STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Warrick Hospital, Inc. (Hospital), Syed Ali, Jorge Quiros, and Santi Vibul bring an interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of their motions for summary judgment in an action for wrongful death and loss of consortium based upon alleged medical malpractice.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Clarence Wallace was admitted to the Hospital on April 11, 1978, and was treated there until he died on April 23, 1978, allegedly as the result of the medical malpractice of the Hospital and treating physicians. Mary E. Wallace, his widow, filed this action for wrongful death and loss of consortium on April 14, 1980, purportedly both individually and as administratrix of Clarence’s estate. However, Mary did not apply for appointment as administratrix, and was not so appointed, until April 21, 1981.
Separate motions for summary judgment were filed by the Hospital and the physicians asserting (1) that Wallace did not comply with the provisions of the Wrongful Death Act, Ind.Code 34-1-1-2, and (2) that she failed to demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact concerning the standard of care received by her husband. The trial court denied these motions for summary judgment and this appeal follows.1 Additional facts necessary to our decision are stated in our discussion of the issues.
ISSUES
We have renumbered and restated the issues presented for our review in the interest of clarity.
1. Does the Medical Malpractice Act create a cause of action for wrongful death separate and distinct from that created by the Wrongful Death Act?
2. Was Mary E. Wallace’s failure to be appointed personal representative of Clarence Wallace’s estate within two years of his death fatal to her wrongful death action?
3. Did Mary E. Wallace individually have a cause of action for wrongful death of Clarence based upon medical malpractice?
4. Did the trial court err in denying defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to the Toss of consortium claim because of lack of a genuine issue as to standard of care?
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issues One, Two, and Three
The underlying question with regard to these three issues is whether or not a plaintiff in a wrongful death action based upon alleged medical malpractice must, nevertheless, satisfy the conditions precedent imposed by the Indiana wrongful death statute, or if the Medical Malpractice Act gives rise to an action for death caused by medical malpractice independent of the Wrongful Death Act. Therefore, we will discuss these issues together.
The right to maintain an action for wrongful death did not exist at common law. General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, (1981) Ind.App., 418 N.E.2d 546, trans. denied; White, Admx. v. Allman, (1952) 122 Ind.App. 208, 103 N.E.2d 901. The right to bring such an action is purely statutory. Id. The wrongful death statute abrogated the common law, and its purpose was to create a cause of action whereby the decedent’s dependent next of kin may be compensated for the loss sustained by reason of such death. Fisk v. United States, (7th Cir.1981) 657 F.2d 167 (Indiana law). The stat*266ute created a new and independent cause of action for wrongful death. Id.
Indiana Code 34-1 — 1—2 provides: “When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the action shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two (2) years . . . . ” (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the personal representative is the only one who can prosecute an action pursuant to the wrongful death statute. General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, supra; White, Admx. v. Allman, supra. Here, Clarence Wallace died on April 23,1978, allegedly the result of defendants’ malpractice. Mary E. Wallace, his widow, filed this action for wrongful death on April 14, 1980, purportedly both individually and as administratrix of Clarence’s estate. However, Mary did not apply for appointment as administra-trix, and was not so appointed, until April 21,1981, two days short of three years after Clarence’s death. This is analogous to the factual situation which existed in General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, supra. In Arnett, the decedent died on January 28, 1978. His wife filed a wrongful death action on January 28, 1979, but she was not appointed as the personal representative of his estate until May 27, 1980, four months after the statutory period had expired. Judge Sullivan, writing for this court, after reciting the well settled rule that only a personal representative can bring a statutory action for wrongful death, stated:
“It was a condition precedent that the action against G.M. be brought by someone in the capacity of the personal representative. Mrs. Arnett failed to meet that condition, because she did not have that capacity within two years of her husband’s death. She lost her statutorily conferred right to bring a wrongful death action under I.C. 34r-l — 1—2 and thus cannot maintain her action against G.M.”
418 N.E.2d at 548.
The Arnett case further rejected the claim that Mrs. Arnett’s appointment as personal representative could relate back to the time of filing suit because of the Indiana view that the two year period within which a wrongful death action may be commenced is not a statute of limitation, but rather is a condition precedent which the plaintiff must meet. Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exchange of Chicago Motor Club, (1977) Ind.App., 369 N.E.2d 1093. It is, therefore, crystal clear that unless this present action for wrongful death is outside the purview of IC 34-1-1-2, and not governed by General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, supra, defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted as to the wrongful death claim.
