specially concurring.
I agree, that the summary judgment should be reversed and that the ease should be remanded for a trial. However, the opinion of the majority that a landowner owes no duty to his invitees to warn of or remove natural accumulations of snow and ice is incompatible with the plain, unambiguous language contained in Wyoming’s comparative-negligence statute.
The majority applies an extensive statutory analysis to interpret the comparative-negligence statute. Wyo.Stat. § l-l-109(a) (1988). It concludes that the rule that landowners do not have a duty to warn of or remove natural accumulations of ice and snow survived the adoption of the comparative-negligence doctrine in Wyoming. In light of this Court’s decision in O’Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278 (Wyo.1985), such statutory-construction analysis is not necessary or proper in this case.
In O’Donnell, the Court considered the impact of the comparative-negligence statute on the open-and-obvious-danger rule as it applied to nonnatural conditions. . The Court in that case did not go through the elaborate interpretation procedure employed by the majority in this case in construing the comparative-negligence statute. Instead, it appears that the Court found that the plain, unambiguous language of the statute warranted the conclusion that the open-and-obvious-danger rule was not compatible with the comparative-negligence statute, at least with respect to nonnatural dangers. Since the extensive statutory-construction analysis was not necessary in O’Donnell, it is not necessary in this case.
The majority’s analysis of the comparative-negligenee statute is not consistent with the established rules of statutory construction. Section l-l-109(a) provides:
(a) Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if the contributory negligence of the said person is not more than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault. Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recovering.
The proper method of interpreting statutes is explained in Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo.1993) (some citations omitted):
“[T]he intent [of the lawgiver] is the vital part, and the essence of the law.... Such intent, however, is that which is embodied and expressed in the statute ... under consideration.”
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 128, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897). “[T]he initial step in arriving at a correct interpretation ... is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.” Rasmussen, 7 Wyo. at 133, 50 P. at 823....
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On numerous occasions the court has, over its long history, consistently followed a general rule that if the statutory language is unambiguous, the court may not resort to application of rules of construction.
The majority opinion recognizes that Wyoming’s comparative-negligence statute is unambiguous. However, it incorrectly interprets the statute by going beyond the plain and unambiguous language.
Under the plain language of the statute: “Contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence.” Section l-l-109(a). The language of the statute clearly indicates that comparative negligence applies to all actions in negligence. The Legislature did not include an exception in the statute for landowners with regard to natural accumulations of snow and ice. The majority’s interpretation effectively *900reads such an exception into the statute. This interpretation violates a basic tenet of statutory construction — that omission of words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the Legislature. This Court should not read words into a statute when the Legislature has chosen not to include them. Carroll by and through Miller v. Wyoming Production Credit Association, 755 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Wyo.1988).
It makes no sense for this Court to retain the no-duty rule for natural accumulations of snow and ice when we ruled in O’Donnell that the no-duty rule did not apply to nonna-tural dangers under the comparative-negligence statute. See also Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169 (Wyo.1989). In dicta in O’Donnell, we stated that the no-duty view of the open-and-obvious-danger rule should be retained when the danger stems from natural causes. Our reasoning for making nonnatural obvious dangers a factor to be weighed in determining the parties’ respective negligence was that it would be irrational to “provide[] that one who creates a known and obvious danger has no duty to correct it because it is known and obvious.” O’Donnell, 696 P.2d at 1283. We did not really explain why the rule should be retained in conjunction with natural dangers except to say that the dangers were natural. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court considered the relationship between Idaho’s comparative-negligence statute and the open-and-obvious-danger rule in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989). That court held that the open-and-obvious-danger rule inappropriately barred recovery under Idaho’s comparative-negligence statute in cases dealing with nonnatural dangers. In all relevant aspects, Idaho’s comparative-negligence statute 1 is identical to Wyoming’s comparative-negligence statute. The Idaho Supreme Court quoted an Idaho Court of Appeals case in its decision:
“There is also a statutory reason in Idaho to treat an invitee’s knowledge or the obviousness of a danger as a limitation of liability rather than as an excuse of duty. Since 1971, Idaho has been a comparative negligence state. I.C. § 6-801 provides that the plaintiffs contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a negligence action, so long as his negligence is not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. Rather, any damages awarded to the plaintiff are reduced in proportion to the amount of causal negligence attributable to him.
