dissenting.
Petitioners Portland State University and the Employment Division seek judicial review of an order of the Employment Appeals Board holding that the university’s discharge of claimant was not for misconduct connected with his work.
Petitioners seek judicial review pursuant to ORS 657.282, assigning as error the board’s conclusion that claimant’s misconduct was not connected with his work.
In Romanosky v. Employment Division, 21 Or App 785, 788, 536 P2d 1277 (1975), we stated:
"In Bauer v. Morgan, 16 Or App 132, 135, 517 P2d 689, Sup Ct review denied (1974), the court recognized that 'misconduct’ as used in ORS 657.176 is defined as ' "* * * deliberate violation[s] * * * [or] disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right *937to expect of his employee * * ’ (Brackets theirs.) Other jurisdictions have applied a similar definition in unemployment compensation cases. See 76 Am Jur2d 945, Unemployment Compensation § 52 (1975).”
The petitioners contend that where a person is employed as a professor by a state-supported institution of higher learning, a conviction for conspiring to destroy government buildings calls into question not only his continued right of access to the government buildings in which he is employed, but also the implication such a conviction may reasonably have upon his fitness to continue as a teacher, guide and counselor to his students, and as a representative of the university. That such a conclusion has much reason for its basis is indicated by the evidence in the record here.
In his appearance before the State Board of Higher Education, the attorney for claimant stated at that hearing:
"* * * that Dr. Giese was a counselor at the Oregon State Correctional Institution. His present legal problems resulted from the fact that certain of the individuals from the institution were again in difficulty after their release. He said Dr. Giese had been associated with them and was charged with conspiring with them * * *.”
Certainly therefore it cannot be doubted that misconduct of the kind demonstrated by his conviction can indeed be "connected with his work” within the meaning of ORS 657.176(2)(a). 76 Am Jur 2d, Unemployment Compensation § 52. See also: U.C.B.R. v. Ostrander, 21 Pa Commw Ct 583, 347 A2d 351 (1975); O’Neal v. Employment Security Agency, 89 Ida 313, 404 P2d 600 (1965).
Here the regulations of the State Board of Higher Education (41.330(1)) expressly authorize, though they do not require, termination of employment for conviction of a felony during the period of employment. The rationale demonstrating that there may indeed be and here was a connection with a professor’s *938work and his conviction of the particular felony of which claimant was convicted is concisely set forth in the findings, expressly concurred in by President Blumel of the university, of the ad hoc Hearing Committee of the university which considered this matter when it said:
" '* * * Conspiracy to commit an act of destruction is inconsistent with that commitment to persuasion, rational discourse, and the rule of law which the University has a right to expect of members of the faculty and the community has a right to expect of the University.’ * *
I cannot believe, although it does not trouble to say so, that the majority would hold such a crime as unconnected with his work, if it involved the very university building in which he taught, or indeed any other of that university’s buildings. In my opinion it matters not whether his crime involved some building of his immediate employer or any other public building. The essence of the crime is intentional resort to destructive violence contrary to law. Such an act is not simply an expression of opinion. It is an assertion of power by force and violence contrary to law.
Nothing in the Unemployment Compensation Act causes me to believe that the legislature intended to reward a teacher lawfully discharged, as the majority here concedes, for committing such a crime by granting him from the public purse unemployment compensation in the same manner and amount as it would any other public employe who lost his job through no fault of his own.
Accordingly, I conclude that the felony of which claimant was convicted was indeed sufficiently "connected with his work” to bring his discharge within the meaning of ORS 657.176(2)(a).
I would reverse, and therefore most vigorously but respectfully dissent.