(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I agree with the majority opinion in all respects, save one: the remand for an environmental impact statement (EIS). This requirement is not only contrary to our well-established statutory and case law, it is also unsupported by the record. The current case involves nothing more than a proposal to change boundary lines between King County and Black Diamond. There were no land use proposals, no development plans, and no environmental changes before the board when it approved the annexation. Although such proposals may occur in the future, at which time an EIS is both necessary and appropriate, the majority is jumping the gun by requiring one at this early date. Ironically, there is significant testimony on the record that virtually the same development proposals will be made in the future regardless of which government body regulates the area. Thus, I dissent to the EIS requirement.
This case arises out of the City of Black Diamond's attempt to annex 783 acres located adjacent to city boundaries. In accordance with the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), RCW 43.21C, Black Diamond considered the potential environmental impacts of the proposed annexation. Following this "threshold determination", it issued a "determination of nonsignificance" (DNS). Here, the completed annexation itself would not have any environmentally adverse impacts. There was also testimony that development was equally likely should the annexed area remain under King County jurisdiction. Although some property owners in *684the area indicated a desire to eventually develop their lands, the annexation plan was not accompanied by any permit applications, or requests for plat approval. Nor would the annexation automatically result in running power lines, building roads, or laying sewer lines. In short, the Black Diamond annexation would do little more than change a few lines on a map.
Generally, a DNS is appropriate when the environmental impacts of a proposed action are "merely speculative". WAC 197-11-060; see also WAC 197-11-340; WAC 197-11-330.18 SEPA requires the preparation of an EIS only for "legislation and other major actions having a probable significant, adverse environmental impact". (Italics mine.) RCW 43.21C-.031; accord RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). The term probable is defined as:
likely or reasonably likely to occur, as in 'a reasonable probability of more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment' (see WAC 197-11-794). Probable is used to distinguish likely impacts from those that merely have a possibility of occurring, but are remote or speculative.
(Italics mine.) WAC 197-11-782. The record before us clearly fails to meet these requirements.
Nonetheless, the majority rejects the statutory language and announces a new SEPA standard: "We therefore hold that a proposed land use related action is not insulated from full environmental review simply because there are no existing specific proposals to develop the land in question or because there are no immediate land use changes which will flow from the proposed action." Majority, at 664. The rationale for this new rule is that "[d]ecisionmaking based on complete disclosure would be thwarted if full environmental review could be evaded simply because no land use changes would occur as a direct result of a proposed government action." (Italics mine:) Majority, at 664. Although I share the majority's concern with full disclosure, the virtually bound*685less language it chooses in this statement is supported by neither common sense nor precedent. "Possible" environmental impacts are not the same as "probable" ones.
None of the three cases cited by the majority supports its new SEPA interpretation. In the first case, Bellevue v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn.2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978), this court did not "require[] an environmental assessment for proposed annexations to cities". Majority, at 663. Rather, we held that the record was unclear as to whether a threshold determination had been made, Bellevue, at 867, and expressly withheld an "opinion as to whether an assessment of environmental factors . . . must result in a decision to prepare a full EIS", Bellevue, at 868.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals decision in Juanita Bay Vly. Comm'ty Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140, review denied, 83 Wn.2d 1002 (1973) offers no support for the majority position. That opinion did not involve a speculative project, but the actual grading and excavation of a 55-acre tract of property in preparation for an industrial park. The final case cited by the majority, Murden Cove Preserv. Ass'n v. Kitsap Cy., 41 Wn. App. 515, 704 P.2d 1242 (1985), is actually contrary authority. In Murden Cove, the Court of Appeals upheld a DNS, stating that "in the absence of specific plans for any future development, SEPA does not require consideration of 'every remote and speculative consequence of an action.'" (Italics mine.) 41 Wn. App. at 526-27 (quoting Short v. Clallam Cy., 22 Wn. App. 825, 834, 593 P.2d 821 (1979)).
Even less persuasive is the majority's policy rationale. It seeks to justify its new SEPA rule by claiming that it is necessary to prevent "snowballing"; i.e., land use projects that "acquire virtually unstoppable administrative inertia". Majority, at 664. If indeed there is a serious "snowballing" problem — a fact not revealed in this record — the majority's solution is akin to swatting a fly with a SCUD. Next, the majority claims that its new rule is warranted because Black Diamond based its annexation decision on "environ*686mental considerations". There is a difference, however, between decisions that consider environmental factors and decisions that have environmental impacts; SEPA is only concerned with the latter.
