(concurring in part and dissenting in part): Time will not permit writing an exhaustive opinion and I will attempt to set forth my views briefly on the question concerning which I differ with the majority.
I do not agree with that part of the opinion which holds that the jury’s answers to the special questions are so inconsistent with the general verdict as to compel a judgment to be entered thereon in favor of appellants.
In considering this question we must bear in mind the often repeated rule of this court that a general verdict imports a finding in favor of the prevailing party upon all of the issues in the case not inconsistent with the special findings, which are to be given such a construction, if possible, as will bring them into harmony with the general verdict. (Hubbard v. Allen, 168 Kan. 695, 701, 215 P. 2d 647; Schroeder v. Nelson, 157 Kan. 320, 326, 139 P. 2d 868; Davis v. Kansas Electric Power Co., 159 Kan. 97, 108, 152 P. 2d 806; Simeon v. Schroeder, 170 Kan. 471, 474, 227 P. 2d 153.) In considering answers of the jury to special questions submitted, the court is not permitted to isolate one answer and ignore others, but all are to be considered together, and if one interpretation leads to inconsistency and another to harmony with the general verdict, the latter is to be adopted. (Dick’s Transfer Co. v. Miller, 154 Kan. 574, 119 P. 2d 454; Lee v. Gas Service Company, 166 Kan. 285, 288, 201 P. 2d 1023.) In considering these special questions and answers together, I am unable to see wherein they are so inconsistent as to compel the overthrowing of the general verdict.
In view of these rules, let us examine the answer to special question No. 1: “How far was plaintiff’s automobile from defendant’s truck when plaintiff could have seen the truck on plaintiff’s side of the highway?” Answer: “600 Feet.” Wherein is this answer inconsistent with the general verdict? At this point plaintiff was not guilty of any negligence. We have held on a number of occasions and the majority opinion concedes the general rule to be that when the driver of a motor vehicle on a public highway is on his *330proper side of the highway, he has a right to presume the driver of a car approaching from the opposite direction and on the left hand or wrong side of the highway will get over on his proper side in time to avoid a collision, and under such circumstances does not have to anticipate he will not do so. (Clark v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, 148 Kan. 155, 79 P. 2d 906; McComas v. Clements, 137 Kan. 681, 21 P. 2d 895; Crowe v. Moore, 144 Kan. 794, 799, 62 P. 2d 846; Balano v. Nafziger, 137 Kan. 513, 21 P. 2d 896; Smith v. Salts, 170, Kan. 313, 224 P. 2d 1025.)
In Duncan v. Branson, 153 Kan. 344, 110 P. 2d 789, we stated at page 350:
“Defendant next argues that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence so as to preclude recovery, and his demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence should have been sustained. In the consideration of this argument we must give the evidence the most favorable consideration possible from the standpoint of the plaintiff. The plaintiff testified that he saw the light of the defendant’s car for the first tune when it was about 450 feet east of him; that he was on the south side of the highway going about 25 miles an hour; that it looked as if it might be going to turn south and the next thing he knew it crashed into him; that he had not figured defendant was going to strike him until he 'plowed right into him.’ There was evidence to the effect that defendant was driving on the wrong side of the highway. The foregoing was sufficient to make the question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence one for the jury. The plaintiff was entitled to believe that the defendant would get back and remain on his' own side of the highway as the cars approached each other. Had the car of defendant been on the proper side of the road at the time they met there would have been no collision.”
In view of what has been said, the answer to question No. 1 in my opinion neither adds to nor detracts from the general verdict.
The jury in answer to special question No. 2: “What, if anything, prevented plaintiff from avoiding the collision by turning his automobile aside after he saw or could have seen defendants’ truck on plaintiff’s side of the highway,” answered “insufficient time.” It must be remembered that the truck and plaintiff’s car were approaching each other at the rate of approximately 130 feet a second, which gave the plaintiff only 4.6 seconds to determine whether the truck would get on its own side of the road, and what action he should take. With such a short time to deliberate, can it be said as a matter of law that this was negligence barring recovery? The jury under the circumstances said it was not.
The answers to questions No. 3 and 4 disclosed that plaintiff’s automobile was at all times traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour. Without laboring this point further, this court has said on *331many occasions that such speed was not unreasonable or negligent under certain conditions; that traffic on the highways must move in keeping with other traffic on the highways. The answer to question No. 5 was that plaintiff never turned from a direct course. In harmonizing the answers to special questions with the general verdict, the jury apparently — and rightfully so — found all the issues in favor of the appellee and against appellants, as disclosed by the pleadings and the evidence under proper instructions from the court, and by their answers to special questions found that appellee first saw the truck on the wrong side of the road when it was 600 feet away; that appellee had a right to presume that such truck would get back on its right side of the road in sufficient time to avoid the collision, until the appellee in the exercise of ordinary care determined that said truck would not get back on its own side of the road, and at that time there was insufficient time for appellee to either slacken his speed or turn aside even if he could have done so safely, and by such general verdict found that the failure of the appellee to act in such case was not a contributing cause or proximate cause of the collision and injury and that the sole and proximate cause of the damage was the appellants’ negligence.
It is an elementary rule of this court and one followed by decisions from nearly every court in the land, that the question of negligence and contributory negligence are matters for the jury. When the facts relating to contributory negligence are of such character that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions thereon, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine. (DeGraw v. Kansas City & Leavenworth Transportation Co., 170 Kan. 713, 228 P. 2d 527; Keir v. Trager, 134 Kan. 505, 7 P. 2d 49, 81 A. L. R. 181, Balano v. Nafziger, supra; cases cited Hatcher’s Kansas Digest, Negligence, § 75; West’s Kansas Digest, Negligence, § 136 [26].)
I cannot say that the answer to question No. 2 is in the nature of a conclusion, nor can I say that the finding is inconsistent with the pleadings or evidence. It seems to me that it is in harmony with both. The questions of negligence and contributory negligence were both matters on which reasonable minds might differ and were questions for the jury in the instant case. The jury determined the matter after hearing and seeing the witnesses testify and being familiar with the surrounding circumstances, and such verdict was approved by a trial court of years of experience, and I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that the special findings returned by the jury are so inconsistent as to compel a judgment *332thereon in favor of appellants. Neither can I bring myself to the conclusion from a reading of extracts of the evidence submitted in this case that the jury should have rendered a different verdict. To me that is usurping the functions of the jury and trial court. I believe the judgment should be affirmed.