(dissenting).
I dissent. The case of Beal v. Turner1 is dispositive of the present matter insofar as the need for counsel is concerned.
Alvarez v. Turner cited as authority for reversing the instant matter is not binding upon this court. That case relied upon Mempa v. Rhay and erroneously assumed that a lawyer was required in parole revocation hearings.
In the instant matter the court granted probation after sentence was pronounced. The release of the defendant was a matter of grace on the part of the trial judge and not a matter of right on behalf of the defendant. All rights to be free were termi*425nated upon conviction of the defendant, and he was then subject to immediate incarceration. If the court wishes to give him an opportunity to prove himself worthy of freedom from incarceration, it should not for that reason alone lose any power to incarcerate him after the defendant betrays the confidence of the court.
There is no jurisdictional requirement that probation be revoked in the county where a defendant was originally tried. If it is necessary for the judge to be in any particular place when he decides that a defendant had deceived him and should be incarcerated, it would make more sense to require him to be in the county where the betrayal took place.
There is no constitutional requirement that a criminal be furnished with an attorney. All that is required is that he have a right to have counsel. See Dyett v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 403, 439 P.2d 266 (1968).
I think it is time for state courts to assert themselves. We should interpret the law in the light of reason and common sense and let other courts turn prisoners loose on flimsy grounds to prey upon society if they care to do so, but we need not subscribe to such procedures.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
HENRIOD, J., does not participate herein.. 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P.2d 624 (1969).