dissenting:
William Morris entered into an agreement with UNLV to “obtain a license to use one of the said boxes” at the Thomas and Mack Center. The use of this box was offered by UNLV to Morris “for the purpose of permitting [Morris] to view from the box collegiate basketball games presented by the University . As I see the arrangement between Morris and UNLV, it was very similar to a season ticket by which the ticketholder/licensee would be permitted to use a certain seat to watch basketball games — hardly the kind of interest that could be characterized as “property.” In fact, Morris and UNLV agreed in writing that the box license “creates no possessory interest which would be subject to property taxes.”
Just because Morris and UNLV believed that the license had no taxable value is not, of course, conclusive on the question of whether Morris had a property right or had any interest that was of value; still, I find nothing in the record that indicates that Morris’ right to watch basketball games, by virtue of what amounts to a glorified season ticket, can be translated into either a property right or an interest of value that would be subject to execution.
Morris was permitted to watch games from the box only for so long as he paid a very high fee for the privilege. In addition to paying the box fee, Morris was required by his agreement with UNLV to purchase ten season basketball tickets for seating in the box. Morris was prohibited from selling his tickets for a profit and, as I read the agreement, prohibited from “scalping” his box at cost higher than that which he was paying for the use of the box.
Morris’ use of the box was conditioned upon his paying to UNLV $24,750.00 per year. Morris assigned a twenty-five per cent right in the box (four seats) to Jay Nady, who in turn agreed to pay $8,000.00 per year for the privilege. Morris assigned to his four children the remaining interest in the box, provided that they pay their proportionate share “of the rent per year” for the three remaining years under the agreement.
Now there may be something sinister in the assignment transaction, but I cannot see it; and neither could the trial judge. It should be noted that the trial judge’s decision in favor of Morris was based on a record that we do not now have before us. The trial court based its decision on the “records and documents on file herein and admitted as evidence.” Sportsco failed to designate the entire record as the Record on Appeal and, specifically, did not designate the trial exhibits or the deposition transcripts entered as evidence. We have ruled that the “lack of a trial record precludes our consideration of the issues” raised on appeal. *635Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 510 P.2d 870 (1973). “When the evidence on which a district court’s judgment rests is not properly included in the record on appeal, it is assumed that the record supports the lower court’s findings. NRAP 10.” Raishbrook v. Estate of Mayley, 90 Nev. 415, 528 P.2d 1331 (1974). I would note that there is no Statement of Evidence or any other agreed upon statement under NRAP 10. Under these circumstances I assume that the trial court’s finding and conclusions are supported by the absent record.
I do not think a season ticket or a season box is property; and, if it were, the property would certainly lose its value at the end of the sports year. Whatever the value of the “usufruct” that a season ticket or box holder might have is certainly cancelled out by the obligation for continued payment that is attached to the privilege. I have been cited to no evidence in this case to show me that a holder of one of these boxes is in a position to peddle the privilege for a profit or that, if this were possible, there is a property interest of value that would be subject to execution proceedings. Under these circumstances, I would give deference to the trial court and affirm its judgment.