dissenting:
I cannot subscribe to several matters contained in the foregoing opinions. The majority opinion approves the opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment entered in the district court; this I cannot do. I realize that several of the matters to which I shall call attention were pleaded by one or more of the parties to this cause and not denied by the others, but siuce they have to do with administrative matters of this court and as such within the personal knowledge of the writer, where they do not conform to the facts I believe it should be pointed out.
Taking first the statement that the furnishing of opinions of this court was assumed to be a purely private transaction between the publishing company and the clerks of court, and that the arrangement was known to and approved by the supreme court, and that the publishing company periodically sought and received the court’s approval of the continuance of the system.
I cannot speak with regard to any arrangements prior to my assuming the office of Chief Justice, but I do know what the practice and procedure has been since January 7, 1957, and I desire to set forth how the matter has been and is now being handled under my administration.
The West Publishing Company publishes the Pacific Reporter which undertakes to print the official opinions of courts of last resort of 13 western states, including Montana. This *419firm prints what is called an Advance Sheet, which is a paper-bound publication issued every week and when a sufficient number of opinions have been published to fill a full volume it then publishes a permanent bound volume. The publishing-company furnishes each justice of our court with a copy of each Advance Sheet in order that the members of the court might read the opinions and note any errors that they may be corrected prior to the printing of the bound permanent volume. This the court does on each opinion.
The Pacific Eeporter is either subscribed to or available through a legal library to practically every attorney in Montana and is relied on by the legal profession of the United States as containing a correct copy of every opinion of this and other courts of the western states therein covered. Our court is naturally very interested in having a prompt and accurate record made of its opinions, and we desire to co-operate with the publisher to that end. Our court cites the Pacific Eeporter in each instance as well as our own State Eeport.
Shortly after taking office I received a communication in my capacity of Chief Justice from the West Publishing Company, asking me if the arrangement for furnishing copies of the court’s opinions then existing would be followed under my administration. At that time I had no knowledge that any payment was made by that company for the copies of opinions and assumed they were furnished as a courtesy by the clerk’s office, so I immediately advised them there would be no change and copies of our opinions would be forwarded to them as they were issued. Some time elapsed without incident until Mrs. Edna Hinman, then the clerk of the supreme court, advised me that some question had arisen following an examination of her accounts by the state examiner’s office by reason of the fact that she had remitted to the state treasurer the payments received in her office from the West Publishing Company. At that time she advised me that she had thought that all receipts were state property and as such should be paid over to the *420State of Montana through the treasurer’s office. I agreed with her in that interpretation and told her that in my opinion no doubt could exist in that regard and that so far as I was concerned all future payments should be treated exactly as she had been doing, and she followed that procedure throughout her term of office.
It might be well at this point to state that the copies of the opinions furnished the publisher were prepared by the staff of the supreme court and when the original signed opinion is handed down a sufficient number of copies is furnished the clerk’s office by the supreme court staff so that they can forward copies of the opinion to counsel and news media in order that the general public can become aware of the pronouncements of the court. I had requested the staff of this court to furnish sufficient copies to the clerk’s office for these purposes and also directed the clerk’s office to furnish copies of the opinions to the news reporting services located in the capital city which desired them, without cost, since I believe that the public is entitled to immediate information upon all actions taken by the court. Further, it would facilitate and ease the work of these news reporters if they could have a copy of the opinion available which could be taken by them to their office from which to prepare their news release, rather than read from the original opinion on file in the clerk’s office and write their news release there, thereby only adding confusion, and if the opinion were lengthy it could result in inaccurate reporting, which would be detrimental not only to the court but to the public and legal profession. The supreme court staff also furnishes, without charge, a copy of each opinion to the publisher of the State Reporter, which is a multilithed publication which furnishes copies of the court opinions to its subscribers on a weekly basis and which covers only the opinions of our court. In return for this courtesy the publisher of the State Reporter furnishes each member of this court, and its staff, a *421copy of its publication without charge, which is very beneficial to us.
