The issue in this mandamus proceeding is the right of the press to attend all hearings in a juvenile court proceeding in which a 13-year-old girl was in custody in connection with the drowning of a younger child. The plaintiff, Oregonian Publishing Company, is a newspaper publisher; the plaintiff Whitney is a reporter employed by the Oregonian; the defendant is a circuit court judge.
Another judge started the juvenile proceeding and barred the press from the courtroom. The Oregonian nevertheless learned the identity of the 13-year-old juvenile and her identity was published in several newspapers. Subsequently, the Oregonian filed a motion to be permitted to attend the hearings involving the juvenile. In support, the managing editor of the Oregonian filed an affidavit stating that there was strong public interest in this juvenile proceeding. The juvenile opposed the motion. The defendant denied this motion and subsequently barred Whitney, the reporter, from a hearing in the same case and the court reaffirmed its intention to exclude the press from all future hearings in the case. The Oregonian and Whitney petitioned for a writ of mandamus and we issued an alternative writ, to which defendant demurred.
The plaintiffs first contend that they are entitled to attend the hearings under the provisions of ORS 419.498(1). That statute provides:
"* * * Unless the child or parents otherwise request, the general public shall be excluded and only such persons admitted as the judge finds have a proper interest in the case or the work of the court. The judge may exclude the public during any portion of the hearing in which it appears that the presence of the public may embarrass a witness or party or otherwise prejudice the reception of trustworthy evidence. * * *” (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs contend that the press should be found to have a "proper interest” in the case because *280it is important for the public to be informed about the workings of the juvenile justice system and the press informs the public.
The statute in point was enacted in 1959 as part of a thorough revision of the Oregon Juvenile Code. Or Laws 1959, ch 432, § 14. The legislation was adopted upon the recommendation of a legislative interim committee consisting of legislators, judges, lawyers and other interested parties. The interim committee borrowed freely from the provisions of the Standard Juvenile Court Act, including much of the text of ORS 419.498a).1
The interim committee report evinces a strong commitment to the parens patriae theory of juvenile justice. This theory contemplates a nonadversary, quiet and relatively private proceeding. The interim committee reported: "The publicity, excitement and tension of a criminal trial often has a serious adverse effect on a child, particularly a young child.” Report of the Legislative Interim Committee on Judicial Administration, Part II at p 11 (1959).
The authors of the Standard Act made like statements and added: "The hearing should have the character of a conference, not of a trial.” National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Standard Juvenile Court Act, comment on § 19 (6th ed 1959), reprinted in 5 National Probation and Parole Assn. Journal, 323, 368 (1959). The exponents of the parens patriae approach also favored privacy because of their belief that exposing a child’s misdeeds to the community would reinforce the delinquent’s negative self-image and, therefore, impede rehabilitation. Howard, Grisso *281and Neems, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 Clearinghouse Rev 203 (1977). The defendant judge in this case is of the same opinion.
For these reasons the statute grants broad authority to the juvenile court judge to control access to the courtroom. The statute authorizes the judge to admit only persons the court finds have a proper interest in the case or the work of the court. The statute offers no guidance on the issue of what constitutes a "proper interest.” That omission persuades us that the legislature intended that the juvenile judge have wide latitude in determining when a person seeking admission to the proceedings has a "proper interest.”
ORS 419.498(1) does not single out the press for special treatment. With the interim committee’s concern with the potential adverse impact of publicity, we conclude that the press are members of the public and may be excluded when the juvenile court is of the opinion that privacy would promote the goals of juvenile justice.
The plaintiffs cite decisions from other jurisdictions and from the Oregon Court of Appeals in which it was held that ORS 419.498(1) or its equivalent permitted the admission of the press to a juvenile hearing despite the opposition of the child. See for example State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. L., 24 Or App 257, 546 P2d 153, rev den (1976). In all of these cases, however, the juvenile court had admitted members of the press and the juvenile sought higher court assistance in reversing such order. The decision did not hold the juvenile judge was required to admit the press. These cases unanimously support our conclusion that ORS 419.498(1) and like statutes entrust the decision to admit or exclude reporters to the discretion of the juvenile court. The defendant judge acted within her statutory powers in excluding the press in this case.
Having concluded the judge acted within her statutory authority, we must consider the plaintiffs’ contention that the application of the statute in this *282case is invalid as it is contrary to Art I, § 10 of the Oregon Constitution.
Art I, § 10 of the Oregon Constitution states: "No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay * * *.” Although this language was enacted as part of the Constitution of 1859, it has not been authoritatively construed.
