dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion to the extent that it sustains the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in what I think is an overly technical application of statutory procedures. Bennion’s petition for agency action under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 asked the Board to order Graham Resources to account for and pay Bennion all proceeds due him from two wells. No one doubts that an accounting was appropriate. The only issue is whether Bennion should have formally sought a pooling order first. The' Board could certainly have granted Benn-ion appropriate relief in an accounting proceeding and ascertained Bennion’s share of the costs to be offset against what Graham owed Bennion.
It is clear that Graham Resources had all the information necessary for the Board to determine Bennion’s “proportionate share of the cost of the drilling in the operation of the well” and could have entered a formal pooling order if that were necessary. See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (1988). Under the circumstances, an accounting was an appropriate procedural vehicle for determining what Graham owed Bennion. If the entry of a pooling order depended upon bringing other nonconsenting owners in the drilling unit before the Board, that could easily have been done.
The dispute in this case seems to have grown out of animosities between Bennion and Graham Resources, which may have provoked some degree of irritation on the part of the Board. If so, that is not a valid reason for refusing to grant the relief to which a petitioner is entitled. It seems to me that the Board’s insistence upon such a highly technical procedural distinction serves no useful purpose and is capricious.