dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
One purpose of NRS 41.031, Nevada’s waiver of immunity statute, is to compensate victims of governmental negligence in circumstances like those in which victims of private negligence would be compensated. Harrigan v. City of Reno, 86 Nev. 678, 475 P.2d 94 (1970). Another purpose, often overlooked though equally important, is to encourage officers and employees of the state, state agencies and political subdivisions of the state to perform their duties using reasonable care. The majority today defeats both of these public policies. Not only does the majority deny appellant the opportunity to obtain compensation from the state for injuries that may well have resulted from governmental negligence, but in doing so, the majority unwittingly promotes “willful blindness” as a means by which the state can avoid tort liability. Officers and employees will now be encouraged to close their eyes to hazardous conditions they confront while performing their duties.
Appellant has alleged that respondent school district had actual knowledge of the hazardous pool of water inside the school building. Construing the pleadings and documentary evidence in favor of appellant, I perceive a genuine issue of material fact *11concerning the school district’s knowledge of the pool of water. See Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 105 Nev. 291, 774 P.2d 432 (1989). Moreover, a summary judgment motion should not be granted if there is any possibility that the factual aspects of the case will look diiferent at trial from the evidence tendered in support of and against the motion. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Here, discovery and other pretrial procedures may well disclose additional evidence sufficient to persuade a trier of fact of the truth of appellant’s allegation. Summary judgment was thus improper.