(dissenting) — Defendant Frank Ferguson was convicted by a Walla Walla jury of the crime of indecent liberties (RCW 9A.44.100(1)). The information alleged that defendant knowingly caused his 10-year-old stepdaughter to have sexual contact with him sometime between September 1979 and February 1980.
Prior to trial, Ferguson filed a motion in limine to exclude nude photographs of himself, his stepdaughter, and his infant son, taken 7 years prior to the alleged incidents. In addition, he moved to suppress the testimony of his wife, Mary, regarding an alleged attempt on Ferguson's part to have his stepdaughter perform oral sodomy on his person at the time the photographs were taken. The trial court denied Ferguson's motions.
*142During the trial, caseworker Dave Williams testified that the victim's story had been "extremely consistent throughout the entire investigation of the case". The stepdaughter's schoolteacher, Kathleen L. Emmert, over objection, was allowed to testify that she and the victim had a discussion about "sexual advances" toward her and that the discussion concerned "her father". The school psychologist testified as to the stepdaughter's subnormal intellectual capacity and the emotional problems she had been experiencing at school. Both the schoolteacher and the victim herself testified as to her propensity to lying and/or misstating the truth. The victim, however, said she was much improved in lying and that what she testified about concerning her stepfather was true.
Ferguson assigns error to the introduction of the following evidence:
1. Nude photographs of the defendant and the victim taken 7 years before the alleged incident;
2. Teacher Kathleen Emmert's testimony regarding the stepdaughter's statement that her stepfather was the culprit;
3. Other testimony of Emmert regarding truthfulness of the stepdaughter;
4. Testimony of caseworker Dave Williams regarding the consistency of the stepdaughter's testimony;
5. Testimony by defendant's wife regarding sex acts which defendant allegedly performed when these photographs were taken.
I
The decision to admit the nude photographs was within the discretion of the trial court, balancing the probative value of the photographs against their prejudicial effect under ER 403. State v. King, 71 Wn.2d 573, 429 P.2d 914 (1967). Evidence of past bad acts is relevant for limited purposes, such as showing a common scheme or plan or demonstrating "lustful disposition". State v. Golladay, 78 Wn.2d 121, 470 P.2d 191 (1970), overruled on other grounds by State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 *143(1976). The photographs were 7 years old, having been taken when the stepdaughter was 3. Only one of the six photographs shows Ferguson with the victim sitting on the floor, with his arms around her and his son. It is difficult to believe this photograph demonstrates in any manner Ferguson's "lustful disposition" toward his stepdaughter. Ferguson's wife testified that at the time of the taking of the photograph Ferguson had her daughter kiss his penis. When the victim testified, however, she emphatically denied the incident. I believe the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding the photographs were not relevant and should not have been admitted.
The ultimate issue thus becomes whether the introduction of the photographs was harmless error. Error is not prejudicial unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred. State v. Tharp, 96 Wn.2d 591, 637 P.2d 961 (1981); State v. Cunningham, 93 Wn.2d 823, 613 P.2d 1139 (1980).
In its majority opinion, the Court of Appeals states that, considering the entire record, the impact the photos may have had was minimal. As Judge Roe points out in his Court of Appeals dissent, however, there was evidence casting doubt upon the victim's credibility — she had a self-admitted problem with stealing and lying and was somewhat emotionally disturbed. There was also evidence admitted to show the victim could have obtained enough information from sexually oriented magazines left around her home to concoct the story she testified to. Additionally, the nude photos, together with the testimony that the Fer-gusons were practicing nudists within the confines of their home, may have offended the jurors, thus prejudicing the outcome of the trial. For these reasons, I cannot conclude this error of admission was harmless.
II
I believe the trial court also erred in admitting testimony of the victim's teacher regarding the conversation in which *144the victim discussed sexual advances made by her stepfather. At trial the teacher testified as follows:
Q. On February 8th, did you have occasion to have a discussion with [the victim]?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did that discussion take place?
