concurring.
I join the Majority with the exception of the following points. The Majority applies the primary purpose test from Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), to conclude that because Geist, a social worker, was confronting an ongoing emergency when he interviewed Appellant’s four-year old daughter, A.A., the statements elicited from A.A. are nontestimonial. While I agree that the statements elicited from A.A. are nontestimonial, my conclusion derives from my belief that, in this context, we should not consider Geist an agent of law enforcement. Because I do not view him as an agent of law enforcement, I find it unnecessary to consider whether he was investigating an ongoing emergency.
The resolution of the admissibility of A.A.’s statements to Geist turns on whether her statements are testimonial. To make this determination we must consider the explanation of testimonial statements in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Davis. In Crawford, following the arrest of the defendant, police detectives interrogated him and his wife and obtained their statements regarding an earlier stabbing. The question before the Supreme Court was whether, when the wife refused to testify at the defendant’s trial, the state could introduce her statement to police to contradict the defense. The defendant argued that admission of his wife’s statement, absent her testimony, violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which guarantees the accused the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Addressing this argument, the Court reviewed the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause and concluded that its history suggested two inferences. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
First, that the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was a specific form of hearsay deriving from criminal procedure in civil-law countries: ex parte examinations of witnesses by justices of the peace and other officers eventually introduced as evidence against the accused. Consequently, the Court noted that not all hearsay implicates the *95Sixth Amendment’s core concerns. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Rather, the text of the Confrontation Clause applies to “witnesses” against the accused — witnesses being “those who bear testimony.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citing 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). “Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. According to the Court, various formulations of this core class of “testimonial” statements exist:
[E]x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially ... statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.... Regardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definition-for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.
Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citations omitted). The Court further noted that the “[ijnvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse ...” Id. at 56, n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court found that unsworn statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are testimonial under even a narrow standard. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
The second inference suggested by the history of the Confrontation Clause was that the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Crawford Court ultimately held that the defendant’s wife’s statements made during a police interrogation were testimonial hearsay that could not be admitted at the defendant’s trial unless the declarant was *96unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine her. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.1
Finding a statement testimonial is, therefore, pursuant to Crawford, a threshold determination in assessing the statement’s admissibility, triggering the demands of the Confrontation Clause. Although the Court left for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, it identified certain statements as the functional equivalent of “ex parte in-court testimony”: those provided in affidavits, id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354; depositions, id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354; those given during police interrogations, id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354; prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354; or similar “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial ....” id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.2 In this core class of testimonial statements, the declarant reasonably believes that he is bearing testimony against the accused for use in a subsequent proceeding. In contrast, nontestimonial hearsay statements are not inadmissible in accord with the constraints of the Confrontation Clause because the declarant does not intend to bear testimony against the accused.
Although the Court in Crawford indicated that all statements made during police interrogations are testimonial, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, the Court was asked to reconsider this absolute characterization in Davis and Hammon v. Indiana, the companion case. In Davis, the declarant provid*97ed statements to a 911 operator, and in Hammon, the declarant made statements to police who responded to a reported domestic disturbance at her home. The Court was called upon to decide whether the statements made in these two circumstances were testimonial and thus subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. The Court distinguished between nontestimonial and testimonial statements made during police interrogation:
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements-or even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogation-as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266.3 The Davis Court assumed that the acts of the 911 operator were the acts of the police, making it unnecessary to decide whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are testimonial. Id. at 823, n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
Applying the above test to the facts of the two cases before it, the Court ultimately concluded that statements to the 911 operator in Davis were nontestimonial because they were provided during police interrogation to meet an ongoing emergency. The Court found, however, that the statements to police investigating a crime in Hammon were, in fact, testimonial, because they were provided as part of an investigation *98into possibly criminal past conduct. Id. at 829, 126 S.Ct. 2266. In reaching this conclusion, the Court indicated that formality is essential to testimonial utterance, id. at 830, n. 5, 126 S.Ct. 2266, noting that after the declarant in Hammon provided her statements to the police, she executed an affidavit to establish the past events. Id. at 832, 126 S.Ct. 2266.
