dissenting.
I believe the majority’s decision undermines the purposes served by the Statute of Frauds, and in so doing sets a very undesirable precedent. It provides a means for any disgruntled employee who has been discharged to bring his employer into court to defend against allegations of án oral long-term employment *208contract. The employee, to state a cause of action, need only.allege that he left another job in order to take the position from which he was discharged.
• I agree with the majority that this court has adopted the. principle that reliance by a promisee, to his detriment, on an oral agreement may in a proper case prevent the promisor from relying on the Statute of Frauds. Moreover, I believe the principle, when properly applied to prevent injustice, to be a salutary one. I do not disagree with its application in the cases relied on in the majority opinion. In United Farm, Agency v. McFarland, 243 Or 124, 411 P2d 1017 (1966) the fact of an oral-modification was admitted in the pleadings, although the precise terms were in dispute. In Rogers v. Maloney, 85 Or 61, 165 P 357 (1917) the jury could have found, from evidence of affirmative acts, that one party had waived a condition precedent to the effectiveness of a written agreement. In Neppach v. Or. & Cal. R.R. Co., 46 Or 374, 80 P 482 (1905) the seller, for its own benefit, sought a delay in the performance of the contract and orally waived the term specifying the'. time, -for installment payments. The court very properly refused .to permit the defendant, by invoking the Statute of Frauds, to deny the validity of the waiver and to treat the contract as forfeited.
In employment contract cases, however, I would not accept the mere allegation that the plaintiff gave up a prior position in order to take the job in question as sufficient to state a cause of action on an oral agreement which is otherwise within the Statute. It is quite common for employees to move from job to job, leaving one position only when another has been secured. Without a showing of special circumstances, I would not require an employer to defend an action which *209pits Ms word against that of a discharged employee concerning an agreement which the Statute of Frauds requires to be in writing. The Statute was designed to prevent just such situations. The majority, without adequate justification, has opened the door to fraud in a large class of cases. I dissent.
Bryson, J., joins in this dissent.