(dissenting) — I believe that the act is unconstitutional in that it contravenes Art. 2, § 19, of the state constitution, which provides:
“No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.”
The majority relies upon Wigmore on Evidence and State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 34 Pac. 201, 23 L. R. A. 340, for the rule that the courts cannot consider legislative journals for the purpose of impeaching an enrolled bill, but only the enrolled bill itself. I agree with that rule. The Jones case held that the courts cannot go back of an enrolled bill to determine whether or not all proper steps were taken in its enactment; that an enrolled bill is itself conclusive evidence of its regular enactment. But this court has held many times that it can consider the legislative history of an act in order to determine the purpose of such legislation. This is especially true in considering its constitutionality. See State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 27 Wn. (2d) 99, 176 P. (2d) 459, 170 A. L. R. 1425; State ex rel. Veys v. Superior Court, 33 Wn. (2d) 638, 206 P. (2d) 1028.
I do not contend that the act under consideration was not regularly enacted. I contend that it is unconstitutional because it embraces two entirely different subjects.
*793February 5, 1949, the 27th day of the session, house bill No. 322 was introduced under the title: “An Act relating to public utility districts; authorizing any two or more districts to exercise jointly certain powers now vested in individual districts, and providing for joint acquisition of certain utility properties.” This bill passed the House February 18th, the fortieth day.
On the same day house bill No. 561 was introduced. Its title read: “An Act relating to public utility districts; amending section 2, Chapter 245, Laws of 1941, as previously amended; and declaring an emergency.”
In the meantime, on February 17th, there was introduced in the Senate, senate bill No. 301, with the title, “An Act relating to the conservation and development of the state’s electrical resources, the financing of facilities for the generation, transmission, and distribution thereof, creating a Washington State Power Commission; prescribing its powers and duties and the compensation of its members; making an appropriation and declaring an emergency.”
March 3rd, the fifty-third day of the sixty-day session, the House amended house bill No. 561 (the title of which was hereinbefore quoted), by adding sections 2 to 17, and by amending the title to read as it now appears in chapter 227 of the 1949 session laws. The amended bill was then passed by the House. March 8th, the fifty-eighth day of the session, house bill 561, as amended, was adopted by the legislature.
The majority quotes a statement from Marston v. Humes, 3 Wash. 267, 28 Pac. 520, as to the meaning of the word “subject” in the constitutional provision. There is no question but that general subjects such as taxation, workmen’s compensation, labor relations, soldiers’ bonus, etc., may contain sub-subjects which are germane to the general legislation considered. However, we are not confined to the title alone in determining whether or not the act contravenes the constitutional prohibition against containing more than one subject. We must consider the body of the act itself.
“Under the constitutional provision, a title is an indispensable part of every statute, and the expression of the *794subject of the act must be found, if at all, in the words of the title. It must be clearly understood, however, that when a statute is attacked because of duality or plurality, the attack is upon the body of the act, not simply upon the caption. ‘Plurality of title is not an objection to an act which deals with but one subject.’ A title may limit the scope of an act, but it cannot broaden or extend the effect of the act as expressed in the body.
“The constitutional provision on titles, therefore, has two component parts. It limits legislation to a single general subject; it requires that this single subject be indicated in the title. In consequence, a statute may be attacked on either one or both of these grounds.” 1 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd ed.) 299, § 1709.
Now let us briefly consider the act. Section 1 provides for taxing public utility districts. Section 2 permits two or more public utility districts to acquire jointly all or any part of certain electric utilities. (This section was enacted to meet the objections pointed out in State ex rel. P.U.D. No. 1 of Skagit County v. Wylie, 28 Wn. (2d) 113, 182 P. (2d) 706, and is the section under which the present action was brought.) Section 3 provides:
“Sec. 3. The Columbia River and its tributaries within the State of Washington and the rivers flowing from the watersheds of the Cascade and Olympic Mountains, and all other rivers and streams of the State of Washington in so far as they affect the hydroelectric power, are hereby declared to be natural resources of this state, and their development and use by the people of this state and of the United States is declared to be of public benefit. The creation and development of hydroelectric power from such rivers and streams in the interest of the people of this state and such natural resources, including the beds and waters of such rivers, the power and power sites in, upon or adjacent to the watersheds of such rivers, owned or controlled by the people of this state, or which may be recovered by or come within their ownership, possession and control shall always remain inalienable to and ownership, possession and control thereof shall always be vested in, the people of this state. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any river or stream covered by the provisions of chapter 9, Laws of 1949. As this natural resource so declared in this act is directly related with the natural resources of fisheries and game, no *795permit for construction for the generation of power on any of the waters mentioned in this section shall hereafter be granted by the Supervisor of Hydraulics without the concurrence of the Director of Fisheries and the Director of Game.”
That is a preamble to the Washington substitute for a Columbia Valley Authority.
. Section 4 creates the Washington state power commission, a political subdivision of the state, exercising governmental and public powers, with the right to sue and be sued. Section 5 provides for the appointment of three members. Section 6 authorizes the commission to explore (a) the development and utilization of hydroelectric power in the state, (b) the present and potential hydroelectric resources of the state, and (c) the utilization and integration of electric facilities and requirements of the state.
Section 7 authorizes and directs the commission to acquire by lease, contract, purchase, or condemnation, all property necessary to operate dams, power houses, transmission lines, and to generate, produce, sell at wholesale, transmit and deliver such electric energy to qualified purchasers; and to establish rates which shall not be subject to regulation by the department of public utilities. Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 give powers to the commission to carry out the purposes of the act.
Then we have § 17, which provides that § 1 shall take effect immediately.
Turning again to the title, it will be seen that the first part is practically a replica of the title of senate bill No. 301, creating a Washington state power commission; that the second part is a replica of the title of house bill No. 322, permitting two or more public utility districts to jointly acquire certain utility properties; and that the third part refers to taxation of public utility districts.
Turning again to the act itself, § 1 provides for the taxation of public utility districts and § 17 provides that § 1 shall take effect immediately. Section 2 permits two or more public utility districts to jointly acquire certain utility properties. Sections 1, 2, and 17 refer to public utility dis*796tricts, municipal corporations authorized by the people when they adopted the public utility district initiative in 1930. Then we find § 3 to 16, inclusive, which make a complete and comprehensive state power authority, even to a preamble contained in § 3. No two subjects could be more repugnant to each other than public utility districts and a state power authority.
As proof that these subjects are repugnant to each other, it can be seen from the legislative history that the Senate would not pass the house bills relating to public utility districts, and that the House would not pass the senate bill creating a state power authority. So they compromised by putting these two strange bedfellows together in one act.
The majority emphasizes a portion of the title: “An Act relating to the conservation, development and utilization of the state’s electrical resources and of facilities for the generation, transmission and distribution thereof;” and says that that portion of the title clearly states that the general subject of the act is the state’s electrical resources. But an examination of the title of senate bill No. 301, where the same wording was used, shows that those words were merely preliminary to the real subject of the bill, which was the creation of a Washington state power commission.
The bill as enacted contains two subjects separate and distinct from each other and contravenes Art. 2, Section 19 of the state constitution.
The judgment should be reversed.
Hill, J., concurs with Schwellenbach, J.
February 23, 1951. Petition for rehearing denied.