(dissenting) — I agree with the majority's conclusion that the Consumer Protection Act is inapplicable to the facts in this case and in the majority's conclusion that, for purposes of RCW 26.16.030(3), a mobile home is not real property requiring joinder of both spouses to transfer community property ownership interest. I must dissent, however, from the majority's interpretation of RCW 26.16.030(5) and its conclusion that the Simmons' mobile home is not a "household good" requiring joinder of both spouses to transfer community property ownership interest. As discussed below, classification of the mobile home as a "household good" within the provisions of RCW 26.16.030(5) fulfills the intent of the legislature in enacting this statute. Moreover, the fact that the title certificate named only Mrs. Simmons as the registered owner does not prevent proof of the community character of the property. For these reasons I dissent.
*329I
The majority treats the term "household goods" as if the term has a fixed, mandatory and inexorable meaning that prevents classification of a mobile home as a household good within the meaning of RCW 26.16.030(5). The term does not have such an established meaning consistent with only one characterization of a particular item. The meaning of a term in a statute must depend on the context in which it is used:
[I]t is the contextual implications, whether indentical [sic] with literalness or the equity of the statute or with neither, that lie at the bottom of every problem of textual interpretation. Once found by theories of statutory interpretation that are properly worked out, properly understood, and carefully applied, it is the best possible indication of legislative intention, whatever one wishes to call it. Thus any meaning, whether it be called equitable, spiritual or literal which best indicates the context of the whole statute is the proper meaning.
de Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 538, 544 (1934); see also Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. Washington Surveying & Rating Bureau, 87 Wn.2d 887, 896, 558 P.2d 215 (1976) ("The word does not have a fixed meaning and is not defined in the statute. In such a case, therefore, regard must be had to the statutory object sought to be accomplished by the use of the word . . . and the context and subject matter in which it is used."). The legislature in this case did not define the term "household goods" nor is it used in the statute in a manner which would preclude classification of a mobile home as a household good if to do so would best carry out the intent of the provision.
For instance, in this case the legislative purpose clearly appears from the following analysis.
In materials placed by the legislature in the statute archives pursuant to RCW 40.04 as part of the legislative history of the 1972 bill ultimately codified as RCW 26.16-.030(5), Laws of 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 108, § 3, supporters of the provision state that the purpose of the bill is to *330"ensure that family home and real estate holdings and items necessary to the family home would be disposed of only on the basis of mutual consent of both spouses," (italics mine), and that the new provision would mean that "family home holdings can be disposed of on the basis of mutual consent of both spouses," (italics mine).
This court's primary concern has always been to effectuate legislative intent. Gross v. Lynnwood, 90 Wn.2d 395, 583 P.2d 1197 (1978); Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 706, 558 P.2d 155 (1976). When interpreting an unclear or ambiguous statute, as we must here, included within the legislation's ambit must be those things and circumstances falling within the spirit of the law, even if it can be said that standing alone they are not within the letter of the provision. Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn.2d 441, 536 P.2d 157 (1976); In re Estate of Donnelly, 81 Wn.2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972). "[T]he underlying purpose inherent in the function of judicial interpretation of statutory enactments is to effectuate the objective —often referred to as the intent — of the legislature." (Italics mine.) Murphy v. Campbell Inv. Co., 79 Wn.2d 417, 420, 486 P.2d 1080 (1971). This can, as in Murphy, supra, entail reading out of the operation of the statute things which appear to be explicitly included.
" [Ijntent of statutes is more to be regarded and pursued than the precise letter of them ..." Eyston v. Studd, 75 Eng. Rep. 688, 694, 2 Plowden 460 (1574), quoted in Murphy, supra at 420. See State v. (1972) Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wn.2d 503, 508-09, 546 P.2d 75 (1976) (term "political committee" defined to include some individuals and to exclude some committees); In re Estate of Donnelly, supra at 436-37 (adopted child cannot inherit intestate from natural grandparents even though falling within the literal interpretation of the intestate succession statute); Jordan v. O'Brien, 79 Wn.2d 406, 409-10, 486 P.2d 290 (1971) (term "year" does not necessarily mean "a period of twelve months" for purposes of acquiring pension benefits); Gaines v. Department of Labor & Indus., 1 Wn. *331App. 547, 551-52, 463 P.2d 269 (1969) (term "findings" defined to include only "findings of ultimate fact"); Silver v. Ladd, 74 U.S. 219 (7 Wall), 19 L. Ed. 138 (1868) (statute granting public land to "single men" extended to widow seeking land grant); Doubleday v. Stockbridge, 109 Vt. 167, 194 A. 462 (1937) (term "owner or possessor" interpreted to include lessee); Gremillion v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 186 La. 295, 172 So. 163 (1937) (statute imposing expenses on "corporations" applied to individual). As can be seen from these illustrative cited cases, the court's duty to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with the legislature's intent can also require us to extend the act to the circumstances in which the application of the statute will serve the spirit of the law:
[EJquitable interpretation has provided an avenue for applying a rule of reason to counteract excessive literalism based on assumptions of inherent meanings in language. Rather than subverting legislative supremacy, it has served as another useful aid ... for discovering either the legislature's intent or its communicated meaning.