The dissent seeks to distinguish Ar-nett on the ground it does not involve medical malpractice, arguing that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (Ind.Code 16-9.5— 1-1 et seq.) created a new cause of action for wrongful death independent of IC 34-1-1-2, where the alleged cause is medical malpractice and that the definition of the term “representative” in IC 16 — 9.5-1—1(f) granted the wife a right to bring such an action without having been duly appointed as personal representative within the two year period. Wallace argues that the provision in the Medical Malpractice Act tolling the running of the statute of limitations during the pendency of the proceedings before the medical review panel2 operates to *267extend the time for appointment of a personal representative. We do not agree with either of these positions.
The wrongful death statute was enacted to provide a remedy which did not exist at common law, that is, a cause of action for damages for death caused by the wrongful act of another. On the other hand, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act was enacted to meet the problems of the rapidly escalating cost to physicians of malpractice insurance, the near unavailability of such coverage to physicians engaged in certain high risk specialties, and because “[hjealth care providers had become fearful of the exposure to malpractice claims and at the same time were unable to obtain adequate malpractice insurance at reasonable prices.” Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind., 404 N.E.2d 585, 589-90. The legislature thus responded to the vital needs of the community to preserve the availability of health care services to the citizens of this state. Id. The obvious purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act is to provide some measure of protection to health care providers from malpractice claims, thus to preserve the availability of such professional health care services to the community. Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1319, trans. denied.
We do not believe that the Medical Malpractice Act (IC 16-9.5-1-1 et seq.) created any separate cause of action for wrongful death or that the legislature intended to do so. The obvious purpose of the act was to protect health care providers from malpractice claims, Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hospital, Inc., supra, not to create new and additional causes of action. Were it to create a separate cause of action it would increase the incidence of such claims rather than protect against them.
The language which the dissent finds to give birth to a cause of action independent of the wrongful death statute simply states that “a patient or his representative having a claim under this article for bodily injury or death on account of malpractice may file a complaint . . . . ” IC 16-9.5 — 1-6. “Malpractice” is defined as meaning “any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered . . . . ” IC 16-9.-5 — 1—1(h). “Tort,” as defined by the act, “means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to another.” IC 16 — 9.5—l-l(g). The source of the action is dependent upon traditional concepts of tort law and is derived either from the common law or statutory law already existing, but does not spring from the malpractice act. Since there is no common law action for wrongful death, the basis for such an action must be the Wrongful Death Act. The Medical Malpractice Act affects the right of action for wrongful death only to the extent of limiting the recovery and establishing the requirement of submission of the claim to the medical review panel created by the act. Further, it is obvious that the wrongful death claim is predicated upon the negligence of the defendant health care providers. If true, such a death is clearly “caused by the wrongful act or omission of another” and within the purview of IC 34-1 — 1—2.
Neither can we agree that the statutory definition of “representative,” 3 relied upon by the dissent, supports an interpretation of the statute as creating an independent right of action for wrongful death. The definition merely enumerates those persons coming within the purview of the definition. Regardless of the need for the definition of the term “representative,” we cannot justify creation of a cause of action from the fact of the presence of the definition in the act.
The argument that the Medical Malpractice Act creates a separate right of action for wrongful death also is demon*268strably untenable from the problems which might arise from such a position. If such action derives its source and vitality not from the Wrongful Death Act, but instead from the Medical Malpractice Act, then what persons are entitled to share in the proceeds if the action is successful, and in what manner are such proceeds distributed? If any person meeting the IC 16-9.5-l-l(f) definition of “representative” can bring the action, and if the decedent had a spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney, or other legal agent, could any one, any combination, or all bring an action or actions for such death? Rather than creating new and independent causes of action, we believe the definitional language concerning the term “representative” simply indicates that such a person having a right to bring an action under existing law can maintain an action predicated upon medical malpractice. Thus, a spouse can bring an action for loss of consortium, a parent for loss of services resulting from death or injury of a child, a guardian for his ward. However, since a deceased person cannot have a guardian, attorney, or legal agent other than a personal representative, we believe the wrongful death claim founded upon medical malpractice must be brought by the only “other legal agent” of the patient authorized by law to institute such an action, that being the personal representative of the patient’s estate. Such construction is consistent with both the Medical Malpractice Act and the wrongful death statute.
Further, since the act applies only to qualified health care providers, it would seem that an action against a non-qualified provider would have to proceed only under the wrongful death statute. Thus, if the defendants here were non-qualified providers, the present action would fail, but, according to the dissent, would not fail if the defendants were qualified health care providers under the statute. The result, then, would be that a health care provider who qualified under the act, the purpose of which, in part, is to provide protection, would be subject to a greater exposure than the non-qualified provider. This is hardly a result contemplated by the Medical Malpractice Act.
