(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the decision to affirm the trial court’s suppression order in this interlocutory appeal on grounds the trial court has not yet ruled upon.
In his suppression motion, defendant alleged that the evidence must be suppressed for several reasons: (a) there were no exigent circumstances that justified the officers’ entry into his home prior to the issuance of the warrant; (b) the warrant was not supported by probable cause; (c) the warrant affidavit contained recklessly false statements; and (d) the warrant did not satisfy the “particularity” requirement in its description of the premises to be searched. The State addressed each one of the defendant’s allegations and also argued that the evidence should not be suppressed because the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in reliance on the search warrant. See State v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
In granting defendant’s motion, the trial court ruled only on issues (a) and (d). First, the court ruled that “[ejxigent circumstances did not exist to justify the officer’s [sic] warrantless entry of defendant’s home.” Second, the court ruled that “[t]he search warrant was defective in that it did not ‘particularly’ describe the place to be searched.” The court did not address any of defendant’s other allegations, nor the State’s allegation that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in reliance on the search warrant.
This court granted the State’s petition for interlocutory appeal under Rule 5 of *959the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The main opinion correctly holds that the trial court’s suppression of the evidence was erroneous in that (1) the evidence obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant cannot be suppressed even if the initial entry into the home is not justified under an exigent circumstances analysis, see main opinion note 1; and (2) the warrant in the present case was not void for lack of particularity, see main opinion note 2. That should end our analysis in this interlocutory appeal. The case should be remanded for whatever further proceedings may be appropriate in the trial court.
However, the main opinion goes on to affirm the trial court’s suppression order based on grounds never considered by the trial court. See main opinion at 955-956 & n. 3 (“[SJince we may affirm on any proper ground, we address Potter’s claim that Detective Harrison’s affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause.”). While this is an appropriate position to take with a final appealable order from the trial court, see State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985), I believe it is an improper position to take with regard to an interlocutory appeal.
An interlocutory appeal is designed to review an intermediate order of the trial court upon which further proceedings in the trial court hinge. See, e.g., Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 435, 361 P.2d 177, 178 (1961) (interlocutory appeal is proper “if it appears essential to adjudicate principles of law or procedure in advance as a necessary foundation upon which the trial court may proceed”); Osteen v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 283 So.2d 379, 381 (Fla.App.1973) (review by interlocutory appeal is an accelerated procedure designed to resolve an issue in question and then return the case to the trial court for further proceedings); Black’s Law Dictionary 815 (6th ed. 1990) (Interlocutory appeal is “[a]n appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits.”). By definition, therefore, an interlocutory appeal contemplates further proceedings in the trial court once the appellate court decides the intermediate issue on appeal. Where, by definition, the trial court remains an active participant in the proceedings and has yet to address an issue, we should limit our ruling to the issues raised in the interlocutory order.
In this case, we should reverse the order of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. The trial court should have the first opportunity to rule on questions such as probable cause. See State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Utah App.1993) (our review focuses on whether it was permissible for the trial court to find that the magistrate had probable cause to issue the warrant).1 Likewise, the trial court must decide, in the first instance, the *960question of whether the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in reliance on the search warrant. At the very least, the trial court should be invited to determine factually if the officer knew that information he supplied in the affidavit was false, or whether he “would have known [it] was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421.
After we have decided the narrow issue presented in an interlocutory appeal, we should allow the case to proceed in the trial court. “To the extent an appellate court supersedes the trial court in the decision of factual issues and the application of law to fact, it undermines the authority of the tribunals through which the legal system speaks directly to those who invoke the legal process for resolution of their controversies.” Section 3.11, American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, 1977 Edition. We must be very careful not to usurp the authority and responsibility of our trial courts.
Due to the intermediate and limited nature of this appeal, I would reverse the suppression order and remand the case for further proceedings in the trial court.
. By deciding issues the trial court has not addressed, the main opinion has neglected to recognize the very important role played by the trial court in reviewing the decision of the magistrate. In White, 851 P.2d at 1198, we discussed the standard of review for each step in the process of reviewing a search warrant:
When a search warrant is challenged on the basis of lacking probable cause for issuance, "the fourth amendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo review of the magistrate’s probable cause determination.” Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991; accord [State v.] Stromberg, 783 P.2d [54] at 57 [Utah App.1989]. Instead, the reviewing court is required to give great deference to the magistrate’s determination, and "will find the warrant invalid only if the magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a ‘substantial basis’ for determining that probable cause existed.” State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv.Rep. 18, 19 [846 P.2d 1256, 1260] (Utah 1993) (quoting Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991); accord State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987); State v. Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 673 (Utah App.1992). The trial court examines the affidavit "in its entirety and in a commonsense fashion.” State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah 1985).
Our review of the trial court’s determination focuses on whether it was permissible for the trial court to find that the magistrate had probable cause to issue the warrant under the Gates test. We do not conduct our own de novo review of the magistrate's decision. State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (1987) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331). We defer to the trial court’s finding that the magistrate acted properly. Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57.
Because of our limited role in reviewing probable cause, we should refrain from addressing the issue where the trial court has never addressed it.