dissenting.
Appellant Daniel Mandich suffered his injury in January 1984. He attempted to rehabilitate his knee under a one-year contract signed in August 1984, and played some games in March 1985 before .suffering a wrist injury. In May 1985, his agent negotiated a new two-year contract. Man-dieh played a few games in the Fall of 1985 before he reinjured his knee and ended his career. Respondent claims Mandich’s agent orally agreed that the May 1985 contract would not be effective unless Mandich played at least 20 games of the 1985-86 season, rendering him ineligible for disability insurance benefits. Mandich was not told of the alleged side agreement until a meeting with respondent’s president, Lou Nanne, at which he told Nanne of his decision to retire.
Judicial power to review arbitration awards is limited. However, the court “shall” vacate an arbitration award when the arbitrator has exceeded his powers. Minn.Stat. § 572.19, subd. 1(3) (1988). Accordingly, the supreme court has explained the limits on an arbitrator’s power:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. * * * his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
Ramsey County v. AFSCME Council 191, Local 8, 309 N.W.2d 785 (Minn.1981) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960)). A court may vacate the award when the arbitrator shows “manifest disregard of the agreement, totally unsupported by principles of contract construction and the law of the shop.” Id. at 792 (quoting Amoco Oil Co. v. Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers, 548 F.2d 1288, 1294 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied 431 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1697, 52 L.Ed.2d 389 (1977)).
Absent suspension of the rule of law for the sake of the North Stars and the NHL, we should vacate the league President’s arbitration award. The essence of the award is not drawn from the contract, and the decision shows manifest disdain for the agreement and league rules that bind the parties.
Paragraph 5(d) of the contract provides: It is also agreed that if the player * * * is disabled and unable to perform his duties as a hockey player by reason ftf an injury sustained during the course of his employment * * * he shall be entitled to receive his remaining salary due in accordance with the terms of this contract
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(emphasis added). This section also provides that consideration for continued salary payments is the player’s agreement to waive all further claims against the team. Section 9.08 of the collective bargaining agreement contains the same language. These provisions, which contain no exceptions, guarantee a player in appellant’s position the right to his contracted salary no matter what added benefits he receives un*178der a disability insurance policy. Arbitrator Ziegler chose to ignore agreements stated and restated in contracts governing the arbitrated dispute.1
The arbitrator also ruled that, under the oral agreement, the 1985 contract never came into effect. This reasoning requires overlooking contractual obligations binding the parties and the arbitrator. Section 9.04 of the collective bargaining agreement prohibits a player from playing without a contract, and league by-law 2.1 states that a contract exists as soon as signed by the player. Mandich signed the 1985 contract, played several games, and received over $80,000 in salary. Under these circumstances, this reasoning is wholly illegitimate.
The arbitrator also ignored the merger agreement found in both the contract and the collective bargaining agreement. His reasoning in so doing is unsupported by accepted principles of contract construction. Respondent claims that consideration of the oral agreement follows accepted uses of parol evidence. However, given the provisions stating that the contract did exist and requiring it to exist before play, the only possible use of this parol evidence was to contradict express written terms. This shows disregard of both the contract language and accepted principles of contract construction.2
In refusing to vacate this award, the district court held that past practices permitted the arbitrator to look past the contrast provisions. In Ramsey County, the supreme court noted that five qualities distinguish a binding past practice from a course of conduct without evidentiary significance.3 None of these qualities have been shown to exist here. Specifically, the requirement of mutuality is wholly absent, as there was no indication that Mandich had ever been a party to this type of agreement before. In addition, the court’s reliance on past practices as a basis for affirming the award is illegitimate. The arbitrator, not the court, determines whether past practices have evidentiary significance. Id. at 793 n. 10.
As a further basis for the award, the arbitrator claimed that Mandich was only entitled to compensation under the contract in effect at the time he was first injured, because no consideration was given for continued payment. This reasoning ignores other language agreed to by the parties. The contract states that the consideration for the injured player receiving the full salary under the contract is his waiver of all further claims against the team.
The arbitrator’s disregard of provisions governing the parties’ relationship is particularly serious in light of the fact that he is president of the National Hockey League. Section 6.3(a) of the NHL Constitution requires the league president to uphold league by-laws. The award here contravenes the by-laws, as well as the collective bargaining agreement and the contract. As a result, the arbitrator erroneously exceeded his powers when he rendered this decision. “When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to [his lawful] obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.” Ramsey County, 309 N.W.2d at 790 (quoting Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 142).
I respectfully dissent.
. Respondent does not contend and neither the arbitrator or the trial court found that appellant was bound by a waiver accepted by him in November 1985.
. League by-law 2.3 requires players and teams to use one of the standard form contracts, and by-law 2.5 provides that the club and the player cannot change these contracts. These provisions strengthen the merger clause’s effect.
.They are: clarity and consistency, longevity and repetition, acceptability, a consideration of underlying circumstances, and mutuality. Ramsey County, 309 N.W.2d at 788 n. 3.