The test provided in Davis, which requires a determination of the primary purpose of the police interrogation that produced the statements sought to be admitted, is limited on its face to police interrogations; the primary purpose test has no application to statements that are not made in the course of police interrogations. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266. If statements are made to someone other than law enforcement, we should look to the principals of Crawford to determine the testimonial nature of the statements. See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 855 N.E.2d 834 (2006) (applying Crawford’s “objective witness” test, rather than Davis’s “primary purpose” test, to find that statements made by an adult rape victim to a nurse practitioner were nontestimonial).
Although the primary purpose test easily classifies some statements as testimonial, its use is more problematic in the context of child abuse cases, which usually involve law enforcement, social workers, health care professionals, counselors, and family or friends. In fact, the difficulty of determining the testimonial nature of a statement obtained in a child abuse case contrasts with the relatively straightforward application of Crawford and Davis to police interrogations. Accordingly, I would not automatically determine that statements made by a child during the course of a child abuse investigation are testimonial unless made during an ongoing emergency solely due to the involvement of a government agent in the interview process. See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 923-25 (Colo.2006) (finding that a doctor working for a child protection team who obtained statements from a child was not a government agent “absent a more direct and controlling police presence”); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.2006) (holding that the question of whether statements made by a *99young child to a child protection worker are testimonial does not hinge on whether the worker was a government agent, but rather on whether the government agent was acting to a “substantial degree” to produce statements for trial). I believe that in the absence of police interrogation, our inquiry should examine the extent to which the questioner is acting at the behest of or in conjunction with law enforcement. In this regard, an important consideration in this case is the degree of police involvement in procuring the statements from A.A.
Before looking at the facts of this case, however, it is helpful to understand how Geist’s interview came about pursuant to the Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 et seq. The Law’s purpose is to involve law enforcement agencies in responding to child abuse, to establish children and youth social service agencies to investigate reports of abuse, to provide protection for children from further abuse, and to provide rehabilitative services for the children and parents involved. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b). The Law requires certain individuals to report suspected abuse, including physicians. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6311(b). Once a report of suspected abuse is received, the county CYS must commence an investigation, which includes a determination of the risk of harm to the child or children if they continue to remain in the home environment, as well as a determination of the nature, extent, and cause of any abuse, and to take any action necessary to provide for the safety of the child or children. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6368. Although CYS workers may release information to the police, there is no requirement that they do so. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6339 and 6340.
Turning to the facts of this case, the circumstances reveal that the police were not involved in procuring A.A.’s statements to Geist. After Appellant injured his seven-month old son, J.A., the infant was treated at the hospital. The treating physician, who suspected physical abuse, contacted CYS social worker Geist. Geist responded to the hospital, where he interviewed J.A.’s mother, and concluded that J.A. and his siblings, including four-year-old A.A., should be removed temporarily for their safety. The children were placed with *100Appellant’s parents. Appellant informed Geist that A.A. caused J.A.’s injury. Acting on this information, Geist arrived at Appellant’s parents’ home to talk to A.A. on May 27, 2004, a week after the children’s removal from their parents’ care. Geist intended to obtain information regarding J.A.’s injury. Geist was causally dressed, and did not indicate that A.A.’s statements would be used in a subsequent proceeding against Appellant. He questioned her on the front porch, and asked her how she was and if she remembered what happened to J.A. She said that she did; Geist asked if J.A.’s twin caused the injury, and A.A. said no. He asked in turn whether A.A. caused the injury, whether her mother did, and whether her father did. When the questioning turned to her father, Appellant, A.A. began to act scared, and answered in the affirmative. She described Appellant as angry at the time, and demonstrated how the injury occurred. When one of Appellant’s siblings interrupted, the interview ended. Geist returned to CYS, followed statutory procedure by notifying his supervisor, and recommended that A.A. be interviewed by Dr. Ryen. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6311. He did not report his findings to law enforcement.
I do not believe that Geist was acting at the behest of or in conjunction with law enforcement. Police were not involved in Geist’s interview of A.A., either formally or behind the scenes. There is no evidence that the police requested Geist’s interview of A.A., provided any direction about the questioning, or had any input whatsoever. As the Superior Court noted, Geist did not notify the police of what he learned from his interview of A.A. Rather, he contacted his supervisor. Geist was acting pursuant to a statutory duty to ensure the safety of A.A. and her siblings.
