dissenting:
I believe that there was no forced entry and, therefore, the announce and identify requirement of People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 484 P.2d 1238 (1971), was not violated. However, even if the entry were unlawful, I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the appropriate remedy is suppression of the evidence seized during the search pursuant to a valid search warrant.
*800Three years ago in People v. Griffin, 727 P.2d 55 (Colo.1986), we held that even though the initial entrance into the defendant’s home was unlawful, nevertheless, evidence obtained pursuant to a valid search warrant was admissible “so long as the valid search is not tainted by the prior illegality.” Id. at 58.
In arriving at this conclusion, we considered and found support for our decision in People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534 (Colo.1983); People v. Turner, 660 P.2d 1284 (Colo.1983); People v. Barndt, 199 Colo. 51, 604 P.2d 1173 (1980); and People v. Hannah, 183 Colo. 9, 514 P.2d 320 (1973).
In each of these cases there was either an initial illegal search followed by a search pursuant to a warrant, Turner; breaking in and securing the premises until a search warrant arrived, Hannah and Barndt; or illegal entry followed by a war-rantless arrest which in turn was followed by a search pursuant to a warrant, McFall.
Here, the evidence is undisputed that the search was based not only on information obtained before entry into the defendant’s home, but did not begin until after the search warrant had issued. Majority op. at 796.
In Griffin, we also rejected the “de facto seizure” rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in People v. Shuey, 13 Cal.3d 835, 533 P.2d 211, 120 Cal.Rptr. 83 (1975). The court there held that once there had been an illegal occupation of the defendant’s home, the subsequent obtaining of a warrant could no more operate to disinfect the illegal police conduct than if the police had actually seized the property sought to be suppressed prior to the acquisition of the warrant.
The majority suggests that its holding does not conflict with Griffin because here the “officers commenced an immediate search of the defendant’s home, and did not seek to secure the premises.” Majority op. at 799 n. 6.
While it is true that here the search began immediately after the police entered the defendant’s home, such search was permissible because the warrant had already issued. In short, there was no need to secure the premises.
The majority also notes that the Griffin issue has not been considered by the parties or the trial court, and if raised by the prosecution may be considered by the trial court. Majority op. at 799 n. 6. While I believe that this case should be decided contrary to the result reached by the majority, I endorse this suggestion.
The remedy of suppression is a drastic one and not warranted here. In my view, we should reaffirm the position we took in People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 539 (Colo.1983), that where the search warrant was not tainted by illegal police conduct, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should not be suppressed.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice MULLARKEY joins me in this dissent.