“Prior to the advent of comparative negligence, contributory negligence was an absolute bar to recovery. Thus, it made little difference whether a known or obvious condition excused a land possessor’s duty to an invitee, or simply insulated the possessor from liability for any breach of such duty. In either event, the injured invitee could not recover. But under the comparative negligence system, the difference is profound. If duty is not excused by a known or obvious danger, the injured invitee might recover, albeit in a diminished amount, if his negligence in encountering the risk is found to be less than the land possessor’s negligence in allowing the dangerous condition or activity on his property. In contrast, if the invitee’s voluntary encounter with a known or obvious danger were deemed to excuse the land owner’s duty, then there would be no negligence to compare — and, therefore, no recovery. The effect would be to resurrect contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery in cases involving a land possessor’s liability to invitees.”
Harrison, 768 P.2d at 1325 (quoting Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1118-19 (1983)). See also Koutoufaris *901v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390 (Del.Super.Ct.1992); Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct.App.1989), cert. denied, 789 P.2d 33 (1990); Cox v. J.C. Penney Company, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 28 (Mo.1987) (en banc), accord, Hefele v. National Super Markets, Inc., 748 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.Ct.App.1988); Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or. 548, 687 P.2d 144 (1984) (en banc); and Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.1978).
The Idaho Supreme Court extended the Harrison ruling to natural accumulations of snow and ice in Robertson v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 793 P.2d 211, 213 (Idaho 1990):
[W]e are not able to discern how we could construe the statute to allow an exemption for negligence as to natural accumulations. To do so would require us to construe the statute as allowing us to apply comparative negligence in some cases but not in others. As we read the statute, it does not allow us to do that. The statute speaks categorically about actions for negligence.
I agree with the analysis presented by the Idaho Supreme Court. Wyoming’s comparative-negligence statute forecloses the use of the open-and-obvious-danger rule to discharge a landowner from his obligation to exercise due care with respect to natural accumulations of snow and ice.
The majority’s decision is not based in sound statutory interpretation. Instead, it represents a policy choice by this Court to insulate landowners from responsibility for their own negligence. This policy decision is improper in light of the Legislature’s express direction that contributory negligence “shall not bar a recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence.” Section l-l-109(a).
In my opinion, we should abolish the distinction between nonnatural and natural dangers and treat the accumulation of snow and ice and the obviousness of the danger as being factors to be considered in determining the percentage of fault attributable to each party under the comparative-negligence statute. I would reverse and remand for a trial to determine the parties’ relative percentages of fault.
The majority’s decision places the state of the law in Wyoming in question with regard to nonnatural dangers. Does the majority decision effectively overrule O’Donnell? If the majority’s rationale in this ease is sound, should it now apply to nonnatural dangers as well? Until additional eases have been decided by this Court, the state of the law in Wyoming will, unfortunately, be in a state of flux.
CARDINE, Justice,specially concurring.
I concur in the court’s opinion insofar as it determines the issues presented by the facts in this case. To the extent that the opinion may go beyond this case in discussing the effect of the volume and course of water flowing to adjoining land, I take no position but prefer awaiting a factual presentation that requires our discussion of these questions.
The case we consider here requires resolution of the following:
1. Are there facts from which it could be found that this was an unnatural accumulation of ice or moisture?
2. Is so, was K-Mart negligent in construction or maintenance of the parking lot which permitted the accumulation?
3. Or, was K-Mart negligent in failing to warn of or remove the dangerous condition?
I would confine the discussion in our opinion to the above.
. Idaho Code I.C. § 6-801 provides:
“Comparative Negligence — Effect of contributory negligence. — Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.”
Harrison, 768 P.2d at 1324 n. 1 (emphasis omitted).