The contention that the provision tolling the running of the statute of limitation while the medical review panel procedure is in progress extends the time to have a personal representative appointed cannot be sustained. We are not dealing with a question of statute of limitations. Rather, we are concerned with the performance of conditions precedent to the right to bring an action for wrongful death. General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, supra. Thus, in our view, the only person who can file a proposed complaint for medical malpractice for wrongful death is the duly appointed personal representative appointed within two years of the date of the patient’s death. Since Wallace was not so appointed she could not institute any proceeding for wrongful death resulting from medical malpractice either by filing a proposed complaint as provided in the Medical Malpractice Act or by an action filed in court.
We hereby hold that the right to prosecute a claim for wrongful death based upon medical malpractice is governed by the wrongful death statute with regard to the parties eligible to institute such proceeding, the persons for whose benefit recovery may be had, and the manner of distribution of such proceeds. We also hold that such a plaintiff must meet and comply with all conditions precedent necessary to bring such an action, specifically including being duly appointed as the patient’s personal representative within two years of the date of death. We further hold that the procedural requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, the filing of the proposed complaint and submission to the medical review panel, must be met if the defendant is a qualified health care provider under that act. Finally, we hold that the limitations on the amount of recovery in the Medical Malpractice Act apply to such a claim.
Since the claim for wrongful death here did not meet the required conditions precedent of the Wrongful Death Act in that Mary E. Wallace was not duly appointed *269personal representative of Clarence’s estate within two years of his death, summary judgment should have been granted on this claim. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment denying summary judgment on the wrongful death claim.
Issue Four
Although we have held that summary judgment should have been granted on the wrongful death claim, we believe Mary E. Wallace could have an individual right of action for loss of consortium and services of her husband between the dates of April 11, 1978, and April 23,1978. Burk v. Anderson, (1952) 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407; Long v. Morrison, (1860) 14 Ind. 595; Heuer v. Loop, (S.D.Ind.1961) 198 F.Supp. 546. The case of Long v. Morrison, supra, was an action predicated upon medical malpractice resulting in death of the wife. Our supreme court in Long cited the common law rule that no action for death survived, but held the husband had a right of action for loss of consortium. The defendants, relying upon Burk, say no cause of action for loss of consortium exists because of the shortness of time between the treatment and the death. However, in Burk, the time involved was a matter of a few hours. We deem it a question of fact for the trier thereof whether any damages for loss of consortium were suffered in this case.
The defendants next contend, assuming arguendo, a cause of action for loss of consortium exists in this ease, the complaint sounds in wrongful death and is insufficient to put anyone on notice that a loss of consortium claim is being asserted. We do not so rigidly construe the complaint in this case. Therefore, we turn to the question of whether or not a genuine issue of fact exists concerning the standard of care afforded to Clarence by the Hospital and physicians.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying the motions for summary judgment because they allege there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the standard of medical treatment received by Clarence Wallace. In response to interrogatories filed by the appellants, Wallace submitted the names of Dr. Madura and Dr. Jessup as the expert witnesses she intended to call at trial. She also claimed in her response that the physicians were negligent in failing to diagnose and treat a ruptured spleen. Ali, Quiros and Vibul submitted an affidavit by Dr. Jessup which stated that he had no opinion on the standard care in the present action. They also submitted an affidavit by a secretary for one of the attorneys representing the physicians. The secretary affirmed that she had contacted Dr. Madura’s office and talked to a secretary, who claimed Dr. Madura disavowed any knowledge of the case. Wallace’s attorney submitted an affidavit, the substance of which was that he had made arrangements for Dr. Madura to testify.
This court has acknowledged that a negligence case is rarely appropriate for disposition by summary judgment, especially when the issue for resolution is whether the defendant exercised due care. Bassett v. Glock, (1977) 174 Ind.App. 439, 368 N.E.2d 18. Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file together with any affidavits and testimony disclose that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Whipple v. Dickey, (1980) Ind.App., 401 N.E.2d 787. The moving party has the burden to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and any doubt must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Even if the facts are not in conflict, summary judgment is inappropriate where there exists a good faith dispute as to the inference to be drawn from these facts. Ang v. Hospital Corp. of America, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 441, trans. denied.
If the moving party files affidavits and other materials establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party may not rest upon his pleadings, but must come forward with specific facts showing there exists a genuine issue for trial. Whipple v. Dickey, supra. Summary judgment was discussed in Bassett v. Glock, supra, a medical malpractice case, where *270this court stated: “Although Bassett was under no obligation to present evidence sufficient to establish her claim, she was obliged to put forth sufficient basis upon which the court might find existence of a genuine triable issue.” 368 N.E.2d at 23. It is with this standard that we must review the present case.
