dissenting:
The reasoning in the majority opinion, when carried to its logical conclusion, will result in protecting Appellant (and others similarly situated, including Peppertree Animal Clinic) from liability under 4 O.S.1991 §§ 42.1 and 42.2. I disagree and dissent.
In Oklahoma, when considering the liability of “owners” to persons bitten or otherwise injured by their dog, different rules apply to “town dogs” than apply to “country dogs”. See 4 O.S.1991 §§ 42.1, 42.2, and 42.3. Here, a “town dog” is involved. Therefore, the exception in § 42.3 should not apply. Apparently, the common law (which gave rise to the truism, “even a dog is allowed one bite”), applies to “country dogs”. City dogs, like human offenders, are not now allowed “one bite”, and strict liability often applies to their owners.
In view of the tenor of Supreme Court decisions in Hampton v. Hammons, 743 P.2d 1053 (Okl.1987), Hood v. Hagler, 606 P.2d 548 (Okl.1979), and Whitefield v. Stewart, 577 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Okl.1978), the word “owner” as used in the above statutes should be most liberally and broadly construed. “Owner” includes persons who possess, control, harbor or maintain a dog. More often than not, a record title to a dog does not exist, and “ownership” is established by some species of oral claim, possession, dominion or control, the same as “ownership” is established for other items of personal property.
Appellant should be held to have been an “owner” within the meaning of §§ 42.1 and 42.2, supra. She had possession, custody, dominion and control of the dog at all times involved in this case.
The majority holds: (1) an “owner” is limited to a person having legal ownership of the dog;1 and, (2) Appellant was not an “owner”. If the majority is correct, and if this town dog had bitten or injured a third party while Appellant was walking the dog, then neither Appellant nor persons similarly situated would be liable under §§ 42.1 and 42.2 as an “owner”; but, Appellees would be liable. In such event the common law doctrine allowing “one bite” apparently would apply in favor of Appellant (but not *1109Appellees) if some other member of the public was bitten and injured. This ignores obvious legislative intent.
In my opinion, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment for the Appel-lees.2 The statute allows third parties to sue “owners” in tort. It does not authorize an injured “owner” to sue some other “owner”. I would hold that the defense of assumption of risk applies to these facts, as a matter of law.
I respectfully DISSENT.
. The majority opinion uses the term “person having the legal right to possession”, but the context requires this to mean "legal ownership".
. Since neither party to this action makes any contention under 4 O.S.1991 § 43,1 assume it is not applicable to this case.
4 O.S.1991 §§ 44 through 47 were enacted in 1991, but did not become effective until February 1, 1992. Whatever the effect of §§ 44 through 47 may or may not be, they cannot apply to the case being considered.