dissenting.
In violation of Wyoming hunting statutes, a father with a mountain-sheep permit sent his (unlicensed) son up a mountain to shoot a trophy big horn sheep. Instead of the desired wild animal, the son negligently shot the guide, killing him instantly. Denying the wrongful-death claim by summary judgment, and absolving the father from liability for instigating, organizing, and directing this lethal activity occasions a result by this court from which I dissent.
I directly differ with the court’s resolution of appellant’s third issue that no agency between father and son could be inferred from the facts. Had both father and son possessed separate hunting licenses for the trophy mountain sheep, I would accept, under the same situation, that responsibility for the negligence of the son might not be attributed to the father. Between the two, only the father held a license. This is important to the factual status that the son was following the direction of the father. Such an inference, if not better a realistic conclusion, is reasonable from the affidavits of the father and son. The presence of control and any degree of control exercised by the father is a material fact to the judgment of law given in this case. I do not say it is unreasonable to infer no agency existed, but merely that it is reasonable to infer an agency may have existed. Two reasonable inferences arising from relevant facts create a genuine issue of material fact making summary judgment inappropriate. Cordova v. Gosar, Wyo., 719 P.2d 625, 639 (1986).
I agree with the majority that the facts are not in dispute. However, my perception from those facts differs radically from the vision of this court. The court sees a father-son hunting trip with both involved and benefited equally. I see a trophy hunt where the father, with the only sheep hunting license, dispatches the son as an agent to acquire the desired prize — a specifically anticipated benefit. The father provided the incentive for the hunt, the gun for the son, and the funds for the trip.
The father drew a highly valued and difficult-to-obtain big horn mountain sheep permit through the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission’s lottery. He instigated and funded the trip in response to his good fortune. The record reflects that the activity was controlled by his supervisory-parental influence.
Decedent came to guide the two to where he had recently seen sheep. The three horsebacked up the mountain until rough terrain forced them to continue by foot. When they reached a rock outcropping, they spotted sheep on a distant rock slide. The father decided to remain where he was because of the difficult terrain yet to be crossed to reach the sheep. The son and guide continued the pursuit for the father. With a rifle provided by his father, the son made three series of shots while attempting a kill. Sadly, in the third series, the guide, whose personal representative is the appellant, was negligently and fatally shot. The guide was negligently killed during this trophy hunt with the father and son criminally violating a hunting statute because only the father had a sheep license. Motivating this violation was the father’s desire to acquire a trophy for his mountain cabin. The father had sent forth his agent which resulted in the death of another.1
*97The majority rely on Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., Wyo., 713 P.2d 160, 164 (1986) to answer appellant’s third issue in the negative. Noonan, supra, provides the analysis to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor, where independent-contractor status bars imposition of liability to the employer. To say Noonan, supra, disposes of appellant’s argument is to say no agency status can exist beyond the employer-employee relation. Such a notion is false and seriously misleads those who rely on this court’s wisdom.
Obviously, the employee relationship is not the only kind of agency which can be created. This is spelled out in the majority’s premiere case. “[0]ne may become an agent by voluntarily performing a gratuitous service for another.” Nicholas v. Moore, Alaska, 570 P.2d 174, 176 (1977). This is true even where the parties involved fail to recognize they have manifested an agency relation. “ ‘[T]he relation may be held to exist, notwithstanding a denial by the alleged principal, and whether or not the parties understood it to be an agency.’ ” True v. Hi-Plains Elevator Machinery, Inc., Wyo., 577 P.2d 991, 998 (1978), quoting from 2A C.J.S. Agency § 52, 623-625. These cases reflect the position taken in Restatement of the Law Second, Agency 2d § 1, p. 8 (1958):
«* * * ip^us, when one wh0 asks a friend to do a slight service for him, such as return for credit goods recently purchased from a store, neither one may have any realization that they are creating an agency relation or be aware of the legal obligation which would result from performance of the service.”
Such an agency would not be an employer-employee situation and yet an agency may be implied.
“The relationship of principal and agent is not dependent upon an express agreement of the parties — it may be implied from either words or conduct of the parties depending upon the circumstances of the case.” Popejoy v. Eastburn, 24 [241] Iowa 247, [747], 41 N.W.2d 764, 768 (1950).
nt* # * This court looks at the record [when reviewing summary judgment] from the viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material appearing in the record.’ ” Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyming, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 (1984), quoting from Reno Livestock Corporation v. Sun Oil Company, Wyo., 638 P.2d 147, 150 (1981).
