Intermediate Appeal from the trial court’s order granting Mr. M’s motion to have his blood tested to determine if he was the father of a child born after a divorce had been granted.1 Reversed with costs to Mrs. M.
In August 1969, Mrs. M filed for divorce alleging that defendant was'the father of her unborn child. In September, 1969, she filed an affidavit in aid of a motion for support and cost money for confinement and for the expected child, in which she reiterated the paternity allegation. In a counter-affidavit, Mr. M denied the allegation. In December, 1969, the Findings of the trial court affirmed the allegation, and a decree was entered awarding support money and visitation rights after the expected child was born. In a motion for determination of paternity, filed March 3, 1971, 14% months after the divorce decree, Mr. M, by affidavit, averred that Mrs. M had informed him that the child was not his.2 Mrs. M filed no responsive pleading, but appeared at the hearing, where the matter was taken under advisement. On May 17, 1971, the court in a handwritten order informally appearing on a work sheet, ordered the blood test.
It is urged that the matter was res judi-cata, or that Mr. M was estopped3 from asserting a claim of extrinsic fraud, or *202“fraud upon the court,”4 on the part of Mrs. M. The record before us reflects only an out-of-court assertion by Mrs. M. and a delay of 14% months in her exhus-band’s claim of bitterness over the awful oathal allegation of Mrs. M in her complaint that the child was legitimate, only to admit she lied and impliedly indulged in a bit of clandestine wedlock adultery. Somehow the courts frown on such matrimonial machinations where adult persons seek, for their own personal reasons, be it money for support, or support for spite, to illegiti-matize an innocent child, who under such circumstances, best would have remained birthless. One wonders whether the vernacular appellation anent illegitimates better might else apply to others than the infant.
We need not decide, however, the bona fides or applicability of the principles anent res judicata, nor the principles of the principals here involved. The claim here, whose predicate was “fraud on the court,” was pursued by filing a motion in the divorce action, to set aside the divorce decree relating to custody of and support money for the child allegedly not the issue of the marriage. Such procedure did not comply with Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil. Procedure, Vol. 9, p. 662, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The instant case is governed by the provisions of that rule as interpreted in the case of Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959), which is dispositive here.
TUCKETT, J., concurs.. The parties have an older child whose status was not questioned.
. At which time both parties had dispensed with the services of their former attorneys and had employed those appearing in this appeal.
. Limberg v. Limberg, 10 Wis.2d 63, 102 N.W.2d 103, 1960.
. Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577, 1962.