I should also call attention to the fact that all the employees of the clerk’s office are members of the staff of this court.
When Mrs. Hinman was succeeded by Mr. Thomas J. Kearney I discussed with him the furnishing of the copies of the opinions as above-outlined and directed him to follow the same procedure and to deposit the payments made by the West Publishing Company with the state treasurer. Mr. Kearney advised me that he would do so and for a period of time this practice -was followed. However, I later was informed that the practice of depositing the payments with the treasurer had been discontinued. I discussed the matter with Mr. Kearney and he advised me that from some advice he had received from undisclosed sources he had become doubtful that he should deposit these payments with the state treasurer and that he had continued to hold them in his office, his advisers believing that they should remain there awaiting the outcome of this case. When I discovered this situation I directed Mr. Kearney to deposit the payments forthwith with the state treasurer in accordance with my previous directive, which he did, and then to clarify the situation so that no further doubt or controversy could arise I rescinded my previous arrangement with the West Publishing Company and entered into one whereby copies of the opinions would be furnished by the staff of this court, by whom they are prepared, and the payment therefor is received and by a member of the staff deposited with the state treasurer to the credit of the office of the clerk of this court.
I have always treated this matter as one within the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief Justice and the actions I have followed have been taken with that thought in mind, and I have not consulted with the other members of the court for that reason. From what I have related it will be seen that the court, as such, had not approved anything in connection with this matter, rather I have directed how it should be done.
*422The district judge in his opinion refers to section 82-504, R.C.M. 1947, as specifying the duties of the clerk of the supreme court and I call attention to the final words of that section: “* # * and to perform such other duties as may be required of him by the supreme court.” I further call attention to section 82-502, R.C.M. 1947, which reads: “The clerk of the supreme court must perform such duties as are prescribed by law and the rules and practice of the court.” Section 93-501, R.C.M. 1947, provides in part: “Every court has power: * * *.
“5. To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every other matter appertaining thereto * *
There can be no question that the clerk of this court is required to perform such duties as may be required of him by this court which are laid down either in the law, the rules, or the practice. The clerk is the ministerial officer of this court and if it is to function properly his actions must be directed and supervised by the chief administrative officer thereof. The district judge’s opinion would infer that we must provide a rule to require him to perform some service or point to a demand that he do so contained in the law. A fair interpretation of the statutes does not bear this out because specific mention is made of the “practice of the court.” The practice of the court covers a multitude of directions which are given to the clerk and the employees of that office orally, by letter, memorandum, telephone, or otherwise, and we expect such directives to be promptly and efficiently handled, and I wish to say that they are and have been, since both clerks during my tenure of office have been most co-operative.
In my opinion Montana Ore Purchasing Co. v. Boston & Montana Consolidated Copper & Min. Co., 33 Mont. 400, 84 P. 706, does not hold to the contrary, nor is it any authority upon the matter in any way.
I can subscribe to the conclusion of the district judge that *423the payments made by the West Publishing Company are not to be classified as fees as fees are presently defined in the law, but I do not subscribe to the conclusion that the former clerk, Mrs. Edna Hinman, “or the present clerk are not bound to account to the State of Montana or deposit in the treasury of the State of Montana such charges as are paid by the West Publishing Company * * * or any other person for the uncertified and unauthenticated carbon copies of the opinions of the supreme court.” These are matters entirely within the jurisdiction of the supreme court and we shall continue to direct the ministerial duties of our clerk to the end that this court may function and perform its duties under the Constitution and laws of Montana.
The words “uncertified and unauthenticated” copies of the opinions of this court have been frequently referred to in this proceeding as if they were nothing but sheets of paper of little value. Suffice it to say that these copies are duplicates of the original opinion and they are obtained from the most reliable sources, and any member of the legal profession knows that the publishing house requires a true and correct copy of the court’s opinion for publication in its reporter for otherwise the publication would be worthless. In other words, in furnishing the copies of opinions both publisher and the court know they are accurate and correct copies and certification or authentication would serve no purpose.
