(concurring).
While I readily concur in the result in this case, I cannot accept the supporting reasoning used by the majority. It is clear to me that the plain reading of the definitions found in AS 23.30.265(15) and (21) must exclude benefits for appellee, who can only be characterized as a common law wife after her divorce from the deceased and his remarriage. The workmen’s compensation statute granting benefits to a “surviving wife” obviously refers to a legal wife as defined in Alaska statutes (AS 25.-05.011(b)).1 While the rather strained in*1026terpretation of the majority avoids ruling on the constitutional problem, it will create problems of statutory interpretation at a later date. Therefore, I feel it is incumbent on this court to decide the central issue in this case.
I find the statutory grant of workmen’s compensation benefits to a legal wife and not a common law wife is a violation of Article I, § 1 of the Alaska Constitution, which guarantees all persons equal protection under the law. Such a classification constitutes impermissible discrimination for it would deny benefits under AS 23.30.-215(a)(2) solely because a “spouse” did not go through a formal marriage ceremony.2
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court stated, in voiding a Louisiana Workmen’s Compensation statutory scheme providing for different benefits for legitimate and illegitimate children, that:
The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.3
The Supreme Court then reached the conclusion that the denial of Workmen’s 'Compensation Benefits to an illegitimate child did not protect legitimate family relationships, but served to unjustly penalize those not guilty of wrongdoing. An analogous situation is presented in the case at bar. I can find no reasonable relationship between the legal formality of a marriage ceremony and the purpose of the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Act which compensates a dependent “spouse” for the death of a provider.4
Further, Alaska’s prohibition against common law marriage is phrased solely in terms of marriages contracted within the state.5 Presumably, this Court would adhere to the conflicts of law principle that the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of the place where contracted.6 This would mean that common law marriages contracted in Alaska would not be recognized, but such marriages contracted outside the state and maintained within Alaska would be recognized and compensation benefits granted to a common law spouse. This would, in effect, permit a certain category of common law wives to recover benefits, but deny benefits to another category, thus constituting impermissible discrimination.
I would affirm the decision of the superior court on the basis that common law wives are entitled to benefits as a “surviving wife” under the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation act.7
. AS 25.05.011(b) provides:
(b) No person may be joined in mar--riage in this state until a license has been obtained for that purpose as provided in this chapter. No marriage performed in this state is valid without solemnization as provided in this chapter.
. In this case approximately four years elapsed since the time the parties were divorced and resumed living together with their children. Problems of duration of common law marriage are obviously not present herein.
. Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company, 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
. Appellee concedes that appellant was dependent on the deceased for support at the time of his death.
. AS 25.05.011(b).
. E. g., Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 54 S.Ct. 084, 78 L.Ed. 1219 (1934).
. The proposition that the wording of AS 23.30.265(15) and (21) as written denied appellee equal protection renders unconstitutional only those sections. It is settled federal law that while a statute may be unconstitutional in part, the portion which is constitutional may stand. E. g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Alaska Statute 01.10.030 provides that “Any law . . . which lacks a severability clause shall be construed as though it contained the clause . ”