I respectfully dissent.
The rule announced today will greatly increase the workload of our already overburdened courts. Internal disputes between private voluntary associations involving their respective bylaws are best left outside the purview of our courts. In extending jurisdiction to these cases, this court misreads the case law and ignores the flood of litigation it is inviting.
The majority rely on decisions which lend little support to an exercise of jurisdiction here. All of the cases cited involve individuals suing organizations which have charged the individuals with misconduct or denied them some privilege. For example, in Lawless v. Brotherhood of Painters (1956) 143 Cal.App,2d 474 [300 P.2d 159], a local union officer, whom the parent union had charged with subversive activity, sued the parent for inducing a breach of contract and default on a debt. In Gonzales v. Internat. Assn, of Machinists (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 207 [298 P.2d 92], an individual regained membership in a union which had expelled him for allegedly maligning an officer of the union. In Mandracio v. Bartenders Union, Local 41 (1953) 41 Cal.2d 81 [256 P.2d 927], an individual successfully sued a union for membership which had been improperly denied him. (See also Lawson v. Hewell (1897) 118 Cal. 613 [50 P. 763] [individual member sued to enjoin organization from trying him on charges of conduct unbecoming a Mason]; Killeen v. Hotel & R. Emp. etc. League (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 87 [190 P.2d 30] [local members sued union which had charged them with conduct detrimental to union’s welfare]; Stoica v. International etc. Employees (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 533 [178 P.2d 21] [members of local sued parent union which had disciplined them for violating orders]; Dingwall v. Amalgamated Assn. etc. (1906) 4 Cal.App. 565 [88 P. 597] [individual sued union which had expelled him for conspiring against welfare of the union].) Thus, the majority cite nó case which holds that our courts should exercise jurisdiction in intraorganizational disputes which do not involve an infringement of an individual’s rights.
When an intraorganizational dispute does not cause injury to an individual, there is no compelling reason for taking our courts’ time and *359energies away from more pressing matters. The majority minimize the burden on trial courts of determining whether an organization has complied with its own rules. To resolve that issue, the court may be confronted with a substantial amount of testimony and documentary evidence.
As the present case illustrates, the trial court’s decision may not end the inquiry. The losing organization at the trial level has a right to appeal. Further, even a full round of appellate litigation may not end the courts’ involvement. In this case, if the parent body now reaffirms its original decision after stating that it has considered the California Dental Association’s (CDA) ethical standards, CDA is likely to return to superior court to complain that the parent body did not substantially comply with the court’s order. Isn’t the court required to resolve this claim? If so, a second round of litigation may begin. While we do not begrudge aggrieved individuals such continuing access to the courts, our limited resources should not be spent on these internal disputes.
The resolution of such disputes is better left to the private organizations themselves. In the present case, if CDA believes that its parent, the American Dental Association (ADA), is not complying with its own bylaws, CDA can alert other constituent members to the breach and seek compliance. If this effort is unsuccessful, and if CDA insists on maintaining standards different than those enforced by ADA, then CDA should reevaluate its affiliation with the parent body. In the long run, a policy of judicial restraint will better serve these private associations with their need for autonomy, and our judicial system with its limited resources and manpower.