A. Outside my classroom in the hallway.
Q. Very generally, what was the gist of that discussion?
A. It concerned her father.
The trial judge then overruled defense counsel's objection and allowed the teacher to testify that the conversation she had with the victim concerned "some sexual advances". Report of Proceedings, at 13-14.
The "hue and cry" doctrine, as adopted in this state, allows the prosecution to present evidence that the victim complained to someone within a reasonable time after the assault, so long as the witness does not tell what the prose-cutrix said concerning the circumstances and details of the assault. State v. Goebel, 40 Wn.2d 18, 25, 240 P.2d 251 (1952). Theoretically this evidence lessens the probability that the victim fabricated the story. State v. Murley, 35 Wn.2d 233, 212 P.2d 801 (1949). Excluded, however, is "evidence of the details of the complaint, including the identity of the offender and the nature of the act". Murley, at 237. See also State v. Hunter, 18 Wash. 670, 672, 52 P. 247 (1898); State v. Griffin, 43 Wash. 591, 595, 86 P. 951 (1906). Thus, the trial court clearly erred in allowing the teacher to testify that the father was the alleged offender.
The prosecution argues that the admission of this testimony was at most harmless error, as identity was not an issue in the trial and the victim later testified as to identity. In State v. Conklin, 37 Wn.2d 389, 223 P.2d 1065 (1950), an indecent liberties prosecution, this court held that although the testimony of the complainant regarding the defendant's conduct toward her was improper, it was not reversible error. Immediately following the testimony, the plaintiff properly brought out all of the details of the offense charged and named the defendant as the offender. The *145Conklin court stated at page 391:
To permit a third party witness to testify as to the details of the prior out-of-court complaint, would incur a risk that the jury might not limit such evidence to the question of whether or not a complaint had been made, and might wrongfully give it some weight as corroboration of the complaining witness' present testimony.
Conklin is clearly distinguishable here. The Conklin court emphasized there was no risk of "bolstering a disputed identification" in admitting the evidence. Conklin, at 391. In Conklin, the complaining witness, after the testimony of her prior out-of-court complaint, then immediately testified as to the details of the alleged offense, including the defendant's identity. This did not occur in the present case, as the teacher testified before the victim, and there was another witness between the two testimonies. In addition, in Conklin, the stepfather was present at the time the complaining witness identified him as the offending party.
Ill
The trial court also erred in permitting a third party witness to testify on cross examination as to the consistency of the victim's "story" when retold to him on several separate occasions.
ER 611(b) provides that cross examination "should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness". Additionally, ER 608 provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation, (1) when the evidence refers only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by reputation evidence or otherwise.
Dave Williams was allowed to testify on cross examination as follows:
Q. Isn't it fair to say that all those times that you have heard her relate the story that she related, it has been consistent?
*146Mr. Phillips: I'd object, Your Honor, as not being in the scope of the direct.
The Court: Objection overruled.
A. Yes, she's been extremely consistent throughout the entire investigational process of this case.
Report of Proceedings, at 82. Obviously, this testimony does not relate to the victim's character for truthfulness, but is relevant only in establishing her consistency in retelling her story to the witness. Its admission was prejudicial error.
Conclusion
The alleged act of the stepfather having indecent liberties with his young stepdaughter is a heinous crime, for which he should be substantially punished if found guilty, after a fair trial. Perhaps I could dismiss a single error on the basis that it was harmless. In the aggregate, however, I find that the trial court erroneously admitted (1) very humiliating, nonrelevant photographs showing the defendant in the nude; (2) the teacher's improper testimony identifying the stepfather as sexually abusive of his stepdaughter; (3) caseworker Williams' testimony as to the credibility of the victim's testimony; and (4) the testimony of teacher Emmert regarding the truthfulness of the stepdaughter. These errors resulted in the introduction of a substantial quantity of evidence which cumulatively, in my opinion, prejudiced Ferguson's right to receive a fair trial.
We must preserve constitutional guaranties or they will soon become meaningless, and a fair trial unattainable, even in America.
For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Utter, J., concurs with Dore, J., as to issue I.
Reconsideration denied September 20, 1983.