(concurring specially). I concur in the conclusion reached in the majority opinion, but I think the same error is present there as was apparent in the first appeal of this case, 200 Okla. 381, 194 P. 2d 603. It was not necessary to reverse the judgment in the former appeal for under the facts of that case it was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove that the intangible personal property had been assessed for taxation and the taxes paid. This is obvious from the former opinion, for therein it is stated:
“The contract sued upon, as found by the court, was made September 25, 1945, and the agreed price became due and payable November 23, 1945. The suit was filed January 24, 1946.”
Before the present amendment of the statute, intangible personal property was assessed as of January 1st.
68 O. S. 1941 §1507 provides:
“Unless otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the listing, assessment and equalization of intangible personal property, subject to taxation under this Act shall be governed by the laws relating to the listing, assessment, and equalization of personal property subject to general ad valorem taxation, including rights of appeal and duties and powers of officials . . .”
68 O. S. 1941 §15.6 provides for the place of listing and assessment of property, and
68 O. S. 1941 §15.11 provides, in part, as follows:
“It shall be the duty of the Assessor to furnish such forms to any taxpayer upon request, and all personal property shall be listed on such forms in the manner provided therein; and such lists shall be signed and sworn to and filed with the County Assessor not later than March 1st of each year.”
The assessment of intangible personal property consists of (1) the listing of the property, either by the 'voluntary act of the owner or by the act of the assessor when the owner fails to file a list of his property.
(2) The valuation of the property by the assessor as of January 1st.
*177(3) The preparation oí the tax rolls as provided for by 68 O. S. 1941 §§ 15.52 and 15.53.
(4) Extension ol taxes by the assessor upon the tax rolls as provided by 68 O. S. 1941 § 15.55. In the case of intangibles, where the rate of taxation is fixed by statute rather than by act of the excise board, the assessment is made and the amount of the tax determined by operation of law when the value of the intangibles is equalized and finally fixed.
(5) Delivery of the tax rolls by the county assessor to the county treasurer.
It is not until all of the foregoing steps have been taken that the assessment is complete and a taxpayer can know the amount of his intangible tax and pay the same.
68 O. S. 1941 §1515 provides, in part, as follows:
“In every action or suit in any court for the collection of any bond, note, account receivable, or other intangible personal property as defined in Section 1 of this Act, the plaintiff must allege and prove:
“That such intangible personal property sued upon has been assessed for taxation under the provisions of this Act for every tax year during which he was the owner of same, and that all taxes, together with accrued interest and penalties, assessed upon the property for such period, have been paid; . . . and provided further, if such intangible property is not subject to such taxes he may so allege, stating the controlling facts upon which is based such allegation.
“If the petition or complaint of the plaintiff fails to make the allegations herein prescribed, or if he fails to prove facts supporting such allegations when made, the action must be dismissed upon demurrer or motion of the defendant, or by the court on its own motion.”
In the majority opinion, it is said:
“In this case the chose in action came into existence in 1945, and this suit thereon was commenced January 24, 1946. Under the rule of Lewis v. Boice, supra, the only intangible tax law compliance which plaintiff needed to show following our decision on former appeal of this case, was a listing or assessing of that item, for the one year 1946, since that was the only requirement of the law which was applicable to this chose in action on and before January 24, 1946.”
Such construction violates the rule that tax statutes are strictly construed against the state or the municipal subdivision levying the tax and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.
The statute does not require that plaintiff must allege and prove that the intangible has been listed for taxation. It only requires allegation and proof of the assessment of the property for taxation and of the payment of the tax, or the allegation of facts which would excuse the making of such allegation and proof.
In this case the contract sued on was made September 25, 1945, and became due November 23, 1945. The suit was filed January 24, 1946. At the time the suit was filed the assessment of the intangible for taxes could not have been completed and there was no tax due or payable.
As I see it, these facts appear from the pleadings sufficiently to make it unnecessary to allege or prove anything about the assessment or taxability of the item sued on.
I cannot believe that in enacting the Intangible Tax Law the Legislature intended to deprive a trial court of the power to render a judgment unless a plaintiff had alleged and proved some step in the assessment of property for taxes or intended to deny to a litigant the right to recover a judgment solely because he failed to make such allegation and proof or because he failed to allege in exact words and prove that the assessment of the property had not been completed at the time of the institution of the action and therefore the payment of the tax could not be made.
*178Such construction of the statute adds to my doubt as to its constitutionality.
The plaintiff in this case would not be relieved from payment of taxes on the contract for the fiscal year 1946-1947 if we should hold that it was unnecessary to allege and prove assessment or some step thereof. The tax liability would remain and the taxes would be collected as are taxes on intangible' property which does not become the subject of suit.
ARNOLD, C. J., concurs in these views.