issue. Then, the Secretary of State, a second representative for the people of the State of Illinois, has the opportunity to review the proceeding. If the Secretary disagrees with the trial court’s factual or legal conclusions, the Secretary can present new evidence and argument as to why the JDP should not issue, essentially requiring that the trial court make a second ruling. If the court disagrees with . the Secretary, the Secretary is then entitled to appeal.
Such a procedure, however, would be illogical since it would require that circuit courts make two separate determinations on the same issue in JDP proceedings. It would also result in the Attorney General’s office’s (on behalf of the Secretary) duplicating the work of the State’s Attorney’s office.
This waste of judicial and executive time and resources would be avoided by narrowly reading the statute as merely creating a ministerial role for the Secretary whereby he issues the court-ordered JDP unless the court’s order does not contain the specific, statutorily mandated information concerning “the name, driver’s license number and legal address of the successful petitioner, and the full and detailed description of the limitations of the JDP” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 206.1(B)(d)). This narrower reading of the statute is preferable to that of the majority since “[wjhere the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would make the enactment absurd and illogical, while the other renders it reasonable and sensible, the construction which leads to an absurd result must be avoided.” Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 303, 312-13.
Under this more narrow reading of the statute, the procedure that would be followed in JDP proceedings would be similar to the one utilized in license reinstatement hearings under the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, par. 6 — 208.1). The procedure in reinstatement hearings, as this court explained in People v. O’Donnell (1987), 116 Ill. 2d 517, 524, is that where a driver has petitioned the circuit court for reinstatement of his license, the Secretary provides the local State’s Attorney with notice of the reinstatement proceeding. The State’s Attorney may then appear at the hearing in the circuit court and present evidence (apparently obtained from the Secretary) in opposition to the petition. Similarly, in JDP proceedings, under a narrow reading of the statute, the State’s Attorney could receive information from the Secretary regarding the petition for a JDP and, if he so chooses, appear in court and present evidence and argument in opposition to the petition. If the court were to grant the petition, the Secretary would then issue the JDP unless the court’s order lacked the statutorily required information. The State’s Attorney, as the adverse party in the JDP proceeding, would then have the right to appeal. This procedure makes more sense than the one envisioned by the majority because it would consolidate the Secretary’s and the State’s Attorney’s arguments and evidence for the court to consider at one time, rather than requiring the court to make two separate determinations. It would also avoid the State’s Attorney’s and the Attorney General’s offices from duplicating each other’s work.
If the General Assembly had wanted the Secretary to play a significant role in JDP proceedings, the General Assembly would not have done so by creating the convoluted procedure envisioned by the majority. Instead, the General Assembly would have simply required that the initial driving permit hearing be conducted before the Secretary, subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, pars. 6 — 205(c), 6 — 212 (Secretary, subject to judicial review, may issue hardship licenses for non-first-time offenders).
The second problem with the majority’s reading of the statute is that it raises serious separation of powers questions. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, §1.) The majority concludes that there are no separation of powers problems raised by its reading of the statute by stating:
“ ‘The [separation of powers] doctrine, with respect to the relationship between the executive and judicial branches of government, is violated when the challenged provision would confer powers to one branch of government which properly should be exercised by another branch [citation] *** or when one branch usurps the authority of another branch [citations].’ (People v. Inghram (1987), 118 Ill. 2d 140, 146-47.) *** In this case, the Secretary and the court are both exercising authority granted by statute. The court is not exercising any power conferred by the constitution or the common law. [Citation.] We do not believe that construing the statute so as to allow the Secretary to appeal a circuit court’s JDP order poses a separation of powers violation. • There is no transfer of authority away from the judiciary or performance of any duty reserved for the judiciary. We are only allowing the Secretary to appeal an order entered when his participation pursuant to section 6 — 206.1(B)(d) has failed to secure what he believes is the proper result.” (129 Ill. 2d at 104-05.)
I disagree.
Article VI, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §1.) One aspect of the appellate level of the judiciary’s power is the exclusive power to review the decisions of the circuit courts. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§4, 6.) The Illinois Supreme Court also has the authority to adopt and administer the rules and procedures governing appeals from circuit court judgments. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §§4, 6, 16.) Finally, the circuit courts may review administrative actions. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §9.) Nothing in the constitution, with the exception of the Governor’s right to grant pardons (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, §12), grants the executive branch the power to review judicial decisions.
Under the majority’s reading of the statute, however, the Secretary has the power to independently review the circuit court’s legal and factual conclusions. If he disagrees with the circuit court, he need not comply with its order. Even though the Secretary’s decision not to comply would ultimately be subject to the appellate court’s review on appeal, the Secretary would still be acting as a sort of intermediate level of review between the circuit and appellate courts. Such a result, contrary to the majority’s assertion, would be both a “transfer of [the judiciary’s] authority [to administer the appellate process] away from the judiciary” and the performance of a “duty [to review circuit court decisions that is] re-' served for the judiciary.” 129 Ill. 2d at 105.
There is a second constitutional problem raised by the majority’s reading of the statute. This is not a case where the General Assembly has given an administrative agency original jurisdiction to adjudicate a statutorily created claim. (See Board of Education v. Warren Township High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504 (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 155, 165-66.) Instead, the General Assembly placed jurisdiction over JDP proceedings in the circuit courts. Since jurisdiction has been placed in the judiciary, it is the judiciary alone which may exercise the inherently judicial function of applying principles of law in JDP proceedings. (See Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 313, 322.) The majority’s reading of the statute, as allowing the Secretary to determine whether a circuit court’s decision in a JDP proceeding “is in conformance with the law” (129 Ill. 2d at 98), therefore renders the statute unconstitutional because it allows a member of the executive branch to exercise an inherently judicial function. See Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 322.
These constitutional problems would be avoided by reading the statute as creating a ministerial role for the Secretary in JDP proceedings whereby the Secretary merely reviews the court’s order to insure that it contains the specific information required by the statute. Consequently, the statute should be read narrowly. See Mulligan, 123 Ill. 2d at 312 (“as between two possible constructions of a statute, one rendering it as constitutional, and the other as unconstitutional, this court will favor the construction rendering it constitutional”).
Because I do not believe that the Secretary’s administrative and ministerial responsibilities in JDP proceedings as set forth by the Illinois Vehicle Code are sufficient to give him standing to appeal as a nonparty, I must respectfully dissent.