This is a prisoner’s rights case. In reaching our decision we must first determine whether the scope of the due process clause of our state constitution is the same as that of the due process clause of the federal constitution. We hold that our due process clause does not necessarily have the same scope as that of the federal constitution. In this case we conclude that the burden of proof established by the United States Supreme Court in prison discipline cases is the standard we establish under our due process clause. However, we hold that there were inadequate written findings of the evidence relied on in disciplining the prisoner. We also question the hearing officer’s decision not to permit two witness*39es to testify at the disciplinary hearing. We reverse the decisions of the magistrate and the district judge that the prisoner’s right to due process was not violated.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
In December 1983 Anthony Cootz, then a prisoner in the Southern Idaho Correctional Institution, was charged with violating prison rules by kicking a correctional officer in the chest. At the hearing, the only evidence presented against Cootz was the correctional officer’s offense report. The correctional officer did not testify. Neither did Cootz. Cootz requested that four witnesses be called in his defense. Two of these, both inmates, testified. Two others, one an inmate and the other the sergeant in charge of the unit where the correctional officer worked, were not called by the hearing officer on the ground they were not available. Cootz contended that the sergeant would say that the correctional officer told him that he would lie about the purported assault. Cootz said' he did not know what the third inmate would be able to say about the incident, because he had not had an opportunity to talk to the inmate.
Following the hearing the hearing officer found Cootz guilty of the violation. The hearing officer’s written finding of the evidence he relied upon for the finding of guilt read: “The perponderance [sic] of the evidence put forth indicates you are indeed guilty of assaulting the officer.” The hearing officer sanctioned Cootz with sixty days disciplinary detention.
Cootz filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was denied due process in the disciplinary hearing. Cootz listed among the grounds for his petition that (1) he had been denied the right to call witnesses who could have testified that he did not kick the officer and (2) no evidence had been presented at the disciplinary hearing to sustain a finding of guilt. In its return to the petition the state contended that Cootz had been permitted to have witnesses testify on his behalf and that it was within the prerogative of the hearing officer to determine whether the preponderance of the evidence considered at the hearing sustained the hearing officer’s finding.
In the evidentiary hearing conducted by the magistrate the hearing officer testified that in reaching his decision at the hearing he considered (1) the correctional officer’s offense report, (2) the testimony of the two inmates called at the request of Cootz, (3) the testimony of Cootz and (4) the fact that the sergeant who was in charge of the unit where the correctional officer worked would not have allowed the offense report to be written if he had not felt or believed that the report was true. The hearing officer also testified that he did not call the sergeant as á witness at the disciplinary hearing because he was not on duty at the time of the hearing. He said he did not call the other inmate as a witness at the disciplinary hearing because he had been transferred somewhere else.
The sergeant did testify at the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate. He said that he did not remember hearing the correctional officer say he would lie about the purported assault, but that his memory might have been better at the time of the disciplinary hearing. At the. hearing before the magistrate Cootz said that the third inmate would have been able to testify as to other matters not directly related to the purported assault incident, but of matters that took place at the other end of the tier where the incident occurred.
The magistrate concluded that Cootz had not been denied his right to due process by the refusal of the hearing officer to call the sergeant and the third inmate as witnesses. The magistrate also concluded that there was evidence admitted at the disciplinary hearing upon which the hearing officer could have made a finding of guilt. The magistrate denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Cootz appealed the magistrate’s decision to the district judge. The district judge affirmed the decision of the magistrate. In doing so the district judge ruled that the hearing officer’s decision would be upheld *40if it were supported by some evidence. In doing so the district judge cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985). The district judge concluded that the correctional officer’s offense report was sufficient evidence upon which to uphold the hearing officer’s decision.
The district judge also noted that Cootz had raised for the first time on appeal the question of whether the hearing officer had made a written record of the evidence he relied on in reaching his decision as required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The district judge concluded that the failure to argue or raise this issue before the magistrate constituted waiver.
Cootz appealed to this Court from the district judge’s decision. We assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. In a per curiam opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge’s decision. Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 786, 792 P.2d 351 (Ct.App.1989). Cootz petitioned for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. We granted review.
ÍI.
IS THE SCOPE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE IDAHO CONSTITUTION THE SAME AS THAT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?
Cootz asserts that under the due process clause of our constitution (art. 1, § 13) the some evidence standard established by the United States Supreme Court in the Hill ease should not apply. We agree that the scope of the Idaho due process clause is not necessarily the same as that of the federal constitution, but we conclude that in this case, the standard set by the Supreme Court in Hill is the appropriate one.
We note with interest that just 100 years ago when our state constitution was being formulated the question of the inclusion of a due process clause was considered. When the proposed art. 1, § 13 was amended to insert the due process clause, the objection was made that the same language existed in the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Despite this objection, the section containing the due process clause was adopted. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho (1889) 287, 1595. While this does not establish by itself that the scope of our due process clause is different than that of the federal constitution, it does indicate that the drafters of our constitution believed that the federal due process clause did not make it unnecessary for our constitution to guarantee due process of law.
We also note that from time to time this Court has said in passing that our constitutional provision relating to due process of law is substantially the same as that of the United States Constitution. E.g., State v. Peterson, 81 Idaho 233, 236, 340 P.2d 444, 446 (1959). However, we find no decision of this Court that has squarely addressed the question of whether the scope of our due process clause is the same as that of the fourteenth amendment. Today, we conclude that the scope is not necessarily the same. We are prepared to consider the parameters of due process under art. 1, § 13 of our constitution without being necessarily bound by the interpreta-tion given to due process by the United States Supreme Court. Cf. State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988) (Idaho’s constitutional provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to different interpretation than that given to the fourth amendment.).
