I concur in the judgment of affirmance but I do not agree with the holding in the majority opinion that evidence of the other robberies alleged to have been committed by the defendant was admissible under any sound legal theory, and such holding is clearly contrary to the holding of this court in the recent case of People v. Newson, ante, p. 34 [230 P.2d 618],
I have heretofore expressed my view with respect to the admission of evidence of crimes other than that which is charged against the defendant and for which he is being tried, and the majority holding in the case at bar on this issue is clearly contrary to the settled rule in all common law jurisdictions (see dissent People v. Dabb, 32 Cal.2d 491, 501 [197 P.2d 1]; People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 483 [190 P.2d 9]; People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 322 [169 P.2d 924]).
In the case at bar, however, I think there is little doubt but that the jury would have returned the same verdict had the erroneously admitted evidence of other crimes been excluded, and therefore the admission of such evidence in this ease cannot be said to have been prejudicial to the defendant. For this reason, I concur in the judgment of affirmance.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 19, 1951. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.