Defendants allege that the affidavits they submitted demonstrate that there exists no expert testimony to establish negligence. They further assert that the affidavit submitted by Wallace’s counsel was not based upon personal knowledge and violated Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56(E).
The trial court did not err in denying the motion for summary judgment. Although the affidavit filed on Wallace’s behalf may have been defective, the answers to interrogatories establish a genuine issue of material fact. The answers to the interrogatories state that the defending doctors failed to diagnose and treat a ruptured spleen. The answers also reveal that Wallace intended to call two expert witnesses. Ali, Quiros, and Vibul submitted an affidavit by one of the experts, Dr. Jessup, disavowing any personal knowledge in the case.
In determining whether a factual controversy exists, the trial court must resolve all doubts as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact against the proponent of the motion for summary judgment and all facts asserted by the nonmovant in affidavits or admissions or by way of answers to interrogatories must be taken as true. Johnson v. Wabash County, (1979) Ind.App., 391 N.E.2d 1139. In the present case, the answers to interrogatories reveal a claim that the doctors failed to diagnose a ruptured spleen. The answers also disclose that Dr. Madura would testify. If the answers to the interrogatories had revealed that only Dr. Jessup would testify, then summary judgment might have been appropriate. The affidavit by the secretary was clearly defective because it was not based upon personal knowledge. However, answers to interrogatories reveal a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ali, Quiros and Vibul failed to diagnose and treat a ruptured spleen.
The Hospital has raised another contention as to why its motion for summary judgment should have been granted. In order to prevail against the Hospital, Wallace must demonstrate that the Hospital failed to exercise that degree of care that would be exercised by same or similar hospitals in similar communities under the same or similar circumstances. See Whitaker v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, (1981) Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 737. The Hospital submitted an affidavit that the standard of care received by Clarence Wallace was in conformity with the standard of care as existed in Boonville, Indiana. The Hospital alleges that Wallace has not challenged the standard of care and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment.
The standard of review for summary judgment has been discussed previously. Applying this standard to the allegations of fact contained in the answers to interrogatories, we find that the trial court did not err. Wallace, in her response to interrogatories, stated the Hospital was negligent in failing to diagnose a ruptured spleen, failing to treat a ruptured spleen by timely surgical removal, failure to diagnose diabetes mellitus, and failure to treat diabetes mellitus. Wallace also listed Dr. Madura and Dr. Jessup as expert witnesses who would testify at trial. We believe that these answers to interrogatories have established a genuine issue of material fact.
In Toth v. Lenk, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 618, 330 N.E.2d 336, we discussed summary judgment in a medical malpractice case and stated:
“Additionally, there are times when summary judgment may be inappropriate even though the essential facts are not in dispute and appear to lead to one reasonable conclusion, because the matters appearing in the record before the court at the time do not foreclose the prospect of additional witnesses or evidence, which, if presented at trial, would be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict in favor of the proponent of the motion.”
*271164 Ind.App. 624, 330 N.E.2d 340. In the present case we believe that there exists a dispute over the essential facts as well as the prospect of additional witnesses or evidence which would be sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. Thus, it was proper to deny the motions for summary judgment as they related to the loss of consortium claim and we affirm the trial court in that regard.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs on appeal are assessed one-half against appellants and one-half against appellee.
NEAL, J., concurs. ROBERTSON, J., dissents with opinion.. There is no contention that Wallace failed to comply with the terms of the Medical Malpractice Act, Ind.Code 16-9.5-1-1 et seq.; consequently, we presume she did follow the provisions of that act.
. IC 16-9.5-9-1 (Supp.1981) provides in part:
“The filing of a proposed complaint tolls the applicable statute of limitations to and including a period of ninety (90) days following the receipt of the opinion of the medical review panel by the claimant. A proposed complaint under this chapter shall be deemed filed when a copy of the proposed complaint is delivered or mailed by registered or certified mail to the commissioner, who shall within ten (10) days after receipt forward by registered or certified mail a copy to each health care provider named as a defendant at his last and usual place of residence or his office.
Not earlier than twenty (20) days after the filing of a proposed complaint either party may request the formation of a medical review panel by serving a request by registered or certified mail upon all parties and the commissioner.”
IC 16-9.5-9-2 provides:
“No action against a health care provider may be commenced in any court of this state *267before the claimant’s proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established pursuant to this chapter and an opinion is rendered by the panel.”
. IC 16-9.5-l-l(f) provides: “ ‘Representative’ means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney or other legal agent of the patient.”