(concurring in the result).
I concur in affirming the judgment of the district court. The reasons which prompt me to do so are the following:
Sec. 78-4 — 16, U.C.A.19S3, reads:
The city court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all cases arising under or by reason of the violation of any of the ordinances of the city * *
This law was enacted in 1901 and has been in force and effect ever since.
When the Juvenile Court Act was passed in 1965, the jurisdiction of juvenile courts was given by Sec. 55-10-77, which so far as material reads: “Except as otherwise provided by law, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction * * * ”
At that time violations of city ordinances were otherwise provided for, and so the juvenile courts were not given jurisdiction over them.
*261The matter seems clear enough up to this point. The ticklish problem arises by reason of the language of Sec. 55-10-79, U.C.A.1953 (1967 Supp.), quoted in the dissenting opinion of Justice Callister. That section clearly says that in cases of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding, where it is ascertained that a juvenile is involved, the case shall be transferred to the juvenile court.
Since the legislature had already given exclusive original jurisdiction to city courts where city ordinances were involved, the reasonable interpretation to be placed on the words criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings in Sec. 55-10-79, supra, is to limit them to proceedings under state law and county ordinances.
Sec. 55-10-100(9), U.C.A.1953 (1967 Supp.), provides:
In cases of violations of traffic laws or ordinances, the court may, in addition to any other disposition, restrain the child from driving for such periods of time as the court deems necessary, and may take possession of the child’s driver’s license.
Sec. 55-10-105(2), supra, so far as material reads:
An adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is within its jurisdiction under section 55-10-77 shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime except in cases involving traffic violations; * * *
These two statutes seem to give to the juvenile court jurisdiction of traffic offenses; but since both sections by their terms are limited by the provisions of Sec. 55-10-77 quoted above, these two sections cannot refer to city ordinances but only to state law and county ordinances.
I am thus convinced that the only court which can try a juvenile charged with a traffic offense under a city ordinance is the city court, and with this limitation I concur in the result.