dissenting.
In initial consideration, I would reject Dr. Ned Tranel as a qualified expert witness in Wyoming court proceedings carte blanche. Dr. Tranel may be considered a member of a platoon, if not an army, of the new mode of forensic witnesses. These experts are generically characterized as witnesses with testimony for hire. With that direction, these experts provide escape from effective cross-examination because the theories which they profess, for a fee, are often not “generally accepted” as valid determinates.
Even if I could accept Dr. Tranel’s non-medically recognized expertise, which I do not, the vouching and verification of the complainant’s testimony by reference to the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome should not be permitted. Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo.1986); Smith v. State, 564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo.1977). This case disregards the forbidden terrain for testimony pontificated by some “experts” which was carefully excised from trial usage by direction of this court in Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo.1988). Zabel’s direction to protect the truth in decision making by the jury must be followed. Otherwise, we turn trials into forensic witness combat where, in a criminal context, the defendant never has an equal or fair fight while seeking justice. Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 590 (Wyo.1990), Urbig-kit, J., dissenting.
This case provides another example of the results of an “expert witness/bad acts” prosecutorial campaign where evidence of guilt is unequally contested. The search for truth is submerged under the visible surface and obscured by the free flowing, but expensive, hypothesis delivered by the prosecution’s expert. The resulting eviden-tiary test focuses primarily on the expert’s communication skills and vague recitation of behavioral characteristics which are then combined with the derogatory connotations, provided for adverse jury influence, from non-relevant bad acts testimony. In this case, we add the redundancy of the sole witness’ exculpatory testimony to both validate whatever the complainant said and to provide independent stimuli for jury de-cisional motivation. The decision here clearly bypasses the reliability requirement of the Frye test for expert testimony introduction. Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013 (C.A.D.C.1923). I would agree with the analysis provided by appellant:
The Frye test has survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, United States v. Brown, 577 [557] F.2d *754541 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.1977), and presumably is still part of Wyoming law when a person professing expertise purports to interpret test results and other scientific data. There are, after all, at least two parts to the introduction of scientific evidence. First there is the test data itself, and [sjecond, there is the expert’s interpretation or opinion regarding that data. This is as true with psychological testing as it is with the polygraph. The test data is meaningless and irrelevant without the interpretive expert opinion. But with an expert opinion that does not conform to the Frye standard the entire matter is inadmissible.
And, in conclusion, appellant states:
The testimony of Dr. Tranel which vouched for the credibility of the accuser, as well as the repetition of the accuser’s story by others, and the lack of acceptance of Dr. Tranel’s theories, and the repetition of prior dissimilar misconduct by Appellant would each, taken individually, be sufficient grounds for reversal of Appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial. Considered in combination, these significant and serious eviden-tiary deficiencies are part of a considered program to bolster the credibility of the' accuser and destroy the character of the Appellant, prior to evidence of crimes charged in this case being presented. That is an inappropriate method of proving the offenses charged, a method which denies Appellant the benefit of due process of law and the presumption of innocence.
I respectfully dissent.