concurring.
Although I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Alamo’s rental agreement violated public policy. Instead, I would hold that Alamo was the primary insurer based on the terms of the agreements at issue in this case.
The majority states that “the dominant public policy of HRS Chapter 431:10C is that vehicle owners are primarily responsible for providing minimum coverage for their owned vehicles.” Majority opinion at 1281. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s discovery of such a broad public policy in the face of the legislature’s subsequent amendment of HRS ch. 431:10C. On June 19, 1997 (effective January 1, 1998), the legislature enacted Act 251, which provided, inter alia, that the “bodily injury liability coverage” of a U-drive motor vehicle insurance policy “shall be secondary to the operator’s or renter’s motor vehicle insurance policy” if certain procedural requirements are met. 1997 Haw. Sess. L. Act 251, § 2, at 517 (codified at HRS § 431:100-303.5 (Supp.1997)) (emphasis added).1
Although Act 251 was adopted after the events at issue in this case, we have often held that “subsequent legislative history or amendments” may be examined in order to confirm our interpretation of statutory provisions. See Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 225, 941 P.2d 300, 308 (1997); State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 372, 917 P.2d 370, 384 (1996); Pacific Int’l Servs. Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Hawai'i 209, 217, 873 P.2d 88, 96 (1994); Franks v. City & County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 340 n. 6, 843 P.2d 668, 674 n. 6 (1993). In my view, the subsequent enactment of Act 251 clearly indicates that it is not against public policy for the renter’s insurer to provide primary coverage for bodily injury liability. Act 251 states that the renter’s insurer shall be primary if the specified notice requirements are satisfied. Inasmuch as the legislature has unambiguously spoken in favor of primary coverage by the renter’s insurer, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis in this case.
There are at least two reasons why the legislature might have decided to allow the renter’s insurer to assume primary coverage for bodily injury liability. First, if the rental agency’s insurer is required to be primary, rental agencies would be forced to charge their customers more in order to cover their liability insurance costs. But if customers already have liability coverage under their individual policies, the customers are essentially paying for the same coverage twice. Thus, the overall insurance burden on the consumer is higher than it would be if the renter’s insurer were primary. Second, car rental agencies are part of the tourist industry. Obviously, visitors coming to Hawaii rent automobiles. Imposing primary coverage on the rental agency’s insurer increases the insurance burden on rental agencies, and eventually increases the cost of renting a car in Hawaii. Inasmuch as tourism is the driving force behind Hawaii’s economy, the legislature was probably concerned about the detrimental impact of increased insurance costs on the tourist industry.
In addition, I do not believe that the overall public policy behind HRS eh. 431:100 is offended by requiring the renter’s insurer to be primary. We have stated that the Hawaii no-fault insurance law
was intended to set a base line, minimum level of automobile liability insurance pro*283tection. From the outset, it was the legislature’s objective to make “a basic, comprehensive, equitable, and reasonably priced auto insurance policy” universally available. Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. IS, in 1973 House Journal, at 1219 ...; see also Hse. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 28, in 1974 House Journal, at 864 (“[T]he no-fault law will continue to provide a basic, comprehensive, equitable and reasonably priced auto insurance premium.”).... Thus, “every car on the road [would] have the basic minimal no-fault coverage.” Sen. Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 4, in 1973 Senate Journal, at 638....
Hurip, 76 Hawai'i at 217, 873 P.2d at 96 (emphasis omitted). Thus, in my view, the public policy behind HRS ch. 431:10C is to ensure that “every car on the road [has] the basic minimal nofault coverage.” This goal is entirely separate from the question whether the renter’s insurer or the rental agency’s insurer is primary. As long as one of these insurers provides minimal coverage, the public policy behind our statutes is satisfied. The new public policy discovered by the majority, in favor of imposing primary coverage on the owners of vehicles, is unrelated to the general public policy that we have recognized in the past.
For these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Alamo’s rental agreement violated public policy. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority’s result based on a plain reading of the contractual terms involved in this case.
The Alamo rental agreement contained an “escape clause” providing:
If there is no other valid and collectible insurance, whether primary, excess, or contingent, available to the renter of any authorized driver while operating the car, then Alamo’s vehicle liability policy shall pay damages not to exceed minimum limits required by applicable law.
Majority opinion at 1275. However, it should be noted that because this clause specifically states that it applies to valid and collectible insurance, “whether primary, excess, or contingent,” it is more accurately known as a “super-escape clause.” See 8A J.A. Apple-man, Insurance Law and Practice § 4906, at 349-50 (1981) (defining super-escape clause). The State Farm policy contained an “excess clause” providing: “If a temporary substitute car, a non-owned car or a trailer designed for use with a private passenger car or utility vehicle has other vehicle liability coverage on it, then this coverage is excess.” Majority opinion at 1275. Consequently, this case involves a conflict between a super-escape clause and an excess clause.
A number of courts in other jurisdictions have held that, in such situations, the policy with the super-escape clause is primary. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North Am. v. Continental Cas. Co., 575 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir.1978); Protective Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 361 So.2d 1058 (Ala.1978); Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ill.2d 108, 273 N.E.2d 360 (1971). These courts reason that, because the excess clause only provides coverage when primary insurance is exhausted, there is no “other valid and collectible insurance” available. Thus, the super-escape clause is not triggered, and the policy containing the super-escape clause is primary. These courts acknowledge that a super-escape clause specifically mentions excess insurance. Nevertheless, these courts hold that the language requiring “other valid and collectible insurance” is controlling, and the mere inclusion of additional language should not allow insurers to avoid coverage. See Insurance Co. of North Am., 575 F.2d at 1073-74; Automobile Underwriters, Inc., 273 N.E.2d at 362-63. It is true that some jurisdictions give effect to the specific language in the super-escape clause over that of the excess clause. See, e.g., Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Globe Indem. Co., 415 S.W.2d 581 (Ky.1967). Other jurisdictions find the two clauses mutually repugnant and apply both policies pro rata. See, e.g., Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444 S.W.2d 583 (Tex.1969). However, I agree with the cases holding that a policy containing an excess clause does not constitute “other valid and collectible insurance” under the terms of a super-escape clause.
Therefore, I would hold, under the terms of the agreements at issue in this case, that Alamo had the primary obligation to defend *284Bowers and that State Farm’s policy provided excess coverage. I would not, however, hold that Alamo’s rental agreement violated public policy.
. See Majority opinion at 1276, for the text of this statute.