To give summary judgment on the basis that the father had no control over the actions of the son is to say no inference favorable to appellant could be made from, among others, the following:
“Q. * * * I would think at some point after you knew you had a license, you said, gees, maybe I will take Steve and you would call Steve up and have him over for Sunday dinner and say, I got a sheep license; why don’t we go hunting, and he will say, I will check and—
“A. I suppose, yeah, yeah.” Appellee-father’s deposition.
“A. The agreement was, dad takes the first shot, and if dad don’t hit it, back me up * * Appellee-father’s deposition.
“A. All he [father] said was it would be okay if I went ahead and tried [to kill a sheep].” (Emphasis added.) Appellee-son’s deposition.
“A. He said that, you know, if we had a chance to get the sheep, that I could go ahead and try.” (Emphasis added.) Ap-pellee-son’s deposition.
A favorable inference drawn is that the father might, or more realistically did, *98have some control over the actions of the son.
A reasonable inference of some control could arise from the statements made in the appellees’ affidavits. How much control was exercised is a jury question. Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, Wyo., 508 P.2d 595, 598 (1973). At a minimum, the argument raised by the appellant is legitimate, i.e., the father exercised a negative control in that he could have said, “Son, you may not hunt on my hunting license because it is illegal to do so.” This argument is side-stepped by the court.
To bolster its position, the majority moves from Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., supra, to Nicholas v. Moore, supra. What the court does not distinguish is that Nicholas was not a summary-judgment affirmance. “The case was tried to the Superior Court,” 570 P.2d at 176. I have no problem in accepting Nicholas, supra, because all critical questions were resolved by the trier of fact.
Noteworthy also is the rule enunciated in Fegler v. Brodie, Wyo., 574 P.2d 751, 754 (1978), that summary judgment should not be granted where contradictory inferences may be drawn from undisputed evidentiary facts.
* * * “If the evidence is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable minds might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is improper.” Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984, 987 (1980).
The following comes together to form a reasonable interpretation of agency which conflicts with that of the majority:
1. Goal: Acquire trophy animal for father.
2. Control: Only father is legally eligible to acquire.
3. Support: Trip organized and costs -advanced by father.
4. Pursuit: At hunting site, son sent out with father’s gun to shoot trophy animal.
5. Claim: Instead, son, in pursuit of goal, negligently shot and killed guide.
“The motion for summary judgment should be sustained in the absence of a real and material fact issue considering movant’s burden, respondent’s right to the benefit of all favorable inferences and any reasonable doubt, with credibility questions to be resolved by trial.” Cordova v. Gosar, supra, 719 P.2d at 640.
When reviewing an appellant’s claim that a jury verdict is clearly erroneous and against the great weight of the evidence, we have said:
“We assume the evidence of the successful party is true, leave out of consideration entirely evidence of the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably be drawn from it.” (Emphasis added.) DeJulio v. Foster, Wyo., 715 P.2d 182, 185 (1986).
A jury could find agency and consequent impressed liability of father as principal for whose benefit the effort was undertaken, when negligent performance caused damage. I believe we would not reverse such a jury decision, and I see summary judgment as inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I see this court pronouncing that under the facts of this case, sending a person to shoot your game animal for trophy purposes does not affix liability to you as the principal when the dispatched person as your agent kills the guide rather than the mountain sheep. In disagreement with such an unjustified rule, I respectfully dissent.
. The conduct of the father in this case in a negligence liability context involving civil liability is not essentially different from the accessory murder cases in a criminal liability context where attributable death penalty criminal liability is created in current jurisprudence. Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 709 P.2d 406, cert. denied — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed.2d 564 (1985); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 708 P.2d 46 (1985); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 704 P.2d 1323 (1985); *97State ex rel. Hopkinson v. District Court, Teton County, Wyo., 696 P.2d 54, cert. denied — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 187, 88 L.Ed.2d 155 (1985); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 679 P.2d 1008 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 228, 83 L.Ed.2d 157 (1984); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 664 P.2d 43, cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127, reh. denied — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 3201, 96 L.Ed.2d 688 (1987).