(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the decision here when read in the light of Gaddis v. Ladies Literary Club,1 a recent case decided by this court. In that case there was testimony that the floor was slippery, as was the testimony here, yet this court would not permit the case to go to the jury.
Nor can I agree with the pronouncements in this case which, in substance and effect, declare terrazzo, as such, to be dangerous per se, nor with the implication of the main opinion that because people customarily use mats on terrazzo in wet weather, that they are negligent if they do not use such mats.
Furthermore, I am of the opinion that in allowing recovery under the facts of this case, we approach a rule of absolute insur-ability on the part of merchants whenever it storms and persons use their entrances, if a mat is not placed therein, — a circumstance which, in my opinion, may or may not be evidence of negligence, and which may or may not be an exercise of greater care than that which such merchants need exercise.
. 4 Utah 2d 121, 288 P.2d 785.