Bib'le v. Committee of Bar Examiners

NEWMAN, J.

I concur in the result. I do not agree with the majority’s dicta concerning estoppel. In Packer v. Board of Behavioral Science Examiners [52 Cal.App.3d 190 (125 Cal.Rptr. 96)] (ante, p. 554), for example, there was no “detrimental reliance” (52 Cal.App. 3d at p. 196). And by no means am I persuaded that the First Year Law Student Examination exemplifies the kind of “strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public” that troubled the justices in Long Beach [3 Cal.3d 462, 493 (91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423)], San Diego [30 Cal.2d 817, 829-830 (186 P.2d 124, 175 A.L.R. 747)], and Fresno [34 Cal.App.3d 813, 819 (110 Cal.Rptr. 262)] (ante, p. 553).

Concerning the majority’s discussion of “a fundamental interest,” I still endorse the views set forth in Justice Mosk’s concurring opinion in Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 595-607 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916]