dissenting.
I dissent.
In this action the plaintiff Carpenter sought a declaratory judgment based entirely upon an oral contract for supplying the furnishings for Carpenter’s motel. In his complaint Carpenter states he “desires a declaration of the rights and duties of the respective parties under said contract.’’
The controlling statute, section 93-8902, R.C.M. 1947, provides:
“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract * * * may have determined any question of construction * * * arising under the instrument * * * and obtain a declaration of rights * * * thereunder.’’ Emphasis supplied.
In my opinion this governing statute only authorizes suits to obtain declaratory judgments upon written or printed instruments and documents. Such writings can be read by counsel, court and jury alike.
The oral contract, on the contrary, depends upon uncertainties such as the veracity of the witness and the accuracy of his memory. It is because of such uncertainties that the statute, R.C.M. 1947, § 93-8902, limits declaratory judgment suits to *561those involving written instruments. It does not authorize the rendering of declaratory judgments based upon oral contracts and agreements. Because of this it follows that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to overrule defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint herein.
The record shows further prejudicial error in admitting, over defendant’s objections, testimony given in answer to leading questions put to plaintiff’s witnesses on their direct examination, and in admitting testimony calling for and giving the conclusions of the plaintiff when on the stand testifying in his own behalf.
The judgment should be reversed.