This is an appeal from a determination of the Industrial Commission that defendant appellant Fiest was liable to claimant respondent Ross for workmen’s compensation benefits. The sole issue presented is whether an employment relationship existed between Ross and Fiest. We reverse and remand.
Claimant Ross was injured while working as a logger with Fiest. Ross alleged, and the commission found that at the time of the injury Ross was an employee of Fiest. In his original decision, the Industrial Commission referee analyzed the facts of this case under the factors indicative of a right to control or lack thereof, as discussed in Beutler v. MacGregor Triangle Co., 85 Idaho 415, 380 P.2d 1 (1963). These factors included the right to peremptorily terminate the relationship without liability, the method of payment, whether the worker had the right to hire subordinates, who furnishes major items of equipment, and whether actual control is exercised. The referee concluded:
“Reviewing the factors above and the record as a whole, the only factor that tends to indicate that Fiest had the right to control the claimant, is the fact that Byers operated the log-dragging equipment for a few days in September. This alone is insufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship. Another result might be reached under the relative-nature-of-the-work test, Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Sections 43.00-45.32, but the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the right-to-control test, Laub v. Meyer [70 Idaho 224, 214 P.2d 884], supra, and the Commission is required to follow the rule established by the Court. Therefore, the claimant’s claim must be dismissed.”
The Industrial Commission approved and adopted the referee’s order as the decision and order of the commission. On motion for reconsideration, however, the Industrial Commission reversed the factual determination in its original decision and concluded that an employee-employer relationship had been established. This reversal was based in part on the commission’s analogy of Fiest’s ownership of timber cutting rights to the ownership of major items of equipment used to do the work involved.
However, we conclude that the commission erred in its conclusion that, Fiest’s timber cutting rights were analogous to the ownership of equipment. Every principal contractor necessarily extends to a subcontractor the right to do work on the involved premises, and the principal does not thereby necessarily change the status of a subcontractor to the status of an employee. Therefore, the commission’s rationale, i.e., that Fiest’s ownership of timber cutting rights was a factor in determining the employment status, was erroneous.
When erroneous evidence is considered in arriving at a factual decision, particularly where the ultimate factual issue is as close as the issue in this case, the cause should be remanded to the factfinder to reconsider the factual issue without the erroneous evidence. See Ridgway v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 98 Idaho 410, 565 P.2d 1367 (1977); Bottoms v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 95 Idaho 487, 511 P.2d 304 (1973). It is apparent that the erroneously considered evidence regarding Fiest’s ownership of the timber cutting rights played an important part in the commission’s second factual determination. Therefore, we remand to the Industrial Commission for a redetermination of the nature of the relationship between Ross and Fiest, in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Costs to appellant. No attorney fees allowed.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.