concurring.
In my view the superior court correctly ruled that the Burnetts had a property interest in the Candlelight Extension. Because I think that appellate opinions re*1246quire reasons for the conclusions reached,1 I write separately to briefly express my reasons for this conclusion.
One condition of the ordinance which granted the Burnetts an express easement in the Candlelight Extension was that appropriate federal approval had to be received. Documents submitted in support of the Burnetts’ summary judgment motion indicate that state officials informed the City that the National Park Service had delegated authority to grant approval of the easement to the State Parks Division and that the State Parks Division did in fact approve of the easement. The City assured the Burnetts on a number of occasions that it was satisfied that federal approval had been obtained and never suggested that the Burnetts should take further action to clarify whether the federal government had granted approval. The Burnetts reasonably and detrimentally relied on the City’s representations concerning federal approval and it would be unconscionable at this point to allow the City to assert an inconsistent position in order to avoid compensating the Burnetts for their losses.
If this case involved the forced imposition of an easement on property subject to a federal dedication for outdoor recreational use, it would be appropriate to require direct evidence of federal approval. However, only damages are being sought in this case and only from the City of Kenai. No federal interest is involved. Therefore, it seems appropriate to hold the City to its pre-taking representations to the Burnetts that the condition regarding federal approval was satisfied.
The City also claims that even if the federal government approved the easement, the Burnetts failed to perfect their easement because they never obtained a conveyance document executed by the City Manager as required by the municipal code. In my view this argument lacks merit.
The City Council consistently recognized the Burnetts’ right of access to their property and disregarded any conditions precedent that arguably might have been present in the 1983 ordinance.2 The Burnetts reasonably and detrimentally relied on the City’s representations. It would be unconscionable therefore to allow the City to now assert an inconsistent position to avoid compensating the Burnetts for their losses. Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, 787 P.2d 109, 114 n. 2 (Alaska 1990) (the doctrine of quasi-estoppel “precludes a party from taking a position inconsistent with one taken previously when circumstances render the assertion of the second position unconscionable”).
COMPTON, Justice,concurring.
I am unpersuaded that the superior court erred in granting summary judgment to the Burnetts. Thus, in my view, this court’s affirmance of the superior court’s decision is correct. While I concur in the affirmance, the reason for this result is that we are evenly divided in opinion on the merits of the issues presented to us.
It is a “sound, reasonable and necessary” rule that an affirmance by an evenly divided court is not precedent. Taylor Constr. Servs., Inc., v. URS Co., 758 P.2d 99, 103 (Alaska 1988) (Compton, J., dissenting). Stating personal opinions for affirmance or reversal of the superior court’s judgment is at best advisory, at worst confusing and misleading. Individual justices’ opinions are simply immaterial. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Etting v. Bank of United States, 24 U.S. 59, 78, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L.Ed. 419, 423 (1826):
*1247In the very elaborate arguments which have been made at the bar, several cases have been cited which have been attentively considered. No attempt will be made to analyze them, or to decide on their application to the case before us, because the judges are divided respecting it. Consequently the principles of law which have been argued cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it.
Therefore, I decline to accept the invitation to express my personal analysis and opinion on the merits of the underlying controversy.
. See Paul D. Carrington, et al., Justice on Appeal 31-43 (1976) (the integrity of the appellate process requires that appellate courts state the reasons for their decisions).
. Of particular consequence is the fact that the City Council voted unanimously to guarantee the Burnetts a right of access to their property either by preserving the Candlelight Extension or by constructing an alternate route. The council took this action after being fully apprised by its attorney of the legal complexities of the case.