Justice (concurring).
In Spaulding v. State, 481 P.2d 389, 393 (Alaska 1971), we said that our trial courts have discretion to exclude evidence
¡L *802of prior convictions and in making such determinations should weigh the probative value of such evidence against its prejudicial effect. Unlike the situation in Griggs v. State, 494 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1972), where the prior convictions were for crimes which were similar to the offense charged, Bowie’s two prior convictions were for offenses which were dissimilar to the crime of attempted robbery. Griggs is also distinguishable in that here the state presented an extremely strong case against Bowie. Further, Bowie testified on direct examination that he did not participate in the attempted robbery, had no intent to commit robbery, and that he fled the store premises because he was on parole at the time from a conviction of burglary in a dwelling, and did not want to get into trouble with the parole authorities. In light of the quantum of the state’s evidence and the fact that Bowie’s prior conviction of a crime was a cornerstone in his defense to the charge of attempted robbery, the state’s cross-examination of Bowie which elicited the fact that he also had a prior forgery conviction was not prejudicial error. Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1969). I therefore agree with the court’s disposition of the protective order issue and all other issues raised in this appeal.