dissenting: I respectfully concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Prager, but feel compelled to advance one additional argument which in my opinion clarifies the legislative intent. While this case on the facts here presented deals with contracts for the sale of caskets, and does not include the cost of mortuary professional services, the provisions of K. S. A. 16-301, set out in the majority opinion, must be fully considered.
K. S. A. 16-301 requires:
“Any . . . contract . . . requiring the payment of money . . . wherein . . . the furnishing of professional services by a funeral director or embalmer is not immediately required, is hereby declared to be against public policy and void, unless all money paid thereunder shall be deposited in a bank or trust company. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Obviously, there can be no constructive delivery of professional services. In this situation the clear intent of the statute is that the words “immediately required” should be interpreted to mean “when needed by reason of the death of the person for whom the services were purchased.” Given this required construction of the statute relative to professional services, the same construction must be applied to contracts for the sale of caskets in the case at bar. A statute must be construed so it is internally harmonious. (Board of Park Comm’rs, City of Wichita v. State, ex rel., 212 Kan. 716, 512 P. 2d 1040; State v. Sumner, 169 Kan. 516, 219 P. 2d 438; and 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 191, pp. 389-390.)
The construction given the statute in question by the court requires the court to recognize that the words “immediately re*220quired” have a dual meaning. In my opinion, this is an erroneous construction of the statute.
Miller, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinions.