dissenting:
If the hospital had defended this action on the basis that the doctors had adopted a negotiation strategy of belligerence, hostility and bad faith regarding the terms of lease renewal, I suspect the need for this dissent would have been obviated. However, the hospital repeatedly has emphasized that it rested its entire case on a single argument: that after a reasonable time passed without agreement on a rental rate, the doctors’ power to exercise the option lapsed. That contention is meritless, for the options were exercised, by their very wording, when notice was given. Thus, the legal effect of the passage of a “reasonable” time without agreement was that a court would imply a “reasonable” rent for the renewal term. Cassinari v. Mapes, 91 Nev. 778, 542 P.2d 1069 (1975). There is evidence that the doctors failed to pay any rent, reasonable or otherwise, during portions of their negotiations. Therefore, an eviction for nonpayment of rent might have been proper. However, the eviction which took place was based, *374expressly and solely, on expiration of the option. Thus, on the sole legal theory chosen by the hospital, I suggest that the hospital’s appeal should fail.
Moreover, I know of no legal basis for the majority’s conclusion that a jury, properly instructed, could find that the option had “died.” The option had, in fact, been exercised. It was no longer subject to death, expiration or debate over its duration. Nor was it necessary for the doctors to resist the hospital’s eviction notice as a prerequisite for an action for breach of contract.
Based upon the hospital’s theory of defense, there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict favoring the doctors. Accordingly, that verdict should stand. Steen v. Gass, 85 Nev. 249, 253, 454 P.2d 94, 97 (1969). I therefore respectfully dissent.