(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The main opinion improperly addresses issues that, as a result of the jury’s no-cause-of-action verdict, are not before this court. In dicta, however, the main opinion goes far beyond the scope of the case law governing the issues framed in the main opinion. In the event that the main opinion might be misconstrued as binding case law, I feel compelled to respond to the main opinion’s analysis.
No-Cause-Of-Action Verdict
Prior to selecting the jury, plaintiff presented to the trial court several articles concerning tort reform. Plaintiff argued that he should be able to have the prospective jurors questioned as to their awareness of such articles. Plaintiff submitted eleven proposed questions with respect to tort-reform issues. Over plaintiff’s objections, the trial court refused to ask any of plaintiffs questions. After a two-week trial, the jury returned a no-cause-of-action verdict.
The main opinion overlooks the import of the jury’s verdict with regard to plaintiff’s arguments on appeal. Plaintiff has not alleged that the jury returned a no-eause-of-action verdict as a result of the trial court’s alleged inadequacies in its voir dire questioning with respect to tort-reform issues. In fact, the article and advertisements submitted by plaintiff discuss tort-reform issues in the context of the amount of damages being awarded by juries after negligence is determined. They simply do not suggest that juries should not make the initial determination of negligence.1 Therefore, in order to *105even get to the question, plaintiff must show that he was prejudiced in the initial negligence determination by the trial court’s failure to inquire into the prospective jurors’ familiarity with the articles. Plaintiff has made no such showing.
This very issue was addressed in Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688 (1979), principally relied on by the main opinion. In that case, Borkoski filed a medical malpractice action against several doctors and a hospital. Borkoski argued by motion that he should be permitted to question prospective jurors as to the influence of a national campaign by leading insurance companies with regard to tort-reform issues. The trial court denied Borkoski’s motion. Following the presentation of evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants. On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court opined at length, but in dicta, about how issues of tort-reform material should be handled during voir dire. However, the court concluded with the following statement:
Unfortunately, the foregoing conclusions [with respect to tort-reform issues] do not avail Borkoski on this appeal. Even though we accept Borkoski’s arguments, it is undeniable that the purpose of advertisements was to reduce the amount of damages awarded by a jury. At no point is it suggested, either by Borkoski or in the advertisements themselves, that juries should not find a party negligent in the first place. The ads speak only to damages, not liability. Here, the jury found defendant doctors not liable at all. The jury did not even reach the question of damages. In such a case, Borkoski’s arguments lose their vitality, and any error committed must be viewed as harmless and not grounds for reversal.
Id. 594 P.2d at 695 (citation omitted). This is precisely the situation in the present case. The jury never even reached the issue of damages. Therefore, like the conclusion in Borkoski any alleged error committed by the trial court during voir dire must “viewed as harmless and not grounds for reversal.” This should be the end of the main opinion’s inquiry and any analysis beyond this point is superfluous and mere dicta.
Specific Tort-reform Information
The main opinion, however, proceeds to analyze the merits of plaintiffs arguments. In its treatment of plaintiffs arguments, it goes far beyond the controlling case law governing voir dire when issues involving specific tort-reform material are present. As indicated by the main opinion, there are three different situations when plaintiffs may attempt to address tort-reform issues during voir dire:
First, plaintiffs have sought to inquire into prospective jurors’ relationships with insurance companies.... Second, plaintiffs have requested permission to determine whether jurors have been exposed to a specific, identifiable media report or advertising campaign; often where insurance companies have funded such a campaign to convince the public of the “evils” of modem tort law and the impact of large jury awards on insurance premiums_ Finally, plaintiffs have sought to inquire of jurors as to their general knowledge about and attitudes toward medical negligence and tort reform without regard to a specific advertising campaign or news media report.
Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah App.1991) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992). The main opinion seems to indicate that this case may fit within either the second or third categories. However, plaintiff presented a specific article and several advertisements to the trial court, and now complains that the trial court erred in not conducting additional voir dire with respect to possible bias as a result of the identified articles. Therefore, this case fits squarely within the second category regarding specific tort-reform articles and campaigns.