We also note that from time to time this Court has decided due process questions with reference to our state constitution only, without considering the scope of the fourteenth amendment. E.g., State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 56, 245 P.2d 788, 791 (1952); White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784, 786, 572 P.2d 887, 889 (1977); Melody’s Kitchen v. Harris, 114 Idaho 327, 333, 757 P.2d 190, 196 (1988). These cases are evidence that this Court has not always found it necessary to resort to decisions of *41the United States Supreme Court under the fourteenth amendment to decide what content we will give to our own due process clause.
Nevertheless, in this case we are persuaded that the “some evidence rule” formulated by the Supreme Court in Hill is the appropriate one for us to adopt in prison discipline cases. The rationale given by the Supreme Court for this rule seems sound in light of the complexity of the prison setting. In Hill the Court dealt with the revocation of good time credits. Here, we deal with disciplinary detention. We do not find any significant difference in the liberty that is impaired by one compared to the other. In Hill the Court said:
The requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government action. Where a prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits, the loss of such credits threatens his prospective freedom from confinement by extending the length of imprisonment. Thus the inmate has a strong interest in assuring that the loss of good time credits is not imposed arbitrarily. This interest, however, must be accommodated in the distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings “take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully incarcerated for doing so.” Consequently, in identifying the safeguards required by due process, the Court has recognized the legitimate institutional needs of assuring the safety of inmates and prisoners, avoiding burdensome administrative requirements that might be susceptible to manipulation, and preserving the disciplinary process as a means of rehabilitation.
Requiring a modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits will help to prevent arbitrary deprivations without threatening institutional interests or imposing undue administrative burdens____ Because the written statement mandated by Wolff requires a disciplinary board to explain the evidence relied upon, recognizing that due process requires some evidentiary basis for a decision to revoke good time credits will not impose significant new burdens on proceedings within the prison. Nor does it imply that a disciplinary board’s factual findings or decisions with respect to appropriate punishment are subject to second-guessing upon review.
472 U.S. at 454-55, 105 S.Ct. at 2773-74, 86 L.Ed.2d at 364-65 (citations omitted).
III.
DID THE HEARING OFFICER’S FINDING PROVIDE SOME EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS DECISION?
The hearing officer’s written finding did not indicate what evidence he relied on in disciplining Cootz. It referred merely to the “perponderance [sic] of the evidence put forth.” The hearing officer testified in the hearing before the magistrate that he relied in part on the offense report in reaching his decision to discipline Cootz. Although the offense report might have been sufficient evidence to support the disciplinary decision, the hearing officer’s failure to state in his written findings the evidence on which he relied violated one of the requirements of Wolff. There the Supreme Court held “that there must be a ‘written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons’ for the disciplinary action.” 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d at 956.
Here, it is clear that the requirement of a written finding of the evidence relied on is a salutary one, since the hearing officer later testified that he also relied on the fact that the sergeant who was in charge of the unit where the correctional officer worked would not have allowed the offense report to be filed if he did not believe it was correct. The reliance on this “evidence” is especially erroneous, since the procedures that applied to the disciplinary hearing specifically provided that “the Hearing Officer shall consider only evidence presented during the course of such hearing.” We also find it curious that the hearing officer said he relied on the testimony of Cootz, since *42Cootz did not testify in the disciplinary hearing.
While we are prepared to accept the “some evidence” standard established in Hill, we are not prepared to overlook the written finding requirement of Wolff in determining whether there is some evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision. If we were to do so, we would open the door to post-hearing rationalizations whenever a prisoner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence stated in the written findings. It is not a heavy burden to place on our correctional officials to require them to state in their disciplinary decisions the evidence upon which they relied. Wolff requires it. So do we. We will look only to the written findings made at the time the discipline was ordered to determine if there was some evidence to support the decision. Here, the written findings do not indicate any evidence the hearing officer considered to support his decision.
We are unable to agree with the district judge that the issue of written findings was waived by Cootz because he did not present evidence or argue the point before the magistrate. One major thrust of the challenge Cootz has made throughout this proceeding is that there was not sufficient evidence to support the decision to discipline him. While his focus was generally on the inadequacy of the offense report to support the decision, he did preserve the question of the adequacy of the evidence. The written findings requirement of Wolff is inextricably interwoven with this question.
Because of the inadequacy of the findings of the hearing officer, we reverse the decision of the magistrate as affirmed by the district judge.
IV.
THE FAILURE TO CALL OTHER WITNESSES REQUESTED BY COOTZ.
While we have reversed based on the inadequacy of the findings of the hearing officer, we also note our concern with the manner in which the hearing officer denied Cootz the opportunity to present his other two witnesses. The standard set in Wolff for allowing an inmate the opportunity to call witnesses is “when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979, 41 L.Ed.2d at 956. Here, the findings of the magistrate indicate that the hearing officer did not call the sergeant because he was not on duty at the time of the hearing and that the hearing officer did not call the third inmate because he had been transferred “somewhere else.” Neither of these reasons appear to fulfill the “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals” standard.
V.
CONCLUSION.
We reverse the decision of the magistrate denying Cootz a writ of habeas corpus, as affirmed by the district judge, and remand the case to the magistrate for the granting of the writ and appropriate further proceedings.
BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.