Contrary to the majority's claims, we have consistently emphasized that environmental impact statements will not be required where the government action is associated with only a speculative land use project. For example, in Cheney v. Mountlake Terrace, 87 Wn.2d 338, 552 P.2d 184 (1976), plaintiffs challenged the City's compliance with SEPA, claiming that the City's road construction plans would cause it to later approve a developer's proposals for a particular piece of adjacent property. We denied the SEPA claim because the completion of the road was "in no way dependent upon or intertwined with the development of the property". Cheney, at 343. SEPA does not require an EIS when "[t]he future use of the private parcel is too remote and speculative to call for present evaluation of its future development." Cheney, 87 Wn.2d at 346. As we noted, "it is impractical if not impossible to identify and evaluate every remote and speculative consequence of an action". Cheney, at 344. "If and when a proposed project is brought to the City for the private parcel, it can then deal with environmental considerations." Cheney, at 346.
Similarly, in Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wn.2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978), this court was presented with a challenge to Wenatchee's failure to commission a separate EIS for each of the various stages in redeveloping its central business district. After initially observing that not "every action or every governmental recommendation requires preparation of an EIS", Lassila, at 813, we held that neither the creation of a fund, the selection of a site, the acquisition of a site, the commission of design contracts, the surplusing of a site, nor the resale of a site to a third party required the preparation of an EIS. Lassila, at 814-15. We also upheld the City's DNS in rezoning a site in the redevelopment project because it resulted in a "down zone" — an action which reduced the number of available uses for the area. Lassila, at 817-18. A *687proposed theater complex for the area did not affect the DNS because no building permit application or specific plans for development accompanied the down zone. SEPA did not require an EIS because the theater was "at best tentative". Lassila, at 818.
In Carpenter v. Island Cy., 89 Wn.2d 881, 577 P.2d 575 (1978), the annexation of territoiy by a sewer district was challenged for failure to conduct an EIS. We held that an EIS was unnecessary because "at the time of the annexation . . . there was before the commissioners no plan for the furnishing of sewage facilities to this annexed territoiy." Carpenter, 89 Wn.2d at 883. "Where, as here, no proposal for a change in the environment is before the agency, there is no impact which can be evaluated." Carpenter, at 884. As this court concluded, "the annexation itself merely changed the boundaries of the district . . . [and] had no impact on the physical environment." Carpenter, at 883. See also Richland v. Franklin Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 100 Wn.2d 864, 868, 676 P.2d 425 (1984) (SEPA does not require consideration of every remote and speculative consequence of an action).
In accord with SEPA, the above cases reflect a clear rule that preparation of an EIS is not necessary when the potential impacts of a government action are associated with land use projects that might take place at some time in the indefinite future. Instead, the proper time for evaluating a proposal is when the principal characteristics are readily identifiable. It is impossible to accurately analyze environmental impacts without knowing the exact nature of the project, its environmental benefits and attendant mitigating factors. Here, the majority can point only to alleged "proposals" and "possible" development "alternatives" which indicate a future intent to develop the annexed properties. See majority, at 661-67. If, in fact, the property owners in the annexed area eventually commit to developing their land, an EIS may be appropriate when they apply for a building permit or plat approval. Until then, environmental review is premature.
*688Finally, the majority implicitly claims the environmental high ground as justification for its SEPA interpretation. In fact, the opposite is true. By requiring an EIS at virtually every level, the process is degraded. A premature EIS, based upon incomplete or projected data, could well be more harmful than helpful. Instead of enhancing the governmental function, the action of preparing an EIS becomes repetitive and onerous. With no current project proposals before the board or other probable environmental impacts, the issuance of a DNS for the annexation decision was entirely appropriate. Therefore, I dissent as to this portion of the majority opinion.
Andersen, C.J., and Madsen, J., concur with Durham, J.
Reconsideration denied February 18, 1994.
Under RCW 43.21C.095, regulations enacted pursuant to SEPA are to be accorded "substantial deference".