(dissenting). Respectfully, I dissent.
Jury instructions that require a jury to unanimously acquit a defendant on the principle charge before considering lesser-included charges are coercive and constitute reversible error. See, People v Erwin, 70 Mich App 60; 245 NW2d 173 (1976), and cases cited therein. In People v Mays, 407 Mich 619, 623; 288 NW2d 207 (1980), the Supreme Court held that such a jury instruction "will not be deemed erroneous unless the instruction or manner of giving it conveys the impression that there must be acquittal on one charge before consideration of another”. In that case, the Supreme Court found reversible error in a jury instruction to the effect that, "The first lesser included offense which you may consider, if you ñnd the defendant not guilty of ñrst-degree sexual conduct, you may consider whether the prosecutor has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of * * * [the lesser included offense]”. 407 Mich 619, 621.
Unlike the majority, I am unable to distinguish the erroneous Mays instruction from the present one. In the instant case, the jury was instructed that, "If you ñnd that all of the elements that I read of breaking and entering, including the spe*608cific intent instruction, did not exist beyond a reasonable doubt, then you would move to receiving and concealing stolen property to see if these elements exist beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, the jury was instructed that, if they acquitted defendant of breaking and entering, then they were to consider the lesser-included offense. This was error. Defendant is entitled to a new trial.