2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 54.02, at 353 (4th ed. 1973).
The majority has made the unwarranted assumption that the term "household goods" has an "inherent meaning" that excludes mobile homes.
The cases cited by the majority in support of this restrictive statutory interpretation are not applicable to the analysis necessary here. Only one of the cases, Kramer v. Beebe, 186 Ind. 349, 115 N.E. 83 (1917), considers the use of the term "household goods" in a statute, and that case only considers the type of property exempt from levy for payment of delinquent taxes. The discussion of the term was unnecessary to the court's conclusion. The other cases are clearly distinguishable both because they did not consider statutes containing the term "household goods" and because they did not consider the meaning of the term with regard to a piece of property like a mobile home. Smith v. *332Findley, 34 Kan. 316, 8 P. 871 (1885) merely declared that foodstuffs were not "household goods" which would qualify for a lower railroad cartage rate. Marquam v. Sengfelder, 24 Ore. 2, 32 P. 676 (1893) again refused to enforce against foodstuffs a lien on "household goods" included in a written lease agreement. Lawwill v. Lawwill, 21 Ariz. App. 75, 515 P.2d 900 (1973) considered whether a painting was a "household good" within the meaning of a couple's separation agreement in contemplation of divorce.
The majority's conclusion that a mobile home cannot be a household good based on this authority is unsupportable. In effectuating legislative intent the courts have rightfully refused to so rigidly define terms with far more precise common meanings. Jordan v. O'Brien, supra; Silver v. Ladd, supra. Where a word or phrase in a statute does not have a fixed meaning and is not defined in the statute, we can interpret that language only with regard to the object sought to be accomplished by the legislation and by the context in which it is used. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. Washington Surveying & Rating Bureau, supra. In. this case, the court, with the intent of the legislature in mind, need only construe the ambiguous undefined words "household goods" in the context of the statute in which the term is found. Bearing in mind our duty to effectuate the legislature's intent, it is clear the Simmons' mobile home should have been characterized as a household good for purposes of the joinder requirements of RCW 26.16-.030(5).
This becomes apparent upon analysis of the practical consequences of failing to characterize the Simmons' home as a household good. In this case, Mrs. Simmons had also purported to sell to Cooper's a bed and a refrigerator in the mobile home. It is clear that the bed is a "furnishing” and the refrigerator an "appliance" within the provisions of RCW 26.16.030(5), and clearly could not be sold without Mr. Simmons' joinder. But if their mobile home is not defined as a "household good," Mrs. Simmons alone could sign away the marital home even though she could not *333transfer two relatively insignificant items within it. Such a result is inconsistent with the intent of the act. The statute should not be interpreted to reach such an absurd result. Blondheim v. State, 84 Wn.2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975). It also violates the "golden rule" of statutory interpretation:
[The] unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.
2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45.12, at 37 (4th Ed. 1973). This alone is reason to reject the majority's construction of RCW 26.16.030(5) in favor of characterization of the Simmons' mobile home as a household good.
The suggested interpretation is further justified by a consideration of the growth of mobile homes into an increasingly important form of shelter. Over 90,000 mobile homes are occupied as dwellings in this state. Bureau of the Census information reveals that in four representative Washington towns selected for analysis from throughout the state, the percentage of housing provided by mobile homes has risen from just over 3 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1979.
This court has already acknowledged the inappropriateness of treating the mobile home as a family dwelling any differently than any other housing. State v. Work, 75 Wn.2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969). Declaring mobile homes to be household goods within the joinder requirements of RCW 26.16.030(5) would merely give spouses living in mobile homes the same protection afforded those living in more traditional dwellings by RCW 26.16.030(3), a result within the intent of the legislature in enacting RCW 26.16-.030(5). There is nothing absurd about such an interpretation.
