Wilfred L. Olsen, defendant-appellant, petitioned the district court for an order *11modifying a decree of divorce entered on the 1st day of March, 1946. The decree ordered Olsen to pay Mrs. Olsen $100 per month for each of two minor children, and further to pay $200 per month as alimony until Mrs. Olsen remarried. Olsen moved the court to modify the decree on the alleged grounds of a material and permanent change in his circumstances. The district court denied Olsen’s motion to modify on the basis that Olsen failed to show a sufficient change in his circumstances and Olsen has appealed.
Olsen claims that his retirement from the active practice of medicine has reduced his earnings, and constitutes a change in his financial ability to pay alimony. The district court found that Olsen’s taxable income for 1972 and 1973 was approximately $45,000. After the doctor’s retirement, his income under a retirement provision of an inter-vivos trust was $19,762. Additionally, the court found that Olsen received from social security the sum of $2,639.20, for a total income of $22,451.43. Olsen listed his estimated living expenses for 1975 as $15,377.52, including $437 for malpractice insurance. Olsen’s estate included a trust with a principal at the time of trial in excess of $200,000.
Mrs. Frances Olsen testified that she too has experienced a change in her financial circumstances. Her income for 1975 was reduced as a result of mandatory retirement upon reaching the age of 65. The court found that her 1974 income was $14,200. Mrs. Olsen testified at trial that her 1975 income is $536 a month from retirement, which totals $6,432 per year. Additionally, Mrs. Olsen has a savings account in the amount of $30,000 from which she receives interest monthly in the amount of $125. She also receives each month $200 as alimony payment, making her current monthly income a sum of $861 or $10,332 annually. Mrs. Olsen’s current living expenses total the sum of $911.08 per month or $10,933 annually. Mrs. Olsen also owns a lot worth approximately $14,000 but which she has been unable to sell for five years.
The trial court concluded that while there had been a change in the financial condition of appellant since the entry of the divorce decree, it was not sufficient to justify a modification of the decree and the elimination of alimony.
Appellant claims that the court erred in finding that his financial position had decreased and yet refusing to eliminate the alimony payments from the decree. In determining whether alimony payments are just the court must consider the correlative needs and abilities of both parties. Shepard v. Shepard, 94 Idaho 734, 497 P.2d 321 (1972).
Here, while it is true that Olsen’s income from his medical practice has decreased substantially due to his retirement, it is also true that he admits that he will return to active practice if he finds it “necessary.” Additionally, the court may consider all sources of income, including pensions, in ascertaining Olsen’s ability to pay alimony; and the record shows that the appellant has income of nearly $20,000 annually from a trust fund.
Mrs. Olsen, as already noted, reached mandatory retirement age in 1974 and has had her annual income reduced from $14,000 to $10,300 including the alimony. With the continuance of the $200 per month alimony, she still will be unable to meet her expenses without reaching into her savings or reducing her standard of living.
The moving party has the burden of establishing a material, permanent and substantial change in circumstances. Larkin v. Larkin, 85 Idaho 610, 382 P.2d 784 (1963); Daniels v. Daniels, 82 Idaho 201, 351 P.2d 236 (1960). It was the trial court’s conclusion that appellant failed to meet the burden. As the resolution of this question rests within the discretion of the trial court it will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. *12See Embree v. Embree, 85 Idaho 443, 380 P.2d 216 (1963); Jarvis v. Jarvis, 218 Kan. 679, 544 P.2d 1384 (1976); Ridge v. Ridge, 542 P.2d 189 (Utah 1975). It is our opinion that no such abuse of discretion occurred in this case.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
McFADDEN, C. J., and BAKES, J., concur.