(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The only one of defendant’s seven points of error that merits serious consideration is the first. In my opinion, the remaining six are specious.
It is my opinion that the legislature, by the use of the following language in Section 47-6-8(A), N.M.S.A.1978, intended to impose strict liability for violation of the New Mexico Subdivision Act [Sections 47-5-9, 47-6-1 to 47-6-28, N.M.S.A.1978] so that even an unknowing violation will support a conviction:
It is unlawful to sell or lease land from within a subdivision unless the subdivision plat is approved by the board of county commissioners .
People v. Mancha, 39 Cal.App.3d 703, 114 Cal.Rptr. 392 (1974) states:
The power of the Legislature to enact laws to prevent fraud and sharp practices in real estate transactions particularly open to such abuses is beyond question. [Citations omitted.] The state in the exercise of its police power may regulate the enjoyment of property rights whenever reasonably necessary to the protection of the health, safety, morals or general well-being of the people. [Citation omitted.] “[T]here is no vested right to conduct a business free of reasonable governmental rules and regulations . . . .”
Fiorella v. City of Birmingham, 35 Ala. App. 384, 48 So.2d 761 (1950) states:
It is perfectly permissible for a legislative body to make the doing of an act criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer, and if such legislative intent appears, the courts must give it effect, although the intent of the doer may have been innocent. Such principle is particularly applicable to enactments passed as police measures. [Emphasis added.]
In my opinion, the language of the Act is clear and unequivocal, i. e., anyone who divides a given tract of land into five or more parcels and sells them without having a plat approved by the Board of County Commissioners is in violation of the Act and this is precisely what the defendant did.
The interpretation adopted by the majority renders the act meaningless. The canons of construction should not be applied so as to change the obvious and reasonable legislative purpose of the statute.
State v. Nance, 77 N.M. 39, 419 P.2d 242 (1966) states:
. In endeavoring to arrive at the true construction of statutes which may be of doubtful meaning, courts should be guided by the well-established rules governing such construction. We are committed to an acceptance of the intent of the language employed by the legislature rather than the precise definition of the words themselves. [Citations omitted.] And, in construing a statute, the legislative intent must be given effect by adopting a construction which will not render the statute’s application absurd or unreasonable. [Citation omitted.] Not only must the legislative intent be given effect, but the court will' not be bound by a literal interpretation of the words if such strict interpretation would defeat the intended object of the legislature. [Citation omitted.]
Courts will not add words except where necessary to make the statute conform to the obvious intent of the legislature, or to prevent its being absurd. [Citation omitted.] But where the language of the legislative act is doubtful or an adherence to the literal use of words would lead to injustice, absurdity or contradiction, the statute will be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason, even though this requires the rejection of words or the substitution of others. [Citations omitted.]
I would affirm.