dissenting.
I believe that there was substantial evidence to support the Alaska Workmen’s Compensation Board’s finding that after April 29, 1977, Kessiek did not suffer any compensable disability from his April 18, 1976, injury. Evidence supporting the finding may be summarized as follows:
*7591. All objective testing was negative. Thus, determination of disability was based on subjective complaints.
2. As of April 29, 1977, there was no atrophy of Kessick’s right leg. Kessick’s complaint was that he had pain ascending from his knee to his spine and that his right leg was weak.
3. Kessick had prior back difficulties.
4. Kessick exaggerated his claim by denying his previous back difficulties, although when confronted with Fairbanks Clinic records he admitted he was receiving treatment for his back the month before his accident, in March, 1976.
5. When originally treated for an inguinal hernia in West Virginia, he attempted to attribute it to his April, 1976, fall, although that claim was later withdrawn.
6. In October, 1976, he was involved in a rear-end automobile collision. He claimed that only his head and neck were injured without involvement of the low back. Dr. Lindig indicated that there was some injury to the low back.
7. On March 1, 1977, Kessick, without consulting his doctor, went on a musk ox hunt at Nunivak Island. He injured his right shoulder when the sled on which he was riding tipped over.
8. Dr. Lindig’s report of Kessick’s condition on April 29, 1977, was very similar to Dr. Berrick’s report of March 29,1976, prior to the accident, indicating that any aggravation of Kessick’s prior back and leg disability had terminated.
It is true that the employer did not submit _ medical expert testimony, but this is not a case involving “highly technical medical considerations” such as those pertaining to the cause of renal failure at issue in Commercial Union Companies v. Smallwood, 550 P.2d 1261, 1267 (Alaska 1976) (footnote omitted), where we stated:
While valid awards can stand in the absence of definite medical diagnosis, this would appear to be the type of case in which it is impossible to form a judgment on the relation of the employment to the disability without medical analysis.
The medical analysis here depended almost entirely on evaluating the history furnished by Kessick and his subjective complaints. This is the type of evidence in which a compensation board has considerable expertise, as summarized by Professor Larson:1
In line with the general tendency of administrative law to recognize the expertise of specialized tribunals, compensation boards may rely to a considerable extent on their own knowledge and experience in uncomplicated medical matters, and in such cases awards may be upheld without medical testimony or even in defiance of the only medical testimony.
Here, the Board was in the best position to evaluate the evidence. I would affirm.
. 3 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 79 at 15 210 (1976). See also Beauchamp v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 477 P.2d 993 (Alaska 1970), where we upheld an award although it was not supported by clear medical evidence.