Following the filing of this appeal two of the defendants in the district court action filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that Mrs. Edna Hinman was not an aggrieved party within the meaning of section 93-8002, E.C.M. 1947, and was therefore without right to appeal from the judgment of the district court.
In the case of Griffith v. Montana Wheat Growers’ Ass’n, 75 Mont. 466, 244 P. 277, 278, this court stated: “* * * It is a general rule, of universal application, that to enable a party to appeal from a judgment or order he must have an interest *424in the subject matter of the litigation which is injuriously affected by the judgment or order. ’ ’
To the same effect is In re Bernheim’s Estate, 82 Mont. 198, 266 P. 378, 381, 57 A.L.R. 1169, wherein this court said: “Augusta Bemheim having been awarded all she sought, she is not an aggrieved party and has no right of appeal.”
There would appear to be no reason why the same rule should not apply to declaratory judgment actions. In 16 Am.Jur., § 76, p. 341, it is stated: “* * * In accordance with the fundamental rule that to be entitled to appeal a person must be aggrieved by the judgment, an appeal from a declaratory judgment will be dismissed where there is nothing in it prejudicial to the claimed rights of the appellant.”
The crux of the situation to my mind is that something prejudicial to the rights of the appellant must appear in the judgment or she must be injuriously affected by it in order to be classified as an aggrieved party.
The pleadings in this cause, which contain the admissions and denials of the parties, are confusing because they infer that the arrangements for supplying the copies of this court’s opinions were made by the clerks and the publisher and as before related such is not the fact so far as the defendant Hinman is concerned, who took office at the same time as the writer on January 7, 1957. The arrangements for furnishing the copies after January 7, 1957, were made between the publisher and the Chief Justice as heretofore recited.
It was the contention of the Attorney General that the defendant Hinman was responsible for 15 cents per folio, a page being about two and three-fourths folios, whereas she had received from the publisher and paid into the state treasury but 25 cents per page, being the amount paid by the West Publishing Company. Mrs. Hinman’s contention was that she made no copies of opinions for the publisher, that they were prepared by persons other than those employed in her office and therefore she was not required by section 82-503, R.C.M. 1947, being *425the statute specifying the fees of the clerk of the supreme court, to collect 15 cents per folio and that she could accept 25 cents per page paid by the publisher; that she had accounted for all the money paid to her by the publisher by paying it over to the State of Montana and therefore the Attorney General could make no claim on behalf of the state against her for the contended difference between 15 cents per folio and 25 cents per page nor proceed against her to require that she make such additional payment. She then alleged there was no justiciable controversy existing between the Attorney General and herself and that the action should be dismissed. In her prayer, she likewise prayed that the action be dismissed upon the merits as to her.
Thereafter, she filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings upon the ground that no material issues of fact were presented or raised by the pleadings and that she was entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law on the pleadings alone. The court granted her motion.
While appellant contends that the judgment was adverse to her in that no declarations were made as to certain issues raised by her answer, the fact remains that she was not, in my opinion, aggrieved by the judgment since it was favorable to her and entered upon the granting of her own motion. In my opinion, the motion to dismiss this appeal which has been filed in this court is well-taken and should be granted.
I wish to make it clear that nothing heretofore said with regard to the manner of furnishing copies of the court’s opinions to the publisher has any significance as to the practice followed by previous administrative officers of this court or clerks prior to January 7, 1957. I have no personal knowledge of what arrangements were made or by whom.
Since the findings of the district court as to the practice and procedure of this court and the clerk are erroneous subsequent to January 7, 1957, it follows that the conclusions of law based thereon and the judgment entered are likewise in *426error in the same respect, in holding and declaring that any clerk of the supreme court subsequent to January 7, 1957, was not bound to account to the State of Montana for the payments received from the publisher and that the same were the clerk’s property.
For this reason I do not concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.
It is only fair to say that the district judge in making his findings, conclusions of law and judgment would have no knowledge of the facts subsequent to January 7, 1957, as set forth herein, since his knowledge would be limited to the allegations contained in the pleadings of the parties.