Since this case involves specific tort-reform articles, it is governed by Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App.1989), *106cert. denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), which was the first case in this jurisdiction to deal with specific tort-reform material. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (under stare decisis, first appellate panel to issue opinion on particular question of law binds all subsequent panels). This case is therefore governed not by Evans, as asserted by the main opinion, but by Ostler. In relying on the wrong case, the main opinion applies the wrong test and needlessly confuses the analysis where the voir dire process is challenged with respect to specific tort-reform material.
In Ostler, the plaintiff presented to the trial court several questions regarding specific tort-reform material. The trial court refused to ask plaintiffs questions. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the voir dire was inadequate to reveal bias related to a specific tort-reform advertising campaign conducted by a national insurance agency. This court did not apply the complex analysis contained in the Borkoski dicta, but instead applied the traditional test by looking at the voir dire questioning as a whole to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. 781 P.2d at 447 (citing Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah App.1989), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990)). The court concluded:
In lieu of plaintiffs proposed questions, the judge informed the venire that plaintiffs claim may exceed a million dollars and asked if any would object to an award of that magnitude. None did. The judge also asked if any of the prospective jurors believed that people should not resort to the courts to settle disputes or recover damages for injuries. Again, none did. The judge followed with a question asking whether any believed they were incapable of rendering a fair and true verdict based on the evidence. None responded affirmatively. In their totality, and in .the context with the remainder of voir dire, these questions are substantially responsive to plaintiffs concerns and appear sufficient to reveal “tort reform” bias in the manner discussed in Doe, 772 P.2d at 458-59. Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown an abuse of discretion in the court’s voir dire of prospective jurors.
781 P.2d at 447.
Applying the Ostler test to present case, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its voir dire questioning. The trial court asked the prospective jurors whether any of them owned stock in any companies. None indicated that they owned stock in any insurance companies. The court then informed the prospective jurors that plaintiffs claim for damages could exceed several hundred thousand dollars and asked whether any of them could not give such an award if it was supported by the evidence.2 None of the prospective jurors indicated they could not give such an award. The court asked if any of the prospective jurors believed that it was not appropriate to go to court to resolve disputes and determine compensation for damages.3 None did. The court asked the prospective jurors whether they would be satisfied to have their own case tried with jurors possessing their present state of mind. None indicated they would not be satisfied. The court also asked the prospective jurors if there was any reason that any one them felt they should not serve on the jury. None indicated they *107should not serve. The court further asked whether any of the prospective jurors, members of their families, close friends, or associates were involved in writing long-term disability or health and accident insurance. One prospective juror responded that her husband was involved in writing insurance. She was removed with a peremptory challenge. One other prospective juror responded that her brother-in-law was in the insurance industry, but indicated that she was not familiar with any policies or underwriting procedures. She eventually served on the jury. No other prospective panelists responded affirmatively.
In their totality, and in the context of the remainder of the court’s voir dire questioning, the specific questions asked by the court are substantially responsive to plaintiffs concerns and appear sufficient to reveal “tort-reform” bias in the manner discussed in Ostler, 781 P.2d at 447. Plaintiff has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to use his specific questions during voir dire. While the main opinion likewise concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this context, it utilized an erroneous test and relied on improper case law in reaching its conclusion.
General Tort-reform Information
The main opinion also analyzes this case as if it involved general exposure to tort-reform material. The main opinion mistakenly relies upon Evans since an alleged general exposure to tort-reform material was first dealt with in this jurisdiction by Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458-59 (Utah App.1989), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
In Hafen, the plaintiff, dissatisfied with the amount of judgment received, claimed on appeal that the trial court erred in not asking specific questions with respect to whether any prospective jurors had formed opinions about high damage awards because of tort-reform information. The trial court did ask, however, whether any of the prospective jurors had read or experienced anything that would affect the amount of compensation they were willing to award. This court adopted the reasoning in Borkoski’s dicta in order to analyze whether the trial court’s questioning had been adequate. Id. at 458. This court focused on the Borkoski requirement that before any specific questioning would be allowed, the court must ask a broad preliminary question with regard to whether any of the prospective jurors would be unable, for whatever reason, to be a fair and impartial juror. If any of the prospective jurors indicated they could not be fair and impartial, more specific questioning might be warranted. Applying this principle to the case before it, this court held that in light of the broad general question asked by the court “we conclude the judge properly refused to continue questioning the prospective jurors about [tort-reform information].” Id.
