(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent, for I remain unpersuaded that the trial judge abused his discretion, either in his evidentiary ruling or in the ultimate order appealed from.
The fact that the trial judge was fully cognizant of the sensitive nature of the issues presented for detérmination is adequately reflected in the content of his order.
It is first to be noted that the order is only temporary, and specifically provides for a review by either party after six months. Should an earlier review be necessary, either party may of course seek it under the ongoing jurisdiction of the court in such matters.1
In addition, the order restrains the defendant from doing or saying anything “in the presence of the minor children of the parties which directly or indirectly touches upon her lifestyle or sexual preferences in general.” Likewise, the order restrains the plaintiff from doing so.
Further, the order prohibits visitation during such times as there is a- male occupant of defendant’s residential premises.
I can only conclude that the trial court has the situation in hand, and that his order should not be prematurely disturbed. I view this as a “wait and see” situation which can best be handled at the trial level.
*647Insofar as the award of attorneys’ fees is concerned, it lies within the prerogative of the trial court to determine if an award is to be made. In this instance, the record supports the order making an award since it was shown that fees were necessarily incurred, that defendant was in need of assistance in the payment thereof, and that plaintiff had the ability to contribute.
I would affirm.
CROCKETT, C. J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, J.. Provided for by U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5.