II
Because the trial court incorrectly refused to characterize the Simmons' mobile home as a household good within the joinder requirements of RCW 26.16.030(5), the question of *334whether Mr. Simmons' joinder in the transaction was effected by his authorization or ratification of Mrs. Simmons' act, or his estoppel from asserting his failure to join, was not reached below. The majority's conclusion that join-der was not required made it unnecessary for the majority to examine this issue. However, to complete the analysis of the appropriate outcome of this case, I review the facts elicited at trial. This examination reveals that under no circumstances could the jury have found joinder in Mrs. Simmons' actions.
As has long been the case in real estate transactions requiring joinder of both spouses, a spouse's acquiescence in the transfer may be shown not only by explicit approval of the transaction, but by prior authorization or subsequent ratification of the acting spouse's transfer. The spouse may be estopped from asserting his or her nonjoinder. "Participation" in the transaction is all that is required. See Cross, Equality for Spouses in Washington Community Property Law — 1972 Statutory Changes, 48 Wash. L. Rev. 527, 548 (1973).
However, there was no evidence of such participation by Mr. Simmons in the transaction under the circumstances described in the majority opinion. Although there was evidence that Mr. Simmons prior to the transfer authorized his wife's selection of a new mobile home style, there was no evidence he authorized her to negotiate the trade-in of their old home. Indeed, the testimony showed that Cooper's employees knew Mr. Simmons wished to negotiate the value of their old mobile home in trade.
Rather than ratifying the transaction, Mr. Simmons immediately upon hearing of the agreement voiced his displeasure and unwillingness to participate in the transaction. Mrs. Simmons promptly relayed his failure to ratify to Cooper's.
Finally, Mr. Simmons was not estopped from asserting his nonparticipation by his transfer of the mobile home to his wife's name several years before the transaction in question. Cooper's had no right to believe that either *335spouse owned the mobile home as separate property because of the existence of title in either spouse's name. If the transfer, of which Cooper's was unaware when this transaction occurred, had not taken place, Cooper's would have had no right to rely on Mr. Simmons' name on the title had he purported to transfer ownership alone. See Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 729, 787 (1974), which points out the practice of title examiners and insurers to assume that property is community property until it has been affirmatively demonstrated that the individual whose name appears on the title, acting alone, can transfer ownership.
The majority's reliance on the provisions for mobile home title certificates in RCW 46.12 as justification for the refusal to require joinder to transfer ownership interest is misplaced. RCW 46.12 does not provide the exclusive method of transferring title to the articles subject to registration under its provisions. Certificates of title are issued to help prevent theft and resale of highly mobile goods by insuring that the rightful owner's acquiescence to transfer is obtained. However, even in the case of automobiles, registration or issuance of title in an individual's name does not preclude proof of the true ownership interest of another person. "Registration and title certificates are only prima facie evidence of ownership, which evidence is rebuttable." Crawford v. Welch, 8 Wn. App. 663, 664, 508 P.2d 1039 (1973), citing Junkin v. Anderson, 12 Wn.2d 58, 120 P.2d 548, 123 P.2d 759 (1941); Gams v. Oberholtzer, 50 Wn.2d 174, 310 P.2d 240 (1957).
Particularly in this case, where Cooper's was aware of the Simmons' marital relationship and of the husband's desire and intention to negotiate the trade-in, and could not be considered a "bona fide purchaser" with no notice of a possible defense to Mrs. Simmons' transfer, the existence of a community property right could preclude sale by one spouse acting alone and overcome the provisions of the certification act. See Junkin, supra; Hartford v. Stout, 102 *336Wash. 241, 172 P. 1168 (1918); Kimball v. Donohue, 124 Wash. 505, 214 P. 1045, 217 P. 37 (1923).
A mobile home used as a married couple's family home should be characterized as a household good for purposes of RCW 26.16.030(5). The trial court's holding to the contrary in this case should have been reversed. Since the jury could not have found sufficient participation by Mr. Simmons to constitute joinder in the purported transfer of their community property mobile home, the transfer should have been considered void and the purchase agreement relying on it could not have survived. Cooper's Mobile Homes should have been ordered to return to Mrs. Simmons the title certificate to the 1969 Concord mobile home.
I dissent.
Utter, C.J., and Dolliver, J., concur with Horowitz, J.
Reconsideration denied November 3, 1980.