The Majority presently applies the primary purpose test to the interrogation conducted by Geist, explaining such application by construing Geist to be an agent of law enforcement. To reach this conclusion, the Majority relies on Commonwealth v. Ramos, 367 Pa.Super. 84, 532 A.2d 465, 468 (1987). I find Ramos distinguishable on its facts. In Ramos, a CYS caseworker obtained a confession from a defendant during an *101interview while the defendant was in prison awaiting trial on criminal charges for the child abuse that prompted the CYS interview. Ramos, 532 A.2d 465. The Superior Court found that the defendant’s inculpatory statements to the CYS worker were inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Id. The CYS caseworker interviewed the defendant, in jail, and there was no dispute regarding the custodial nature of the interrogation. Accordingly, the Superior Court properly concluded that the CYS worker in Ramos was assisting the police in investigating a crime.
The role of Geist in this case is distinguishable. Geist interviewed A.A. out of concern for the plight of Appellant’s children. He was not involved in the criminal case against Appellant. His questioning was not intended to make the case against Appellant. Moreover, the status of the individual questioning the defendant is but one consideration into whether a statement was given during a custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. McGrath, 504 Pa. 103, 470 A.2d 487 (1983) (“The determination of whether statements were elicited at a custodial interrogation must be made in light of the totality of circumstances involved, and the status of the questioner is only one of the relevant circumstances.”).
Where law enforcement is not involved, the primary purpose test does not apply and an emergency is not a prerequisite to finding the statements nontestimonial. Because Geist was not acting as an agent of law enforcement, the primary purpose test does not apply. Rather, we should look to Crawford’s core class of testimonial statements to determine whether the statements at issue here qualifies as the functional equivalent of “ex parte in-court testimony,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, and are therefore testimonial. Because we are not concerned here with statements provided in affidavits, depositions, during police interrogations, or prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, the remaining formulation of Crawford’s core class of testimonial statements is the objective witness test. This test asks whether statements were made under circum*102stances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
Considering all of the circumstances of Geist’s interview, an objective person in A.A.’s position would not reasonably have anticipated that her statements might be used in a later prosecution of Appellant. There is no evidence that Geist elicited A.A.’s statements to preserve them for trial. The lack of formality connected with the interview would have objectively indicated to A.A. that she was not “bearing testimony” against Appellant. An objective witness could have reasonably believed that her statement to Geist was made to ensure the children’s safety.
I conclude that A.A.’s statements were nontestimonial because they were provided to Geist, who was not acting as a law enforcement officer. In contrast, the Majority concludes that the child’s statements are nontestimonial because, although Geist was acting as law enforcement, the primary purpose of his interview was to meet an ongoing emergency. I recognize that my disagreement with the Majority may appear to be a minor, nuanced point. However, I am wary of the implications of concluding that Geist was acting as an agent of law enforcement in this context. Specifically, construing the CYS worker as law enforcement because he was contacted by the hospital and was responsible for J.A.’s safety makes the admissibility of A.A.’s statements contingent on whether there was an ongoing emergency. As explained above, I do not believe that there is such a requirement under Crawford.
Justice GREENSPAN joins this opinion.. The Court overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), which conditioned the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it fell under a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court found that this test was, in certain circumstances, too broad, because it applied the same analysis regardless of whether the hearsay consisted of ex parte testimony, thereby requiring close constitutional scrutiny of nontestimonial statements far removed from the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause.
. Commentators have referred to this definition as the "objective-witness test.” See, e.g., Christopher Cannon Funk, The Reasonable Child Declarant After Davis v. Washington, 61 Stan. L.Rev. 923 (2009).
. Commentators have referred to this standard as the "primary purpose test.” The Reasonable Child, 61 Stan. L.Rev. at 935.
If the primary purpose is to meet an ongoing emergency, the statement is nontestimonial; if there is no ongoing emergency and the primary purpose is instead to establish past events, then the statement is testimonial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266.