The plaintiffs contend it means what it literally states; that is, all proceedings before Oregon courts are required to be open to the public, including representatives of the news media. The defendant responds that Art I, § 10 grants the right to an open trial solely to the litigants and not to the public. The defendant points out that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 US 368, 99 S Ct 2898, 61 L Ed2d 608 (1979), provides a right solely for the accused and not for the public or the press. According to this view, under Art I, § 10, the juvenile court could close the courtroom if the child did not object or requested that it be closed.
One weakness in defendant’s contention is that the language of the Oregon constitutional provision, Art I, § 10, and the Sixth Amendment are substantially different. The Sixth Amendment provides: "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial * * *.” The court said in Gannett, 443 US at 380: "Our cases have uniformly recognized the public trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.” Art I, § 10, on the other hand, does not provide that the accused or anyone else has the right to a public trial. It provides flatly that no court shall be secret and justice shall be administered openly. This prohibition can inure to the benefit of individuals but the sweeping language with which the prohibition is written makes it unreasonable to interpret it to be merely a grant of a right to an individual that can be waived or which would vanish if not affirmatively raised by the individual.
*283This interpretation of Art I, § 10 is buttressed by the presence of the next section of the Bill of Rights in the Oregon Constitution, Art I, § 11. The first sentence of § 11 is a paraphrase of the Sixth Amendment. The sentence states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; * * This section is a guarantee of individual rights. The enumeration of these individual rights accentuates that the previous section with its provision that "no court shall be secret” must concern more than rights guaranteed to individuals.
The defendant further contends: "In theory, the public has no interest in [juvenile] proceedings, as the role of judicial monitor is assumed by each parent.” But Art I, 10 does not recognize distinctions between various kinds of judicial proceedings; it applies to all.
The Attorney General, appearing as amicus curiae, argues that we should not enforce the express terms of Art I, § 10 because the generation that adopted it did not intend the prohibition to be literally applied. He supports that argument by pointing out that section 898 of the original Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1862 and retained in the current code as ORS 1.040, provides:
"The sittings of every court of justice are public, except that upon the agreement of the parties to a civil action, suit or proceeding, filed with the clerk or entered upon the journal, the court may direct the trial, or any other proceeding therein, to be private; upon such order being made, all persons shall be excluded, except the officers of the court, the parties, their witnesses and counsel.”
The state believes the contemporaneous enactment of this statute creates an inference that the framers of the Constitution, many of whom were legislators in 1862, would not have enacted § 898 if they had intended Art I, § 10 to require that all civil proceedings be open to the public.
*284This is a dubious inference. Contemporaneous legislative actions should not necessarily be given much weight when construing constitutional principles. Constitutional draftsmen are concerned with broad principles of long-range significance; legislators are more likely to be concerned with the immediate. We have observed a political temptation to adopt an ideal as an abstract principle and then substantially undercut the ideal in order to accommodate an immediate concern. For example, the political generation that adopted the first amendment also attempted to suppress political criticism by enacting the Alien and Sedition Acts.
We hold the order of the defendant judge barring plaintiffs from the hearings is invalid as contrary to Art I, 10.
Our holding, however, should not be interpreted as guaranteeing the right of public access to all judicial proceedings.
One obvious limitation is that jury deliberations and court conferences have been and are held in private. We are of the opinion that despite the absence of any language in Art I, § 10 expressly excluding jury deliberation from the prohibition against secret deliberations, the tradition that such proceedings be held in private was so long and so well established in 1859 that the tradition should be read into the section. See Clark v. United States, 289 US 1, 13, 53 S Ct 465, 77 L Ed 993 (1933); State v. Lehnherr, 30 Or App 1033, 1039, 569 P2d 54 (1977), construing Art I, §§ 10 and 11. The same is true of conferences of collegial courts.
If there is a question of whether access to court proceedings can be limited by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial, it has not been raised and, therefore, we do not address it. Likewise, we do not address the question of whether certain persons can be excluded from certain court proceedings.
*285We limit our holding to directing the defendant to permit the "press” to attend because that is what the alternative writ orders. However, the public has a right of access co-extensive with the press. On the other hand, the trial court retains the right to control access by members of the press or public who would overcrowd the courtroom, attempt to interfere in the proceedings or otherwise obstruct the proceedings.
A peremptory writ shall issue directing the defendant to permit the press to attend subsequent proceedings in the underlying juvenile proceeding.
The Standard Act, § 19, stated as follows:
"*•* * generaj public shall be excluded, and only such persons shall be admitted who are found by the judge to have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court.* * *” National Council On Crime and Delinquency, Standard Juvenile Court Act, Sixth Ed (1959), reprinted in 5 National Probation and Parole Assn. Journal 323, 367 (1959).