I write to make plain the deficiency in Dr. Stutts’ deposition testimony which leads the Court to hold that although an expert witness may rely upon the deposition testimony of a defendant physician, here the deposition testimony was inadequate to form the basis of Dr. Jenkins’ knowledge of the local standard of care.
Dr. Stutts’ was thoroughly questioned at his deposition concerning the specifics of his treatment of Cleon Rhodehouse. Following a lengthy series of questions about this treatment, counsel asked whether his conduct complied with the applicable standard of care. Stutts replied that it did. My review of the deposition reveals, however, that Dr. Stutts was never asked to describe, in the abstract, the standard of care in Idaho Falls in 1987 applicable to a cardiologist performing an invasive procedure such as an angioplasty. Nor was Stutts interrogated as to whether the national standard of care for cardiologists performing such procedures was the same as the local standard.
Thus, the rule to be drawn from the Court’s decision here is that for Rule 56(e) admissibility purposes, an expert witness must rely upon a direct affirmative statement of the local standard of care, either from the deposition testimony of the defendant physician or from other sources, such as conversations with local doctors. An expert may not draw inferences about the local standard of care from deposition testimony concerning the actual course of care rendered to a patient by the defendant.