Applying the Hafen test to the present case, the trial court asked several broad preliminary questions designed to determine whether any of the prospective jurors would not be able to be fair and impartial. None of the prospective jurors indicated that they could not serve fairly and impartially. Under Hafen, the questioning was then at an end, and the trial court had no obligation to probe further.4 Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing “to continue questioning the prospective jurors about [tort-reform information].” Id.
By ignoring Hafen, the main opinion has done away with the requirement that there be some initial showing of a question of bias before a plaintiff is entitled to ask specific questions regarding tort-reform material.5 The main opinion states,
*108In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform information, and the corresponding potential for general exposure to such information by potential jurors, a plaintiff is entitled to know which potential jurors, if any, have been so exposed. Plaintiff is entitled to such information absent any particular showing of specific campaigns, advertisements, or literature offered for the purpose of showing potential prejudice.
As a result of the main opinion’s ruling, plaintiffs will now demand that the trial court ask specific questions regarding tort-reform material without any initial showing of a bias. I believe that is contrary to case law and general principles governing voir dire.
Conclusion.
I would affirm the no-cause-of-action verdict. The issue of tort-reform bias influencing the amount of the award is not before us because the jury never reached the issue of damages. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting voir dire with respect to tort-reform issues.
. The main opinion argues that actual holding in Borkoski v. Yost, 182 Mont. 28, 594 P.2d 688, 695 (1979), draws too fine a distinction between the effect tort-reform material might have on the initial finding of negligence as opposed to the effect it might have on the actual amount of the award. See main opinion, at 100 n. 4. The main opinion therefore argues that we should only selectively use Borkoski by relying on its dicta and ignoring its actual holding. The main opinion states that "a juror who has become convinced that damage awards are way out of hand might not restrict the manifestation of his or her bias to the issue of damages; such a juror may well perceive that the first line of attack in keeping damages as low as possible is in finding plaintiff has no cause of action.” Id. If properly raised, this issue might conceivably have merit. However, just as in Borkoski, plaintiff in the instant case presented to the trial court tort-reform material not on the initial determination *105of negligence, but on the amount of tort awards. Plaintiff does not argue that he was in any way prejudiced by the initial determination of negligence. The main opinion has therefore improperly recast plaintiff’s arguments on appeal,
. This question is clearly sufficient to address any concerns with regard to a bias resulting from tort-reform information limiting the amount of damages awarded after negligence is determined. If no prospective juror indicates bias, it is hard to imagine any intelligible reason for going further and inserting the specter of tort-reform material into the voir dire. By so doing, the plaintiff may in fact create the very bias that he or she was hoping to avoid. If on the other hand, a prospective juror, in response to this question, indicated they could not give a large award it is conceivable that it might be necessary to probe further. However, without such a response there is no conceivable reason to require Ae trial court to discuss tort-reform material where no question of bias has been shown.
. This question goes to Ae broader issue of whether a prospective juror would be able to make Ae initial finding of negligence. If the prospective juror felt Aat it was not appropriate to go to court to resolve disputes, it is likely Aat Aat juror would be less willing to make Ae mitial finding of negligence. Since none of the prospective jurors indicated a bias, Aere was no reason to probe further especially by injecting Ae issue of tort-reform material wiA the possi-bUity of prejudice to Ae plaintiff.
. The main opinion indicates that the preliminary broad general question must be phrased so as to detect "whether any of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform and medical negligence propaganda.” However, under Hafen, there is simply no requirement that the trial court focus specifically on "tort reform and medical negligence propaganda.” The trial court, under Hafen, retains the discretion to merely ask a broad preliminary question without indicating that it is looking for bias related to tort-reform material.
. The Evans court similarly ignored the holding in Hafen by suggesting that a tort plaintiff is always entitled to have the prospective jurors questioned about general tort-reform bias. 824 P.2d at 467.