dissenting:
Although the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) adopts, and the majority embraces, a reasonable method for extending the temporary authority authorized by the General Assembly, the plain language of section 40-6-120(1), 17 C.R.S. (1993), prohibits the statutory construction employed. The statute provides that if the PUC fails to approve a request to extend temporary authority within the statutorily mandated time and before the initial term of temporary authority expires, the PUC may not extend the grant of temporary authority. Because the plain language of the statute is dispositive, I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Farmer’s Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo.1991). To discern intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute. People v. Terry, 791 P.2d 374 (Colo.1990). If the language of the statute is clear and the intent of the General Assembly may be discerned with certainty, it is not necessary to resort to other rules of statutory interpretation. McKinney v. Kautzky, 801 P.2d 508 (Colo.1990). We will not judicially legislate by reading a statute to accomplish something the plain language does not suggest, warrant, or mandate. See Schlessinger v. Schlessinger, 796 P.2d 1385 (Colo.1990) (holding that the court should be careful to avoid judicial legislation by adding to a statute that which the legislature did not deem proper); Jones v. People, 155 Colo. 148, 393 P.2d 366 (1964) (stating that the court may not change the laws enacted by the legislature).
Subsection (1) of section 40-6-120 provides:
To enable the provision of carrier service for which there appears to be an immediate and urgent need to any point or within a territory having no carrier service capable of meeting such need, the commission may, in its discretion and without hearings or other proceedings, grant temporary authority for such service by a common carrier or a contract carrier by motor vehicle, as the case may be. Such temporary authority, unless suspended or revoked for good cause, shall be valid for such time as the commission specifies, but for not more than an aggregate of one hundred eighty days, unless for good cause shown the commission extends such temporary authority for a period of time which may extend until a final administrative decision is rendered, and shall create no presumption that corresponding permanent authority will be granted thereafter.
Nothing in the language of the statute gives the PUC authority to consider extensions of the initial grant beyond 180 days. In my view, simply because the statute is silent, we should not read the statute to accomplish something the plain language does not permit. Although a PUC decision interpreting a statute that regulates agency action must be given weight, Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo.1984), a PUC interpretation of a statute cannot be contrary to the plain language of the statute. See Three Bells Ranch Associates v. Cache La Poudre Water User’s Ass’n, 758 P.2d 164 (Colo.1988) (stating that court deference to agency interpretation of a statute is not compelled when the language of the statute is clear).
The majority notes that the purpose of section 40-6-120 is to “prevent a carrier from suffering financial losses by interrupt-*414mg its services after expiration of its temporary authority but prior to the PUC’s rendering a decision on the carrier’s permanent authority application.” Maj. op. at-. I do not disagree. However, giving effect to the plain language of the statute and holding that the PUC may not act to grant an extension beyond 180 days does not frustrate the purpose of the statute. Carriers will not suffer financial loss if they request, and the PUC grants, an extension 'of temporary authority in a timely manner.
Even in this case, the intent of the General Assembly was not frustrated. Although the PUC delayed the grant of temporary authority beyond the statutorily required time, Blackjack Shuttle Express, Inc. (Blackjack), did not request an extension until two days before the expiration of the 165-day temporary authority. The majority states that this request was “timely.” Maj. op. at 411. It was not. The PUC’s Rule of Practice and Procedure 50(j)(4) provides that a “motion for an extension of [temporary authority] should be filed at least twenty days before expiration” so that the request for an extension can determined before the -temporary authority expires. Section 40-6-120(1) requires a showing of good cause to obtain an extension of temporary authority beyond the 180-day period and to obtain protection of temporary authority until the administrative processes are completed.
Therefore, if Blackjack complied with the PUC rule which was enacted as a result of the statutory time limitation, the purpose of the statute would have been satisfied. In my view, we should not rewrite the statute to give one group the benefit of the statute when that group failed to comply with the PUC rules.
The majority relies on Blackjack’s filing of a request for an extension as the crucial event that somehow “tolls” the 180-day period. The plain wording of the statute requires that the initial temporary authority may not be for more than an aggregate of 180 days, and extensions can only be granted for good cause during the 180-day period. There is no statutory source of authority for the proposition that a “timely” filing of a request for extension “tolls” the operation of section 40-6-120(1).
The General Assembly could have provided that a carrier operating under initial temporary authority could continue to operate until the PUC acted upon a timely request for an extension of that temporary authority. For example, such a scheme is specifically created in the State Administrative Procedure Act. See § 24-4-104(7), 10A C.R.S. (1993 Supp.) (stating that a licensee may continue under his license until an administrative agency has acted upon a request for renewal). The legislature made no provision for tolling the statute. Subsection (3) of section 40-6-120 specifically forecloses that possibility by barring the use of the State Administrative Procedure Act or any alternate vehicle for renewing or extending temporary grants of authority.1 If the filing of a request may toll the statutory time limit, as the majority and PUC suggest, temporary authority may theoretically become a permanent authority if the PUC never makes a determination. In my view, this was not the intent of the General Assembly when it enacted section 40-6-120, 17 C.R.S. (1993).
Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice SCOTT joins in this dissent.
. § 40-6-120(3), 17 C.R.S. (1993) states:
The maximum time period of any temporary authority or approval.shall not be extended or renewed under the provisions of article 4 of title 24, C.R.S. [the State Administrative Procedure Act], or otherwise.